I. Reply to the question
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result of these repeated [correct] dictates, prudence will be generated in the intellect; and yet what will be generated in the will is not moral virtue, but in fact vice.
Fifth, an act of scorning all things for God's sake is difficult and accords with right reason; therefore, there can be a virtue that inclines to that act. So a poor person3 who scorns all things for God's sake evidently has a virtue by which he is so inclined. But such a person cannot have generosity, as is obvious, since he does not have the matter of that virtue; for he has no money to give away. Similarly, many who are not poor have other virtues.
Sixth, marital fidelity is evidently a virtue, because it is a kind of chastity. And yet marital fidelity exists apart from virginity, which is also evidently a virtue.
Seventh, magnanimity is a virtue, and it is evidently incompatible with humility, since a magnanimous person regards himself as worthy of great honors, whereas a humble person regards himself as worthy of small honors, because he has little worth in his own eyes.
For the affirmative:
See Ethics VI and Augustine, On the Trinity VI.4.4
I. Reply to the question
This question encompasses a number of topics: (1) the connection of the moral virtues with each other, both in terms of their genera and in terms of the species of those genera; (2) the connection of each moral virtue with prudence; (3) the connection of the moral virtues with the theological virtues; and (4) the connection of the theological virtues with each other.
A. The connection of the moral virtues with each other
1. HENRY OF GHENT'S VIEW
a. Exposition of the view
On the first topic, according to one writer,5 the Philosopher says in Ethics VII [1145a15–1145b20] that one must distinguish four levels in every genus of goodness or badness. The Philosopher calls the first of these (namely, the beginning)6 perseverance. The second level is continence, the third is temperance, and at the fourth level he speaks of "heroic virtue." At the first two levels there is no virtue, but merely an imperfect disposition that is apt to develop into perfect virtue.
At the third level there is virtue as predicated in the general sense (communiter dicta),
3 From the context it is clear that Scotus has in mind someone who has embraced poverty voluntarily.
4 Aristotle, Nic. Eth. VI.13, 1145a1–2: "For as soon as the single virtue of prudence is present, all
[virtues] will be present." Augustine, De Trin. VI.4.6: "Although the virtues that exist in the human soul are in one way understood individually, in fact they cannot be separated from each other at all. Thus, people who are equal in, say, courage, are also equal in prudence, justice, and temperance."
5 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. V q. 16 in corp.
6 Q omits the parenthetical phrase.
ARE THE MORAL VIRTUES CONNECTED?
whereas at the fourth level there is virtue as predicated according to excellence and in a superexcellent degree.7
12 Accordingly, one view8 concedes that there is no connection at the first two levels, since one can devote effort to the acts of one virtue and not another and thus acquire both perseverance and continence in the domain of one virtue but not in the domain of another virtue.9
13 This view draws a distinction at the third level: at this level virtue can be inchoate, middling, or perfect.10
14 There need be no connection when it comes to inchoate or middling virtues, for the same reason as before [n. 12]: someone can devote his effort to acts of one virtue at these levels but not to those of another virtue.
15 But at the third level of this third level, and much more at the fourth level, there is a connection.
16 Several proofs of this claim are offered:
First, "A virtue that can stray from its proper end and fail is not a perfect and genuine virtue. As Augustine says in his sermon on the works of mercy, 'Charity that can be abandoned was never genuine to begin with.'"11 Now a moral virtue that existed by itself, apart from other virtues, could stray from its proper end; therefore, it would not be a genuine virtue. Proof of the minor premise: a single virtue does not make the will resolute with respect to desirable things that the virtue is not intrinsically concerned with; therefore, if the will has only that virtue, it can go astray concerning other desirable things that are presented to it. But as a result of its going astray concerning other things it can go astray concerning the object of that one virtue. Therefore, etc.
7 NYQ omit "as predicated according to excellence and."
8 Henry of Ghent Quodl. V q. 17 in corp.
9 The edition reads, "Accordingly, one view concedes that there is no virtue at the first two levels, because in the habits of the virtues one can devote effort to the acts of one virtue and not another and thus acquire both perseverance and temperance, and one [virtue?] and not another." This cannot be correct: first, the point has to be that there is no connection at the first two levels (that's what the argument from uneven moral effort establishes); second, temperance is a virtue, and what is possessed at the second level is not a virtue but continence; and third, if indeed we are to supply 'virtue' in the last clause, the view would be saying that at the first two levels someone can acquire one virtue but not another, but we've already been told that there is no virtue at the first two levels. (And if we're not to supply 'virtue' in the last clause, I don't know what feminine noun we're meant to supply that would make any sense.) My reading follows Q (with some support from ZB), adding only "and continence" from Z. (If one were transcribing Q one would add
"and continence" in angle brackets anyway, because the context requires it and there is a 'both' (tam) without its correlative 'and' (quam).) 10 In fact, Henry distinguishes only inchoate and perfect virtue at the third level, as Scotus himself reports in Lectura III d. 36 n. 13.
11 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. V q. 17 in corp. The quotation is actually from Paulinus of Aquileia, De salutaribus documentis c. 7.
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An example will make this clear.12 Someone who has temperance and not courage is not resolute when it comes to facing frightening situations. So if frightening situations are put before him—say, he must either commit fornication or suffer death— then he can go astray concerning what is frightening, and, as a result of this, also concerning matters within the domain of temperance. For such a person will choose not to suffer death rather than not to commit fornication, since he is not resolute concerning such frightening suffering.
A second argument is offered for this same conclusion. It is characteristic of virtue that it acts with pleasure (as we read in Ethics II [1106a15–17]), but one virtue apart from another does not enable a person to act with pleasure. That is clear in the example just given: someone tempted by intemperance, if he lacks courage, does not have pleasure in fleeing things that belong to intemperance; consequently, someone is not perfectly temperate unless he is also courageous. One could offer a parallel example about a greedy person: if someone is greedy, he will choose to preserve money rather than to preserve temperance.
And a third argument: perfect virtue leads one to the end of virtue, since leading to the end is a perfection in moral matters. But no single virtue, apart from any other virtue, leads one to the [ultimate] end; nor does it confer political happiness.13
Therefore, etc.
This position is confirmed by Gregory, Moralia XXII.1: "Someone who is thought to be strong in one virtue is genuinely strong when he is not subject to vices in some other sphere." And in XXI.3: "One virtue apart from another is either not a perfect virtue or not a virtue at all." And in his commentary on the beginning of Ethics VI, the Commentator asks, "In the absence of temperance, how will there be justice?"14— as though saying outright that there is no way justice can exist. And in commenting on the claim in Ethics VI [1140b11–12] that "We call 'temperance' by that name as what preserves prudence,'" the Commentator remarks, "The virtues are sisters to each other," and so forth.15 Look it up there.
The same thing is proved through the Gloss on Revelation 21:16, "The city lies foursquare." Look it up there.16
12 The reading in the edition does not give the sort of example required here. I have followed Q, which does.
13 Literally, "nor does it make someone a political man." The contrast between complete happiness and this-worldly, "political," happiness is present in the text of Henry of Ghent on which Scotus is drawing.
(For the last sentence I read sed una virtus sine alia non perducit ad finem nec virum politicum facit [Q] against the edition's sed nulla virtus sine alia perducit ad finem, nec sese de se nec virum politicum.)
14 Eustratius, In Eth. ad Nic. VI c. 2.
15 Ibid., c. 6: "We will say first that the virtues are sisters to each other and greatly resemble each other. . . . And it is not at all surprising if the essence (ratio) of one of them brings forth the others."
16 "The four sides are the four principal virtues, no one of which should exceed any other in a human being."
ARE THE MORAL VIRTUES CONNECTED?
b. Refutation of Henry's view
There are many arguments against this view.
First, according to you, the first two levels (perseverance and continence) need not be connected, and likewise the first two levels of the third level (imperfect or middling virtue). I argue along the same lines regarding the third level: someone who has virtue at the first two levels of the third level can devote effort to attaining the third level of one virtue and not of another. For someone who has a habit for acting with respect to those objects is no less disposed [toward acquiring a further degree of virtue] than is someone else who has no habit [with respect to those objects] at all; so if someone in the beginning stages was able to devote effort to the object of one virtue and not another, someone who already has the habit of one virtue as far as the first two levels of the third level is that much more able to devote his effort to the object of one virtue and not another, and thus he can acquire one perfect virtue without acquiring another. Confirmation: it might be that no opportunity arises for him to act concerning the matter of another virtue, and so he is not inclined17 to further acts in that domain as he is to the acts in the other domain in which he is already habituated.
23 Now one might reply18 that even if the matter of another virtue does not arise in the external world, it nonetheless arises in the imagination, and one must choose rightly with respect to those things, or else the acquired virtue (of whatever level) will not be preserved. On the contrary: the intellect can just not consider those things but instead consider only those things to which the habit of virtue inclines one—for according to the received view, the intellect cannot distinctly understand two things at the same time.19 Or if those other things that belong to another virtue do occur to one, the will cannot choose either well or badly concerning them, but it can command one not to consider them and to consider instead the things that belong to the virtue that one has. And thus my point holds.
24 Another (and better) approach20 [to defending Henry's view] is to say that it is possible for any habit, however perfect of its kind, to be acquired through frequently elicited acts concerning the object of one virtue, without any other virtue's being acquired; but that habit, however intense it is, will not be a virtue because it does not meet the definition of virtue unless it is conformed to other acquired virtues in the same person. For the harmony of one habit with another is necessary for any habit to meet the definition of virtue.
25 This view would be quite easy to refute if moral virtue were a per se being or per se one in the category of quality.
17 Reading nec inclinatur for the edition's ut inclinetur (AB).
18 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. V q. 25 in corp.
19 Cf. Scotus, Ordinatio IV d. 1 [q. 1 nn. 22–3].
20 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II q. 65 a. 1. in corp and ad 1.
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But since I don't think that's true, as I will discuss below [nn. 27–30], I will instead argue as follows: a virtue, along with all the things that belong to the per se character of virtue, is generated through acts that conform to right reason. Thus, the only thing that is required for a virtuous habit or virtuous act, beyond the nature of the habit or act itself, is conformity to right reason. This is proved from the statement in Ethics II [1106b36–1107a2] that "virtue is a habit concerned with choice as determined by reason." But there need be no harmony with other virtues coexisting in the same agent in order for a habit or act to conform to the right reason in accordance with which the agent chooses. The assumption is clearly true, for what one needs in order to choose rightly concerning the matter of temperance is a prior correct dictate of reason concerning that possible choice, and there can be a prior correct dictate concerning the matter of one virtue without any correct dictate whatsoever concerning the matter of another virtue. Therefore, etc.
Second, it follows from what you say [n. 22] that every virtue will be the ground of some other habit's being a virtue; the consequent is false; therefore, so is the antecedent. Proof of the inference: if this habit is the virtue of temperance only because it coexists with some other virtue—say, courage—then it follows that the virtue of courage, insofar as it coexists with this habit, is the ground of that habit's being the virtue of temperance; and by parity of reasoning, temperance as coexisting with the other habit is, conversely, the ground for that other habit's being the virtue of courage. Accordingly, each virtue will be the ground for every other virtue's being a virtue. The consequent is false, because it follows that something is a virtue before it's a virtue, and thus no virtue will be first.
Proof of these points:
Let's take that habit in the category of quality that ought to be temperance. If it can't be a virtue unless the virtue of courage coexists with it, then courage will be a virtue before temperance is a virtue. But, ex hypothesi, courage can't be a virtue unless it coexists with the virtue of temperance.21 So courage will be a virtue before it is a virtue.
That there will be no first virtue is proved by the same means: for temperance won't be the first virtue, since, ex hypothesi, it can't exist unless all the other virtues as virtues exist along with it; and no other virtue will be first either, because no other virtue can be a virtue unless temperance as a virtue coexists with it.
One might offer a probable argument22 in response to this point by saying that something can be a virtue when it is accompanied by all other virtues, and yet qua this sort of habit it precedes another habit, but not qua virtue; rather, all habits, whether generated prior or posterior, have the character of virtue, each through its
21 "temperance" NYSZB; the edition has "courage."
22 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. V q. 17 ad arg.
ARE THE MORAL VIRTUES CONNECTED?
own nature and through the mutual concomitance of them all. Against this: then it follows that a single act will generate all the moral virtues as virtues, which seems untenable.
Proof of the inference: suppose that the habit that is temperance is generated, and subsequently the habit that is courage is generated, and at a similar level; yet neither of these habits will be a virtue until each of them is at the level at which it is a virtue.
So either a given habit is before another or not. If so, I have established my claim that one habit can exist without another, and so the virtues are not connected. If not, then the habits will become virtues through a single act, which seems untenable, since surely that act will be the act of some particular virtue. And just as it would be an act of some particular virtue if the virtue had already been generated, so too would it be such as to generate some particular virtue and not all of them.23
31 Moreover, third, it seems more reasonable for two species of the same genus of moral virtue to be connected than two genera, since someone who has a virtue is more inclined to behave in a well-ordered way concerning matter more closely connected with that virtue than concerning more remote matter. Now the matters of species of the same genus are more closely connected than are the matters of diverse genera.
But species of the same genus of virtue are not connected: for example, virginity and marital fidelity. Therefore, etc.24
2. SCOTUS'S OWN VIEW
32 Regarding this first topic, I concede that the moral virtues are not necessarily connected either according to the genera that are typically identified (justice, courage, and temperance) or according to the more general division that I identified earlier25
(virtue disposing the affection with respect to oneself and virtue disposing the affection with respect to another).
33 One can offer a persuasive argument for this conclusion along the following lines.
Virtue is a human perfection. But it is not total perfection—otherwise a single moral virtue would suffice. Now when there are several partial perfections for something, it can be unqualifiedly perfect in terms of one perfection and unqualifiedly imperfect in terms of another. This is evident in the case of human beings, for whom there are several perfections of the bodily organs. Someone can have one such perfection in the highest degree but entirely lack another: for example, someone can be in the best possible condition in terms of vision or touch but lack hearing altogether.
So someone can have a perfection in the highest degree with respect to the matter
23 "not" QZ.
24 The edition follows A against all the other MSS in reading ergo non omnium and adds an explanatory footnote, supple: specierum virtutes sunt connexae. This would give the reading "Therefore, it is not the case that virtues of all species are connected."
25 Cf. Ordinatio III d. 34 n. 33.
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of temperance but have nothing of the perfection that would be required with respect to the matter of some other perfection. Consequently, someone can be unqualifiedly temperate, even with respect to every act26 of temperance, and yet not be unqualifiedly moral, because he does not have all the moral virtues (just as someone is not unqualifiedly sensate if he does not have all the senses); but he is no less perfectly temperate, even though he is less perfectly moral (just as someone who does not hear is no less perfectly sighted,27 though he is less perfectly sensing).
3. REPLIES TO THE ARGUMENTS FOR HENRY'S VIEW
On this basis the reply to some of what was brought up in favor of the first view—
I mean the point that virtue can go astray [n. 16]—is straightforward. This is false concerning virtue: it is not virtue that goes astray; rather, the person who possesses virtue goes astray with respect to the matter of some other virtue because he lacks that other virtue. Nor does this mean that the virtue he does have is imperfect, because it is not that virtue's job to direct a human being in all matters, but only concerning its proper objects (just as someone who cannot see does not go astray in his hearing any more than he would if he could see, though he does go astray in sensing).
One might argue28 against this that such a disposition can be easily lost and therefore is not a virtue. I deny the antecedent. Indeed, although such an act is done against one's inclination, the good disposition is destroyed only by many sins or vices, or a few intense ones.
And on the same basis the reply to the point about acting with pleasure [n. 18] is straightforward. For he does act with pleasure as far as that matter, taken just by itself, is concerned. For example, it is pleasurable for him to refrain from an act of intemperance; but it is not pleasurable for him to expose himself to terrors, since he is not properly ordered to such things. Consequently, he commits the act of intemperance with sadness, because it is contrary to his habit; but because he would be even sadder if he had to face terrors, he avoids what is sadder and involuntarily (in a certain way) chooses what is less sad so as to avoid what is sadder. I therefore concede that such a person is imperfect and experiences sadness when he acts; but he is not imperfect, and does not experience sadness, with respect to the matter of the virtue he does possess, except only accidentally, because that matter is accompanied by other matter with respect to which he is not virtuously disposed so as to act virtuously or with pleasure in this case.
26 "act": "habit" ZBNYQ.
27 Reading sicut non-audiens non est minus perfecte videns with Q, which both continues the earlier example and provides a proper parallel for the moral case, for the edition's sicut non est minus perfectus videns nec est minus perfectus audiens, which does neither.
28 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II q. 49 a. 2 ad 3.
ARE THE MORAL VIRTUES CONNECTED?
37 On the same basis the reply to the point about the end of the moral virtues [n. 19] is straightforward: a single virtue does not lead one perfectly to the end of the virtues, just as a single sensory power does not lead a human being perfectly to the perfect actuality of sensing. Rather, every virtue leads one to the end to the extent that it can, but all the virtues are required to lead one to the end perfectly, so that one acts virtuously and with pleasure. So I concede that a single virtue does not lead one sufficiently to the end, but it does lead one to the end sufficiently to the extent that it can, that is, to the extent that suffices for the perfection of that particular virtue.
38 In reply to the first argument, which is drawn from Saint Augustine [n. 16], I say that the Philosopher does not say in the Categories29 that a habit cannot be lost, but that it is difficult to lose. So even though virtue can be lost and thus someone who possesses it can go astray (for30 the virtue itself does not go astray, but rather the person who possesses it draws back from the peak of virtue), it nonetheless does not follow that it wasn't a virtue, even a perfect virtue, in keeping with the nature of a habit, just because one was able to lose it (with difficulty, to be sure). So what he says about charity in that passage should be interpreted to mean that someone was genuinely in a state of charity but then sinned mortally thereafter—but that wasn't the charity that genuinely joins someone to the end, that is, to happiness.
39 As for the authorities brought forward there:
One can say that Gregory [n. 20] is speaking there of the virtues as principles of merit. Understood in that way, it's true that one moral virtue apart from another is not a virtue, because one does not acquire merit through one virtue if it is not accompanied by another. For someone who has moral temperance does not acquire merit if his temperance is not accompanied by humility, or, at any rate, if he possesses the opposite vice.
40 One can reply on the same basis to the gloss on Revelation [n. 21].
41 On that same basis one can also reply to the Commentator's remark on Ethics VI that the virtues are sisters [n. 20]. Yes, sisters may help each other in their life together, but one sister is not another, and no sister essentially perfects another. In the same way, these virtues help each other a great deal; each helps preserve another.
And this is how we can interpret the claim some people31 make that one virtue is not a whole apart from another: one virtue is not preserved well apart from another, for as human beings are exposed to many temptations concerning diverse matters, an imperfection with regard to one matter can be an occasion for acting imperfectly regarding another, and a perfect disposition regarding one helps someone to act
29 "which . . . Categories" = quod adducitur de Augustino, dico quod in Praedicamentis (Q). The edition has quod adducitur ibi de beato Augustino, "Nunc autem" ibi etc., dico quod Philosophus non dicit in Praedicamentis, which combines readings from several different codices to make needless difficulties.
30 Reading enim (Q) for the edition's quidem.
31 Bonaventure, Sent. III d. 36 a. un. q. 3 in corp., ad 2.
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rightly concerning another; therefore, the virtues help each other like sisters. But no virtue is essentially required for the perfection of another virtue, in much the same way that one sister is born before32 another. And, similarly, the virtues cannot be generated33 at the same time, since there cannot be two perfect acts at the same time by which two virtues would be generated, since one perfect act of one power would impede the act of another power; [if this were in fact possible,] then [two virtues] could be generated perfectly at the same time.34
B. The connection of the moral virtues with prudence
The second topic—the connection of the moral virtues with prudence—offers two points of contention: first, the connection of each individual virtue with its own prudence; and second, the connection of all the virtues with a single prudence.
1. THE CONNECTION OF EACH INDIVIDUAL VIRTUE WITH ITS OWN PRUDENCE
a. Henry of Ghent's view (i). Exposition of the view
As for the first, it seems35 that this connection is necessary. This is proved through the Philosopher in Ethics
VII.15 [VII.10, 1151a10–14], where his view is that if the will chooses badly, the intellect dictates badly.
In the same passage he says something else to the same effect (look it up there).36,37
He says in VI.6 and 16 that "badness makes the intellect lie and err concerning practical principles" and thus it destroys prudence.38
He also says (look this up), "It is impossible for the prudent person not to be good," and vice versa.39
He also says this at the end of chapter 17 and in chapter 18.40
Also in VII.5, around the middle of the chapter.41
Furthermore, I make two assumptions: first, that the intellect cannot understand more than one thing at a time; second, that the will cannot will anything qua evil. On this basis I argue as follows: as long as the intellect's judgment about some future evil to be avoided remains intact, either the will will avoid it or it won't. If it does, then the will can't be evil (so long as the thing itself remains evil) when the intellect's judgment is right; if the will can will that thing, then it can will evil qua evil or will something uncognized.
32 Reading prius . . . quam (ZBYQ) for the edition's prius sine.
33 Et similiter virtutes non possunt generari (Q) for the edition's et semper, si non possint simul procreari.
34 NYQ omit "since one perfect act . . . at the same time."
35 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. V q. 17 in corp.
36 Aristotle, Nic. Eth. VII.10, 1151a14–16.
37 NYQ omit nn. 45–50.
38 Aristotle, Nic. Eth. VI.5, 1140b19–20; VI.13, 1144a33–6.
39 Ibid., VI.13, 1144a36–1144b1.
40 Ibid., VI.13, 1144b30–2, 1145a1–6.
41 Ibid., VII.5, 1147a25–1147b5.
ARE THE MORAL VIRTUES CONNECTED?
50 I reply that the first assumption is false in the case of two completely disparate things that are opposite to each other, as is evident by looking at various cases: one relative can neither exist nor be understood without its correlative, nor an accident without its subject, nor (all the more so) a privation—which necessarily presupposes both a subject and a suitability to the form that it lacks—without a subject suited [to possess the positive feature]. So the intellect cannot understand a privation just by itself, as the argument assumes, but only in an ultimate subject that is suitable, just as it also cannot understand one relative without its correlative or an accident without its subject. So when the intellect understands that some bad thing is to be avoided and presents this to the will, the will can elicit the act that underlies the badness—that is even necessarily somehow accompanied by badness—and yet will-against the badness. So although the intellect can understand a subject without a privation, it cannot understand a privation without a subject, since privative opposites are immediate with respect to the subject that is suited to be characterized by them.42
51 Also, drawing on De motu animalium [7, 701a11–23]: if a major premise is put forward by the practical intellect and a minor premise is taken from sense or imagination, the conclusion will be an action, so much so that one necessarily acts in accordance with it unless one is impeded. So, according to Aristotle, there is never an act altogether contrary to a dictate of reason.
52 And this is also confirmed by Augustine's commentary on Psalm [2:5], "He will speak to them in his wrath": "Confusion or darkening of the mind chases after those who transgress the law of God."43
53 What Dionysius says in On the Divine Names 4—"No one does anything with an eye to evil"—also supports this point, as does Ethics III.3 [III.2, 1110b28–30]: "Every evil person is ignorant." Wisdom [2:21] agrees with this: "Their wickedness has made them blind."
54 You should look up Henry's Quodlibet V, q. 17, to see how this supposedly works.
55 Now suppose you object to this on the basis of the condemned article that says it is an error to hold that "with both universal and particular knowledge in a given case remaining present, the will cannot will the opposite."44 Henry responds in Quodlibet
X, q. 10, that the proposition "with knowledge remaining present, the will cannot will the opposite" needs to be distinguished in terms of composition and division. In the divided sense it's false, because it signifies that the will never has the power to will the opposite, which is false.45 As for the composed sense, a further distinction has to be
42 Cf. Scotus, Ordinatio III d. 3 n. 36.
43 Augustine, Enarrat. in Psalmos ps. 2 n. 4.
44 Articuli 219 a Stephano Tempier Parisiensi episcopo damnati a. 219.
45 NYQ sensibly omit this last (redundant) clause.
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made, depending on whether the ablative absolute46 should be interpreted using 'if,'
'because,' or 'so long as.'
If we interpret it using 'because,'47 it's false, and the claim that it is an error is correct: for it signifies that correctness in knowledge or in the intellect causes correctness in the will.
But if we interpret it using 'if' or 'so long as,'48 so that the proposition indicates that one thing follows or accompanies the other, rather than that one causes the other, then according to Henry the proposition can be true and is not an error or condemned, provided that it is understood that the intellect's error is not naturally prior to the will's (for the two errors are temporally simultaneous).
Rather, the will's error is naturally prior, so much so that the intellect, considered only as it is naturally prior to an act of will, is correct; instead, with the will erring freely, the intellect is blinded. Even if this blinding is temporally simultaneous, it is naturally posterior.
He argues for this in the following way: if the first choice does not blind the intellect, neither will any subsequent choice, for the first can be every bit as bad as any subsequent choice; and if it doesn't blind the intellect when it's bad, it will never blind the intellect. And thus no actual badnesses in the will would ever blind the intellect, and so someone could be as bad as possible without any error in the intellect—which a number of authorities evidently deny.
(ii). Refutation of this view
I argue against this first on the basis of authorities:
One is Augustine's commentary on Psalm [123:3], "Perhaps they would have swallowed us up alive": "Those who know something to be evil and consent to it are thus swallowed alive, or perhaps they die."49
And on Psalm [68:23], "Let their table [become a snare before them]," he says, "What is it for them to be alive—that is, to be consenting—but that they know they ought not consent to vices? Behold, they have recognized the snare and placed their foot into it."50
And on Psalm [118:20], "My soul has yearned [to desire your judgments]," he says,
"Understanding comes first; desire follows sluggishly or not at all."
46 Translated here by "with . . . remaining present."
47 Reading quia with all the MSS but ABSZ for the edition's quia vel per si, which is obviously wrong from the context (and see the next paragraph).
48 Reading si vel dum with Q (SZBY have just dum) for the edition's quia vel dum, which has Scotus giving two completely incompatible evaluations of the interpretation using 'because' in back-to-back paragraphs.
49 Augustine, Enarrat. in Psalmos ps. 123 n. 5.
50 Ibid., ps. 68 sermo 2 n. 7.
ARE THE MORAL VIRTUES CONNECTED?
63 The authority of Ethics II [1105b2–3] favors this view.51 There the Philosopher says that "knowledge (or reason) contributes little or nothing to virtue." By contrast, if the intellect's correctness in consideration were necessarily accompanied by correct volition, then, given that knowledge contributes a great deal to consideration, it would follow that knowledge would contribute a great deal to correct willing. Indeed, something further follows: it would not make sense to try to persuade someone not to be vicious, but rather to persuade someone to give consideration in accordance with the habit of virtue, for (according to you) if the intellect gives consideration correctly in accordance with the habit of knowledge, the will cannot fail to be correct at the same time; and thus the appropriate thing to do is not to persuade someone to will rightly but to persuade someone to consider rightly.
64 Also, there are arguments from reason:
With the intellect dictating rightly, the will can choose nothing, as it can refrain from choosing what is dictated by the intellect, since reason is not moved at the same time by two distinct objects of intellect. But if the will elicits no act, no virtue is generated in it, whereas (according to you52) prudence is generated from a correct dictate. Therefore, prudence will be generated apart from any moral virtue.
65 Also, I prove that a bad choice can't blind the intellect in such a way that it errs concerning possible actions: the terms are the total cause of the knowledge of a first principle in the practical domain just as they are in the speculative domain according to Posterior Analytics I [72b24–5], and the syllogistic form is self-evident to every intellect (as is clear from the definition of a perfect syllogism in Prior Analytics
I [24b22–4]). Therefore, once the intellect has apprehended and composed the terms, and made a syllogistic deduction, it necessarily acquiesces in the conclusion knowledge of which depends precisely on knowledge of the terms of the principle and knowledge of the syllogistic deduction. Therefore, it is impossible for the will to cause an intellect that is considering principles through a syllogistic deduction to err regarding a conclusion, let alone to err concerning the principles themselves. And so the intellect is in no way blinded so that it errs.
66 Now you might concede that conclusion and say that the will blinds the intellect by averting the intellect from correct consideration. I argue against this:
67 Averting the intellect in this way is not blinding it, for one could do so even with prudence remaining intact. It is, after all, possible for a prudent person not always to 51 Reading Ad hoc est auctoritas II Ethicorum (Q) for the edition's Ad hoc etiam videntur esse ratio et auctoritas Philosophi II Ethicorum. The intrusion of ratio et is puzzling, because at this point Scotus is expressly arguing from authority; the arguments from reason begin in the next paragraph.
52 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. V q. 17 in corp.
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be considering the things that belong to prudence but instead sometimes voluntarily to consider other things.53
Also, the will has that willing to avert the intellect either with the correct dictate remaining present or not. If the correct dictate remains present, then the will (by your lights) is not sinning at that time, because a correct dictate remains present when it wills to avert the intellect; and thus that averting of the intellect is not a blinding that follows from sin, because as yet there is no sin. If the correct dictate does not remain present, then the will has this will to avert the intellect with some other act being present. I ask: from what source does this other act come about? It is either by chance, in which case that chance act is not a blinding that follows from sin, or else through an act of will, in which case one must posit an additional act of intellect, prior to the willing to avert the intellect—and then there will be an infinite regress, because the willing to avert the intellect took place with that posited act of intellect being present.
For it will always have to be the case that the will's willing to turn its attention to something is prior to its turning its attention to that thing; and thus if that willing was a sin, there was a bad willing with a correct dictate being present. Or if that was not the case, but instead there was always an incorrect dictate preceding that willing to avert the intellect, then there is in fact some dictate preceding every sin on the part of the will, and thus I have established my point.
Moreover, either the will chooses badly with a correct dictate remaining present, and thus I have established my point, or else, if it chooses badly with no correct dictate remaining present, it chooses on the basis of some other, incorrect, act of intellect, since in that case, by your lights, it would not sin. Therefore, that other, incorrect, act will be prior to the bad willing. Therefore, it will not be incorrect as a consequence of some other bad willing. And thus my point is established, because there is no circularity because of an infinite regress in causes and effects; and consequently the will does not blind the intellect with respect to the bad dictate that, according to you, follows from that bad willing.
Moreover, no wayfarer is wholly incorrigible; therefore, no one can be wholly in error concerning first practical principles. Proof of the inference: there are no means by 53 The text of n. 68 in the edition is found only in PZB; the editors claim that the text of the other MSS was "canceled by Duns Scotus." That text reads as follows:
Moreover, willing to avert the intellect requires an understanding that is temporally simultaneous and naturally prior. That dictate is either a correct dictate of reason that remains present, from which the will can will to avert the intellect—in which case it follows, by your lights, that this willing to avert the intellect is not a sin, because it coexists with a correct dictate—or else that act, which is previous to the willing to avert the intellect, is distinct from the correct dictate. If that distinct act is correct, the same thing follows as before, namely that the willing to avert the intellect is not a sin, and thus no blinding follows from it; by contrast, if that previous act is not correct, this will not be a case of a blinding of the intellect that follows the willing to avert the intellect, because it precedes that willing.
ARE THE MORAL VIRTUES CONNECTED?
which someone who is in error concerning first practical principles can be recalled to the good, since he will deny any premise someone might try to use to persuade him; for there can be no premise that is better known than a first practical principle.
71 Also, the damned do not assent to "God is to be hated" as true, since if they did, they would not have that worm of which the last chapter of Isaiah [66:24] says, "Their worm will not die." They would just enjoy hating God without remorse. Therefore, etc. b. Scotus's opinion
On this topic it can be said that an unqualifiedly correct dictate can remain present in the intellect without any correct choice in the will in accordance with that dictate; and thus, given that a single act of dictating correctly generates prudence, prudence will be generated in the intellect apart from any habit of moral virtue in the will.
73 And if that is the case, a question arises: how does badness blind the intellect according to those authorities [nn. 52–3]?
74 It can be said that it blinds the intellect in two ways: privatively and positively.
It does so privatively in that it averts the intellect from correct consideration. For the will, by choosing the opposite of something that has been dictated rightly, does not permit the intellect to focus very long on that correct dictate. Instead, it directs the intellect to consider arguments for the opposite (if there can be sophistical or probable arguments for the opposite) or at least to consider some other irrelevant thing, so as to avoid the actual dissatisfaction that is an element of the remorse one feels when choosing the opposite of what the intellect dictates.
75 It blinds the intellect positively in the following way. Just as a will that rightly chooses an end commands the intellect to consider the things that are necessary for that end, and the intellect by inquiring into the means ordered to that correct end generates in itself a habit of prudence, so too a will that chooses a bad end for itself (for it can indeed adopt a bad end for itself, as was explained in Book 1, d. 1 [nn. 16, 67]) commands the intellect to consider means necessary to attain that end. Augustine rightly says of this in the last chapter of City of God XIV [c. 28] that the will has its own powers, as he discusses at length in that book. That is, when the will uses its power to adopt a bad end for itself, it commands the intellect to find54 the means necessary to attain pleasant things and avoid the frightening things that are opposed to them. Now when the will has chosen rightly and the intellect dictates means to attain that rightly chosen end, the habit generated in the intellect through the will's command is prudence. Similarly, the habit acquired through the intellect's dictate concerning things ordered to a wrongly chosen end is an error and a habit directly opposed to the habit of prudence; it can be called "imprudence" or "foolishness," not just privatively but positively and contrarily. For just as a prudent person has a habit
54 "find": invenire. The edition adds vel adducere (A).
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by which he rightly chooses things ordered to an appropriate end, so this person has a habit for correctly and readily choosing means ordered to the end adopted by a bad will. And since such a habit is generated through the command of a will that chooses badly, it is to this extent true that a bad will causes blindness—not, in fact, by making the intellect err concerning any judgments, but rather by causing the intellect to possess an act or habit of considering other means to a bad end. And this whole habit is an error in the domain of action, though it is not an error that involves being mistaken in speculative thought.
There could be another matter of controversy here: given that a correct intellectual habit and a correct appetitive habit are not necessarily generated at the same time, because it is possible for someone to dictate well about particular matters but not act well concerning those same matters,55 is an intellectual habit generated without moral virtue prudence, and (conversely) is a habit generated in the appetite without the intellectual habit a moral virtue?
As for the first part of that question, it could be said that strictly speaking there is no prudence without moral virtue, because prudence is right reason concerning possible actions,56 which certainly requires correct appetite, according to Ethics VI.2
[1139a22–31]; and appetite is not correct apart from moral virtue. And if this were true, then the first dictates concerning the principles of possible actions would be correct, and yet they would not be instances of prudence, but rather seeds from which prudence can grow. But even if there were a habit that dictated correctly concerning the means that are necessary for an end adopted by the will, it would still not be prudence.
One can identify two correct intellectual habits concerning possible actions, neither of which would be prudence.57 One such habit would precede correct choice of a particular end; that would not be prudence because prudence concerns means that are ordered to an end. For prudence is a deliberative habit, and deliberation is not about the end but about things that are for the end.58 Because it is deliberative it is also a discursive habit, and thus [it deliberates] about the things it considers discursively. Now once a good end has been chosen, not merely in general but even in 55 "because . . . same matters": quia contingit bene dictare circa aliqua non bene agendo circa illa (Q). For aliqua . . . illa the edition reads hoc . . . illa, which suggests, wrongly, that the good judgment concerns one topic and the failure of good action a different one.
56 Cf. Auctoritates Aristotelis 12, 112: "Prudence is right reason concerning possible actions." Cf. Scotus,
Metaph. VI q. 1 n. 68: " 'Reason concerning possible actions' in the definition [of prudence] should be understood as meaning reason that gives direction perfectly, immediately, and in particular concerning possible actions. By contrast, moral science has to do with possible actions in a different way, namely, universally, and of itself it is insufficient to give direction concerning possible actions."
57 Posset igitur poni duplex habitus intellectualis circa agibilia rectus et neuter esset prudentia = Q. I do not know how to make sense of the edition's Posset ergo poni duplex habitus intellectualis circa agibilia—et rectus et neuter—prudentia.
58 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III.5, 1112b11–12.
ARE THE MORAL VIRTUES CONNECTED?
particular—for example, "One ought to live chastely"—there could be a habit of the intellect that makes correct dictates about things that are for the end but is not accompanied by correct choice. That habit would be prudence as far as its object goes, because it would be right reason concerning things that are for the end, but it would be lacking one condition, namely, it would not be in harmony or conformity59 with right appetite concerning those same objects.
79 In keeping with this approach one would have to say that whatever habit is generated in the intellect, even if it is practical and correct, whether it concerns a particular or universal end or the means necessary to attain a particular chosen end, it is not prudence if it is not accompanied by correct choice on the part of the will concerning those same objects.
80 Someone might argue against this, along the same lines as the earlier objection in the discussion of the connection of the moral virtues [nn. 26–30], that in this harmony it would follow that prudence constitutes moral virtue and vice versa, and thus both habits (prudence and a moral virtue) would be ultimately generated through a single act; but that act could not be an act of both intellect and will, but only of one or the other; therefore, it could not generate a habit in both of them. In response, it could be said that it is not necessarily for one moral virtue to conform to another, because no moral virtue is a rule for another; but it is necessary for each moral virtue to conform to prudence, because it is part of the definition of virtue that it is a habit concerned with choice that accords with right reason. And for that reason a habit can be constituted in moral being through prudence by way of concomitance, and prudence through a moral habit, but this is not the case for the moral virtues in relation to each other.
81 And then it would be conceded that one habit would be generated as prudence and another as a moral virtue at the same time, and that they would be generated by a single act,60 which ultimately generates either moral virtue or prudence. For it is absurd in the domain of morals that a single act should ultimately generate two moral virtues.
82 But this is not absurd in the case of prudence and temperance, because the very act that generates prudence qua regulative also generates temperance qua regulated. For temperance has the character of a virtue only as something regulated by reason, and so [the act that generates the habit of prudence in reason thereby also] generates temperance as a virtue. One cannot argue in the same way about temperance and courage, because courage is not the rule of temperance.
83 It would therefore be said that there is no relation of priority involved in their constituting each other as virtue, as though one virtue were prior and caused the 59 BNYQ omit "or conformity."
60 The edition follows A alone in reading "habit or act."
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other to be a virtue; rather, the intellectual habit of prudence and the moral virtue corresponding to it are naturally simultaneous.
And if one asks, "Through what are these two habits generated in perfect being?"—
I concede that they are generated through a single act, whether that act is a correct choice (since apart from a correct choice of an end there is no intellectual habit in conformity with right reason, and therefore no prudence) or an act of the intellect
(since apart from a correct dictate of the intellect there is no choice in conformity with right reason, and therefore no virtuous choice or choice that generates moral virtue). So both an act of intellect and an act of will, by generating something per se in natural being, can concomitantly generate it in relative being and, further, concomitantly generate its correlative; and in this way a single act would generate a moral virtue and its associated prudence naturally simultaneously.
In keeping with this approach, it would be said that either habit as preceding a correct choice would indeed be a habit of moral knowledge or a particular instance of moral knowledge. In the domain of production, an artisan differs from a person of experience in that an artisan knows why something is the case, whereas the person of experience knows only that it is the case (Metaphysics I [981a28–30]); and the artisan is not prepared for action, whereas the person of experience is, as is said in the same place.61 Similarly, in the moral domain someone who has a correct habit concerning a principle or a conclusion regarding action but is not experienced in acting (that is, in directing his own conduct in matters of action), may have a remote directive habit—a habit that can be called moral understanding or moral science— but does not have a proximate directive habit. Prudence, like the habit of the person with experience in the domain of production, is that sort of proximate directive habit.
Although that statement of the distinction between practical science and prudence seems probable, prudence is not concerned solely with means ordered to the attainment of the ultimate end; it also gives dictates about the end itself, at any rate about a particular end (for example, chastity).
This is proved, first, as follows: moral virtue always follows some prudence according to a certain order of nature, and moral virtue is generated from the choice of a particular end (for example, chastity); therefore, some prudence precedes that choice.
Therefore, it is evidently a mistake to restrict prudence so narrowly and regard it as nothing more than a habit concerning determined and dictated means that are ordered to a particular chosen end; rather, prudence of itself and properly also concerns the end itself.
61 This seems to be a garbled version of a comparison Aristotle draws, not between the artisan and someone who has experience, but between someone who has experience (but no theory) and someone who has theory (but no experience): "We see that people of experience have greater success than those who have theory without experience." Metaphysics I.1 981a14–15.
ARE THE MORAL VIRTUES CONNECTED?
88 This is also proved, second, because if prudence did not concern the end, there would not be one prudence corresponding to one moral virtue. For a moral virtue is one because the end that the virtue principally inclines someone to choose is itself one.
But if prudence gave dictates only about means to an end, and not about the end itself, then there would be no one object in virtue of which dictative prudence would itself be one. Instead, there would be many prudences, dictating many means to the end, and yet there would be one moral virtue because there would be one end.
89 So both because of the natural priority of prudence to moral virtue [n. 87] and because of the unity of prudence with respect to a single moral virtue [n. 88], it should evidently be conceded that the practical habit62 that dictates correctly regarding a particular end is properly prudence.
90 And the claim that that prudence is a deliberative habit and thus a discursive habit concerning what is for the end [n. 78] is no objection to this. For prudence gives dictates concerning the proper ends of the moral virtues by reasoning discursively from a practical principle, taken from the universal end, toward particular ends.63
And this discursive reasoning is the first deliberation, although the word 'deliberation' is more commonly applied to reasoning about the means of the virtues.
91 As for the additional claim that prudence is in harmony with correct desire [n. 78], that has no force. For what is naturally prior obviously cannot have something definitive of itself that depends on what is posterior. Now prudence, as prudence, is evidently naturally prior to moral virtue, since it defines moral virtue. So (as I discussed in Book I in the question on practical and speculative theology
[prol. nn. 236–7, 265–9]) the claim that prudence is "in harmony with" correct desire should be understood to mean that prudence is such as to bring correct praxis into conformity with itself: that is, the cognition must be intrinsically such that correct practice ought to be conformed to it. But the cognition has this character whether or not correct choice follows in the same person who makes the dictate.
92 So it can be said otherwise that this habit generated from dictates, whether concerning ends (at any rate particular ends that are properly the ends of moral virtues) or concerning means ordered to those ends (concerning which perhaps there are no habits distinct from the habits that concern those ends), is properly prudence, even if correct choice does not follow in the same person who makes the dictate.64 Thus
62 Reading habitus with PBNYQ for the edition's actus.
63 Reading ad particulares fines (suggested by the varied readings in BNYQ) for the edition's particulari, politico.
64 Reading dictante for the edition's dictamine (AN). As at the end of n. 91, the point is that the very person who makes the correct dictate need not then choose correctly in order for the correct dictate to manifest prudence—not that correct choice need not follow in the same dictate. (Moreover, how can a correct choice, an act of will, be in [or fail to be in], a dictate, which is an act of intellect—let alone in the same dictate?)
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there will be no necessary connection at all between any moral virtue and the prudence that dictates concerning the matter of that virtue.65 Nonetheless, conversely, no choice can be morally right unless it is in harmony with its rule and measure, which is a correct dictate. Now a correct dictate is apt to generate prudence.66 Therefore, one can concede that there is a connection in the opposite direction: moral virtue cannot exist apart from prudence concerning the matter of that virtue.
One can reply to the arguments and the authoritative passages drawn from Augustine
[nn. 43–59]. On this, look up Henry, Quodlibet IX, q. 5.
2. THE CONNECTION OF ALL THE VIRTUES TO A SINGLE PRUDENCE
Regarding the other part of this topic, the connection of all the virtues to a single prudence, the Philosopher evidently says that they are connected: Ethics VI.7 [VI.13,
1145a1–2], "When the single prudence exists in someone, all [the virtues] will be present." Look up the Commentator's remarks on this passage.67 a. Henry of Ghent's view
One can answer the question of how there can be a single prudence for the whole domain of morals in the same way one answers the question about the habit of science. Look up the view and its refutation in Questions on the Metaphysics VI, q. 1.68 b. Scotus's view
On this topic it should be said that prudence concerns possible actions in just the same way that art concerns possible products. There is no greater connection among possible actions, such that there should be a single habit that concerns them, than there is among possible products. Therefore, just as diverse possible products require diverse arts of their own, so too diverse possible actions require diverse prudences of their own. And just as one can be morally well-affected concerning certain possible actions and ill-affected concerning others, so too in dictating one can be habituated to dictating well concerning these matters and not concerning those—since69 the former matters are neither principles for dictating concerning the latter nor conclusions following from them.
65 This is a clumsy way of expressing the claim that prudence regarding a particular domain does not guarantee possession of the moral virtue that concerns that domain.
66 The edition adds etiam unitam, "even a unitary prudence." I follow Q in omitting it. (As we shall learn in nn. 96–100, Scotus does not believe in a unitary all-encompassing prudence. Alternatively, we could read unicam and translate "even a single prudence." But the argument in no way depends on prudence's being either unitary or single, and it seems better to read with Q and omit the superfluous expression.) 67 Eustratius, In Eth. ad Nic. VI c. 18.
68 Henry of Ghent puts forward his view in Quodl. IX.4. Scotus states Henry's view in Metaph. VI q. 1 nn. 13–16 and immediately refutes it in nn. 17–38. He also gives a brief exposition and refutation in Lectura
III d. 36 nn. 87–9, 91–101.
69 Reading cum (PZBQ) for the edition's tamen.
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97 I explained in that question in Metaphysics VI [q. 1 nn. 17–27, 40, 42] how all the prudences are a single habit and all the habits of geometry belong to a single universal science. One must understand this not as formal unity but as virtual unity. Just as the habit that concerns the first subject is formally one from that subject and is virtually, but not formally, the habit of all the things contained in that first subject, so too the habit that is formally the habit of a given end in a given domain of action is virtually the habit of all the things practical cognition of which is virtually included in that end. But it is not formally the habit of all those things. And thus there is one prudence formally that is virtually a habit concerning all the virtues, extending the name
'prudence' to the habit that is the understanding of the first practical principle.
98 On this basis one can expound the authoritative passage from the Philosopher,
Ethics VI, that says "when the single prudence exists in someone," etc. [n. 94]. One way to interpret it is that he is speaking of a single prudence formally, and then this should be understood to mean that when the single prudence exists in someone and is perfect—not merely in intensity but also in extent—all the virtues will be present.
Now prudence is never as perfect in extent as it could be unless it is perfect with regard to everything to which it can extend itself, and those are all the objects that pertain to each of the moral virtues.
99 The other way to interpret this passage understands it as speaking of prudence as one not formally but as a genus. For just as the Philosopher says that temperance is one virtue and is formally distinct from courage, and yet each of these virtues is a kind of intermediate genus that contains several distinct species (as I discussed earlier [d. 34, nn. 31–3]), so too one can say that prudence, which has its place in this list of intermediate genera, is one because it is one intermediate genus, even though it contains several distinct species.
100 And if we understand the unity of prudence in this second way, all the moral virtues are connected to generically-one prudence insofar as each individual virtue is connected to an individual species of prudence. This presupposes what was said on the previous topic [nn. 77–83] about the reciprocal or non-reciprocal connection of each virtue to its own prudence.
C. The connection of the moral virtues to the theological virtues 101 On the third topic Augustine evidently says in Against Julian IV.3 that there are no genuine or perfect virtues apart from charity. He argues for this on the grounds that such a person would not boast perfectly in the Lord.70
102 Against this: Augustine in his sermon On Endurance [c. 26, n. 23] (quoted in Gratian, part 2, "On penitence," distinction 3, chapter 49, Si quis): "If a heretic or a schismatic
70 Reading Domino for the edition's Deo (AS). Augustine is alluding to 2 Corinthians 10:17, "Let the one who boasts, boast in the Lord."
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dies rather than deny Christ, will we not commend his endurance?" Therefore, he has endurance but not faith or charity; therefore, there can be endurance without charity.
Also, when things are essentially ordered as a disposition and the acquired form to which it is a disposition, the disposition can exist without the form but not vice versa.
The moral virtues are evidently dispositions71 to charity, as natural happiness is a disposition to supernatural happiness.
Furthermore, third, the definition of moral virtue can be perfectly satisfied in someone apart from any theological virtue.
It can be said that no virtues incline to the ultimate end except through the mediation of the virtue that in and of itself concerns the ultimate end; and thus, given that charity alone immediately concerns the ultimate end, the other virtues are not ordered to the ultimate end except through the mediation of charity. Now inasmuch as they are certain instruments for perfecting human beings, they ought to be instruments for ordering human beings to the ultimate end, in which their supreme perfection consists; and therefore they are imperfect without charity, without which they cannot order human beings to the ultimate end.72 Nonetheless, because this imperfection does not characterize them according to their species (for no moral virtue according to its species is meant to order human beings immediately to their ultimate end), it follows that any moral virtue can be perfect in its species apart from any theological virtue. That is why the moral virtues are said to be unformed apart from charity and formed by charity,73 precisely to the extent that charity orders the moral virtues and their ends to the ultimate end, an ordering in which their supreme and genuine extrinsic perfection consists.
On this basis the response to the authoritative passage from Augustine [n. 101] is straightforward: the virtues are not genuine apart from charity in that they do not lead one to happiness apart from charity.
But there is controversy about whether, conversely, the theological virtues presuppose the moral virtues.
As far as their acts are concerned, it is clear that they do not. For if someone who was once vicious is newly converted, he has all the theological virtues from the outset, and yet he has no moral virtues (at any rate, no acquired moral virtues). For he does not have pleasure in doing all the things to which his virtuous habit inclines him; indeed, it would be pleasant for him to act in accordance with the old vicious habit he had previously acquired, and unpleasant to act contrary to it.
71 Reading dispositiones (NYQ) for the edition's dispositio.
72 Reading sine qua non possunt sic ordinare (Q) for the edition's ad quam non possunt sic ordinari.
73 Bonaventure, Sent. III d. 36 a. un. q. 6 in corp.; Thomas Aquinas, Sent. III d. 27 q. 2 a. 4 qc. 3 in corp.,
ST II-II q. 23 a. 8 in corp., De caritate a. 3 in corp. and others. See Scotus, Quodl. q. 17 n. [8].
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109 Someone might say74 that all the moral virtues are infused in him from the outset
(and likewise for an infant at baptism) and thereby the connection is preserved, because even if he does not have innate virtues he does have infused virtues.
(He argues for this on the grounds that one will have them in heaven according to Augustine, and he also appeals to the Master in the text of the Sentences;75 but it does not seem probable that one would have them in heaven, according to Augustine, unless one had them in this present life, and one would not acquire them instantaneously in this present life when one dies.76) But although many things are said about these infused moral virtues, namely that they appear to be necessary on account of the mode or the mean or the end,77 in fact the inclination of charity is sufficient to determine a virtue to any end that it cannot have from its own species, and the mode or mean is sufficiently determined by infused faith. So there is evidently no necessity to posit additional, infused, moral virtues distinct from the acquired virtues in people who possess, or are capable of possessing, the acquired virtues. But then there is also no necessity to posit them in anyone else, since there is no greater reason why they should be infused in anyone else than in those who have, or can have, the acquired virtues.
110 And one could say in response to the point about infants [n. 109] that it is not necessary to posit that infants78 have moral virtues in heaven; it is enough that they are well-disposed toward desirable objects by charity (charity of course disposes one toward everything willable under one aspect of being willable), just as there is no need for them to have knowledge (scientia) of all things in their own genus, but instead it is enough for them to know (nosse) them in the Word, which is perfect knowledge (notitia).
111 Or, second, if infants will have moral virtues in heaven, it can be said that those virtues are infused in them in the instant of happiness. For it is not more necessary that they be given in baptism the things that are appropriate for a wayfarer (assuming they will at some time be a wayfarer) than it is that they be given in the instant of happiness the things that are appropriate for one who has attained the end. Indeed, the latter is more79 reasonable than the former.
74 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II q. 65 a. 2 in corp., a. 3 in corp., III q. 69 a. 6 in corp., I-II q. 67 a. 1 in corp.,
Sent. IV d. 4 q. 2 a. 2 qc. 1 in corp., III d. 33 q. 1 a. 4 in corp. and ad 5.
75 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II q. 67 a. 1 in corp., quoting Augustine, De Trin. XIV.9.12 and Peter
Lombard, Sent. III d. 33 c. 3 n. 3.
76 Thomas Aquinas, De virtutibus cardinalibus a. 4 in corp.
77 That is, because of the way in which the infused moral virtues act, the kind of mean or intermediate they seek, and the end to which they direct their possessor. See Thomas Aquinas, De virtutibus in communi a. 10 in corp. and ad 8, Sent. III d. 27 q. 2 a. 4 qc. 3 in corp.; Bonaventure, Sent. III d. 27 a. 2 q. 5 in corp.;
Richard Middleton, Sent. III d. 27 princ. 9 q. 2 in corp. Scotus presents this aspect of Aquinas's view in language deriving from Henry of Ghent, Quodl. VI q. 12 in corp.
78 For 'infants' in this and the next two paragraphs, read "those who have died in infancy or early childhood."
79 Q alone reads magis ("more"), but the edition's minus ("less") gives the opposite of the sense required.
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Or, third, it can be said that if the moral virtues are appropriate for some perfection on the part of one who has attained the end and are not given in the instant of glorification, infants will be able to acquire them through their own acts in heaven.
For just as there is evidently no reason they cannot learn knowable things in their own genus that they had not known before, so too there does not appear to be any reason why they will not be able, through good choices concerning things desirable for the sake of the end (and not only insofar as they are to be willed for God's sake but even insofar as they are to be willed for their own benefit), to acquire a moral habit that inclines them to choose such desirable things under the relevant particular aspect80 and thus to acquire a moral virtue.
So as far as this topic is concerned, just as I said earlier [n. 105], I say that the moral virtues do not require the theological virtues in order for the moral virtues to be perfect in their species, though apart from the theological virtues they lack the further perfection that they could have; thus the converse—that the theological virtues, whether in this present life or in heaven, necessarily require the moral virtues— need not hold either.
D. The connection of the theological virtues with each other
On the fourth topic, the connection of the theological virtues with each other, I say that they are not connected. This is clearly true of heaven, where the habit and act of charity will remain apart from the habit and act of faith or hope.81 And it is also clearly true of this present life, where faith and hope remain in a sinner apart from charity. So there is no necessary connection in terms of the existence of these habits.
But what about their coming to be, in other words, their being infused? Is there some connection such that one cannot be infused apart from the others?
My response is that if things can be separated in their existence, such that one can exist apart from the other, God can separate them in their coming to be or their being infused. Thus, as far as their being infused is concerned, they are not necessarily connected in themselves; rather, they are connected because of God's generosity. For God perfects the whole human being, as Augustine says in On True and False
Repentance: "It is impious to look to82 God for half-measures of grace; God never grants bodily healing without doing so completely, and likewise he does not heal anyone spiritually without healing him completely."83 Now there is perfect health in 80 "under the relevant particular aspect" = sub propria ratione, that is, under the aspect or description under which the objects fall within the domain of a particular moral virtue.
81 Cf. 1 Cor. 13:8–13.
82 Reading sperare (S) for the edition's separare. Sperare could be dismissed as a scribal correction (since it is the word that appears in the pseudo-Augustinian text that is being rather inaccurately quoted here), except that (1) the sense demands it and (2) it is hard to make sense of the edition's reading ("It is impious to separate half-measures of grace from God"?).
83 Cf. pseudo-Augustine, De vera et falsa poenitentia c. 9 n. 23.