I. Reply to the question
JUSTICE AND MERCY
I. Reply to the question 63 Reply to the question:
Someone27 who adopts the first view discussed in q. 1 [nn. 9–27] will say that mercy is a part of justice in the first sense, that is, in the sense of what befits God's goodness, since it befits God's goodness to be merciful.
64 But if instead we adopt the second view [nn. 28–36], it is clear that justice and mercy are not formally the same, since justice has the divine goodness as its first object, whereas mercy concerns something in a creature—leaving aside the justice (iustum) that can exist in a creature, that is, what the creature demands, since there is no mercy in God with respect to what is just in a creature in this way. Now x and y do not have distinct first objects unless there is some distinction or formal non-identity between x and y. Nonetheless, this formal non-identity is compatible with unqualified identity, as I explained in Book I, distinction 13 [nn. 40–2] and distinction 8 [n. 209].
65 Now if you ask about the order of justice and mercy, understood in this way, justice is unqualifiedly prior in terms of their objects, because the object of justice is unqualifiedly prior to the object of mercy.28
66 But in terms of justice and mercy themselves as intrinsic to God, the only way in which there is an order between them is the way in which other perfections that are not formally identical are characterized as having an order: if there were a real distinction between them, one would be said to inhere in a prior way, and consequently that one is prior to the other in accordance with the distinction that does exist between them. And justice is prior to mercy in terms of this possible priority, in keeping with what Anselm says in Proslogion 11: "Mercy is born from justice."
II. Replies to the preliminary arguments 67 Reply to the first argument [n. 60]: Cassiodorus extends "two things" to apply to what are two in a certain respect, as I explained in Book I, distinction 8, as I mentioned before. One need not understand "things" as meaning realities and formalities, since the distinction of one thing from another is similar to that of one reality from another or one formality from another.
68 In reply to the second argument [n. 61] it is said29 that 'mercy' connotes something different from 'justice,' even though mercy and justice are unqualifiedly the same.
27 Thomas Aquinas, Sent. IV d. 46 q. 2 a. 1 qc. 1 in corp.; Richard Middleton, Sent. IV d. 46 princ. 2 q. 1 in corp., q. 2 in corp.
28 Cf. Richard Middleton, Sent. IV d. 46 princ. 2 q. 2 in corp. and ad 2.
29 Richard Middleton, Sent. IV d. 46 princ. 2 q. 1 in corp., q. 3 in corp.
ORDINATIO IV, D. , QQ. –
But against this: this connotation does not require any such distinction between mercy and justice as they are in themselves, but only as they are understood and signified, because that is what connotation is concerned with. The argument, however, requires that there be some distinction between them as causes of distinct effects.
Nor is this [difference in connotation] sufficient for a difference in reason, as he claims,30 since a relation of reason is not that in virtue of which an effect is really brought about; indeed, in no case does a real distinction in an effect depend on a relation of reason in the cause, as I proved in Book I, distinction 13 [n. 39]. Now this distinction in the effects depends essentially on a distinction in the cause; therefore, it is not a distinction of reason alone.
So in response to that argument I concede that just as in God intellect is not formally will and vice versa, even though one is the same as the other in terms of the truest identity of simplicity, so too justice is not formally the same as mercy or vice versa. And because of this formal non-identity one can be the proximate principle of some external effect of which the other is not a formal principle, just as if they were two things, since being a formal principle belongs to something insofar as it has such-and-such a formal character.
Against this: the divine being is supremely actual; therefore, it includes every divine perfection. But it would not include every divine perfection if there were such a formal distinction in God, since whatever is formally distinct from the divine being is in God actually; and consequently as distinct it is an act in God, and so the essence as distinct does not include every act.
Also, if there are distinct real formalities in God, it follows that there are distinct realities and thus distinct things. Proof of the first inference: each formality is distinct in virtue of its own proper reality.
Reply to the first argument [n. 72]: the divine being unitively contains every actuality of the divine essence. Now items that are contained without any distinction are not contained unitively, since there is no union without any distinction; nor are unqualifiedly really distinct items unitively contained, since they are contained in a manifold or dispersed way. So this word 'unitively' involves some sort of distinction between the items contained, a distinction sufficient for union,31 and yet such a union as is incompatible with any composition and aggregation of distinct items. And this cannot obtain unless there is both formal non-identity and real identity.
30 Ibid., d. 46 princ. 2 q. 1 in corp.
31 That is, the items contained must be distinct enough that we can speak of them as being united— made one or brought together as one.
JUSTICE AND MERCY
75 So in reply to the argument, I concede that the divine essence contains every actuality, and consequently every formality, but not as formally the same, since if they were formally the same the divine essence would not unitively contain them.
76 And if you should say that the divine essence contains them to the full extent that they can be contained, that's true as far as it can be for something of a single intelligible character: but nothing that is of a single intelligible character can contain multiple formally non-identical items more perfectly than unitively.
77 In reply to the second argument [n. 73] it can be said that there are as many realities and as many things in God as there are formalities, but each reality exists only in a certain respect, as I showed elsewhere.32 Alternatively, one could deny the inference
"multiple real formalities, therefore multiple realities" just as one denies the inference
"a plurality of divine persons, therefore a plurality of deities"—but the first reply is more real.33
78 As for the argument for the negative [n. 62], it proves the true identity of anything in God to anything else, speaking of whatever is intrinsic to God. But from this it does not follow that everything in God is formally the same as everything else, since true identity—indeed the very truest identity, which is sufficient for something's being altogether simple—is compatible with formal non-identity, as I explained in the question I mentioned earlier: Book I, distinction 8 [n. 209].
32 Cf. Ordinatio I d. 13 nn. 34–5.
33 "more real": presumably, more grounded in the real or metaphysical domain, instead of the conceptual or logical domain.
Quodlibetal Questions q. 18
"Does an exterior act add any goodness or badness to an interior act?"
The next question concerns the relation of the interior act of the will to the exterior act: does an exterior act add any goodness or badness to an exterior act?
Argument for the negative:
What is not voluntary is not good or bad. And the exterior act as distinct from the interior act is not voluntary, since it derives its voluntariness entirely from the interior act. Therefore, the exterior act has no goodness or badness in its own right; and it would not add goodness or badness [to the interior act] unless it had some such goodness or badness in its own right. Therefore, etc.
On the contrary:
Acts that are prohibited by distinct negative commandments have their own distinct character as illicit. And in fact an exterior act and an interior act are prohibited by distinct commandments, as is clear in the case of the commandments
"You shall not commit adultery" [Exodus 20:14] and "You shall not covet [your neighbor's wife]" [Exodus 20:17], and likewise in the case of the commandments
"You shall not steal" [Exodus 20:15] and "You shall not covet what belongs to your neighbor" [Exodus 20:17], etc.
This question poses a greater difficulty with respect to the moral goodness of an act, since it seems quite clear that there is a distinct natural goodness (however exactly we are to understand natural goodness) for acts that are distinct in nature. Now it is evident that the interior act and the exterior act are distinct in nature. Indeed, these acts are immediately elicited by distinct powers: the interior act by the will, the exterior act by some exterior power, albeit through the will's command.
Second, the difficulty is not in understanding the two acts when they are diverse— whether in diverse supposits (say, if one person has the interior act and another person has the exterior act) or in the same supposit (say, if someone at one time has only the interior act and at another time only the exterior act)—but rather in understanding them when they are conjoined, as when the exterior act follows from the interior act in one and the same person.