II. Replies to the preliminary arguments
LOVE OF NEIGHBOR
19 So from this it is clear in what way the act is necessary in virtue of the nature of the habit, if an act ought to be elicited by means of that habit: necessary in the sense that an act cannot be elicited [from charity] either as private or as contrary to an act [of love] toward a neighbor.
20 And in virtue of the nature of the commandment, which goes beyond the habit, it is required that one elicit an act positively, or at least not contrarily, concerning one's neighbor, lest by demerit one deserve the destruction of the habit that concerns God.
C. Who is the neighbor who is to be loved out of charity?
21 On the third topic I say that one's neighbor is anyone whose friendship is pleasing to the Beloved, that is, anyone by whom God is pleased to be loved. After all, it is not right or rational for me to will that the one whom I love above all else be loved also by another by whom he does not will to be loved, or whose love is not pleasing to him.
22 So since there is no doubt that the love of the blessed10 is pleasing to him, I ought to will absolutely that he be loved by them; and because there is doubt about every individual wayfarer, I ought to will that he be loved by any one of them on the condition that it pleases him to be loved by them either for the time being or at some time at which it pleases him to be loved by them.
23 But concerning wayfarers in general, because it should always be assumed that some are good people whose love is pleasing to him, or not displeasing, it makes sense to will absolutely that God be loved by them in company with oneself.11
24 Now concerning the damned—either demons or human beings who are displeasing to God beyond their term [of wayfaring]—it is not the case that I ought to will that they love God.12
II. Replies to the preliminary arguments 25 In reply to the first preliminary argument [n. 2] it is clear how in this case there is just one object. As for the argument that the distinctive character of goodness is not the same in God as it is in one's neighbor, I say that the distinctive character of goodness in one's neighbor is not the characteristic that terminates an act of charity as its object; rather, that role is played by the character of the divine goodness. For even if there is a tending toward the goodness of one's neighbor, that is only by way of a reflex act, which always tends further toward the object of the direct act, as I explained earlier [n. 15].
10 "of the blessed" = NQ; other MSS have "of the good."
11 literally: "an act of willing absolutely that God be co-loved by them can be had."
12 Only AZB include this sentence.
ORDINATIO III, D. , Q. UN.
The reply to the second argument [n. 3] is evident on the same basis. For this virtue
[i.e., charity] has God alone as its intrinsically satisfying object, but it can have something created as a proximate object in a reflex act. Thus perhaps the heavenly vision can have some elicited act concerning something created, yet not stopping there, but tending further toward God.
To the third argument [n. 6] I say that through the habit of a principle one tends toward the principle in accordance with the principle's own truth, which it has in virtue of its terms; through the habit of a conclusion one tends toward the conclusion in accordance with the truth of its own that the conclusion has, distinct from the truth of the principle. Things are otherwise in the case we're concerned about here: there is only one goodness that is the basis for tending both toward God in himself and toward one's neighbor as he in turn tends toward God. For the goodness of a neighbor does not move me any more than if a straw could love God; but if I love
God perfectly, I will that he be loved by everything that is capable of loving him ordinately and whose love is pleasing to him. Nor is there generally any likeness between the objects of the intellect, which are [simply] representations, and the objects of the will, which are such as to draw or entice.