I. Reply to both questions
ORDINATIO II, D. , QQ. –
Also, an inferior nature—for example, an irrational nature—has a principle of tending necessarily to that which is rightly suited to it according to its nature.
Therefore, the will also has a principle of necessarily tending toward justice, which is suited to the will in virtue of its nature.
The Master holds the negative in the text, citing Jerome's claim in his commentary on Ezekiel that synderesis is the higher part of reason.4 So synderesis is in the higher part of reason, and therefore in the intellect, which tends toward contemplation.
Question 2: "Is conscience in the will?"
Second, I ask whether conscience is in the will.
Arguments for the affirmative:
The Letter to the Hebrews speaks of "a good conscience."5 Goodness belongs to the will; therefore, so does conscience.
Furthermore, if conscience were in the intellect, someone who was more knowledgeable in the domain of action would be more conscientious. The consequent is false; therefore, so is the antecedent.6
Arguments for the negative:
Ecclesiastes 7:23: "For your conscience knows that you have cursed others,"7 etc.
This is also evident from the acts of conscience, which are bearing witness, accusing, judging, etc.,8 all of which belong to reason and intellect. Therefore, etc.
I. Reply to both questions A. Henry of Ghent's view
One view is that the law of nature contains the natural principles for acting. See
Henry, Quodlibet I, q. 18.
I argue against this.
First, I argue against what he says about synderesis. If synderesis has an elicited act necessarily tending toward good and resisting evil, and there is no such thing in the will, it follows that synderesis is not in the will. Proof of the premise: I showed in Book I, distinction 1 [nn. 80, 143–6], that when an end is presented, the will does not necessarily enjoy it; nor can any capacity or power or habit in the will be a principle
4 Peter Lombard, Sent. II d. 39 c. 3 n. 3, citing Jerome, In Ezechielem proph. I.1, 6–7.
5 Hebrews 13:18, "We are sure that we have a good conscience, willing to act well in all things."
6 Cf. Henry of Ghent, Quodl. I q. 18 in corp.
7 "others": reading aliis with S, to conform to the Vulgate text, against the edition's ei, "him."
8 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST I q. 79 a. 13 in corp.
SYNDERESIS AND CONSCIENCE
of necessarily enjoying [an end]; therefore, neither can any such thing be a necessary principle of willing in accordance with practical principles, which are taken from the end.
14 Furthermore, if there were some such capacity or power or portion in the will that by an elicited act necessarily tended toward good and resisted evil, it would be supreme in the will as a whole, since the will itself has to do with the ultimate end, from which the first practical principles are taken. Therefore, any inferior power or portion of the will would be under the control of this supreme power, in such a way that when the supreme power moved, the inferior portion or power would obey it and move in conformity with it. Therefore, the supreme power would prevent any sin in the will, since, being itself moved necessarily, it would move the whole will necessarily—for the whole will would be moved as it is moved. And if the whole will were right, there would be no sin.
15 I also argue against what he says about conscience. First, an appetitive habit is not generated from a single act, but conscience is [generated] from a single practical syllogism manifestly deducing some conclusion from first practical principles. Therefore, conscience is not an acquired appetitive habit. It is also evident that conscience is not innate, or a portion, or a power.
16 Furthermore, what is apt to be caused by a certain cause cannot be caused by another cause unless the latter virtually contains the perfection of the former. A habit of the will is apt to be caused by an act of the will as its proper cause; therefore, it cannot be caused by another act unless that act virtually contains in itself an act of the will. But an act of the intellect does not virtually contain in itself an act of the will, according to him,9 because an act of the will is more perfect. Therefore, the intellect cannot, by an act of its own, cause a "weight" in the will of a sort that is a quasi-habit of the will.10
17 Furthermore, either the will can fail to receive that weight, in which case the intellect is not a sufficient cause of that weight—for when a receptive patient is in the required proximity to a sufficiently acting cause, the effect follows11—or else it cannot fail to receive it, in which case, as long as reason is actually considering [its object], the will cannot overthrow that weight, since reason has no less necessity in causing this weight than in conserving it.
18 Furthermore, either it is necessary that the will act in accordance with this weight that has been given to it, or it is not. If it is necessary, the will is not free, because the agent cause of this weight is a natural cause; therefore, its effect is also a natural form; therefore, something that necessarily acts in accordance with this weight does not 9 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. I q. 14 in corp.
10 Scotus takes the idea of a "weight" in the will that functions as a habit from Henry of Ghent, Quodl. IX q. 5 in corp.
11 Reading sequitur (VYOQ) for the edition's est, "exists."