II. Replies to the preliminary arguments
ORDINATIO II, D. , Q.
the ten commandments), either way, that sevenfold division of capital sins would not be adequate. For in the first way, the seven capital sins would have to be different from those [in the traditional classification], since faithlessness and despair are properly opposed to the sevenfold [list of virtues] and are not included within any of the seven [on the traditional list of capital sins], whereas in the second way, there would need to be ten capital sins, corresponding to ten violations of the Decalogue.
So the traditional division should not be regarded as adequate to encompass all bad acts: those sins are not the ultimate21 roots [of all sinful acts] and perhaps not even the principal sins, but perhaps they are very common to other sins as occasions for sinning.
II. Replies to the preliminary arguments
Replies to the preliminary arguments.
To the first argument [n. 25] I say that Augustine is speaking of the unqualifiedly first sin, which was an inordinate friendship-willing. And that was indeed presumption, and I concede that that presumption was the unqualifiedly first sin, but not presumption as the first species of pride, which is the proper sense of the term.
To the second argument, concerning the division in 1 John ("All that is in the world," etc.) [n. 26], from the fact that he begins with "All that is in the world" it is clear that he means "what is alluring to human beings who dwell in the world." Thus, the sins that human beings generally commit are encompassed by that threefold classification. But the angel's first sin, the spiritual sin by which the angels initially sinned, need not be encompassed by this carnal sin. Indeed, if we have to classify that sin of desire in the second step [n. 44], it would be more appropriate to classify it as lust of the eyes. For just as in us immoderate desires for some beautiful visible thing pertain to the lust of the eyes, so in the angels an immoderate desire for something delightful ought to pertain to the lust of the eyes.
In reply to the third argument [n. 27], it is clear that that argument by elimination, based on the sevenfold classification of capital sins, is not sufficient to include their act of desire, unless we assign it to one of them taken in an extended sense.22 And if we do that, I can concede that that sin is assigned to lust (luxuria), just as every inordinate desire for something delightful qua delightful belongs to the lust of the eyes (concupiscentia oculorum).23
To the fourth argument [n. 28] I say that there was not just one sin; there were many sins, as I said in distinction 5.24
21 Reading primae (AVNYOQ) for the edition's primo.
22 "unless we assign it to one of them taken in an extended sense": nisi per quamdam reductionem.
23 Cf. nn. 71 and 75.
24 Cf. dd. 4–5 n. 45.