IV. How certain propositions are to be understood
REPORTATIO IA, DD. –, QQ. –, NN. –
both, taken separately. And so I can never will both simultaneously, because willing one alternative rules out willing the other.
As for the third objection [n. 47], to the claim that the power exists either along with its act or prior to its act, I say that when one thing is naturally, not durationally, prior to another, it can coexist with the opposite of what is [naturally] posterior to it
(though not posterior in terms of duration). Hence, what is naturally prior can coexist with the opposite of what is naturally posterior; but because it is not durationally prior, it cannot exist simultaneously, in terms of duration, with the opposite of what is [naturally] posterior.
So to the form of the argument I say that this power neither exists along with its act nor is durationally prior to its act; it is merely naturally prior to its act, or (in other words) precedes its act by a priority of nature. Just as my will wills its effect contingently and brings it into being contingently, in such a way that in the very same instant it has the power [to will and bring into being] the opposite of that effect, in the way that I have explained, so too the divine will determines itself to x in this instant in such a way that it could determine itself to the opposite of x in that same instant.
As to the fourth objection [n. 48], to the claim that "granted that the false alternative is impossible," etc., I say that the rule is false if taken in an unqualified sense. For when certain items are possible without one opposite's succeeding another, the other opposite is possibly true in virtue of the power of its naturally prior cause, by which it can be made true. Thus, if there were only one instant of time, and in that instant everyone was engaged in disputation, I say that in the very same instant it is possible for them not to be engaged in disputation, so that in one and the same instant each alternative, taken separately, could be true and its opposite false. If, by contrast, the possibility requires that one opposite succeed another—for example, through motion or change—
I say that the fact that the opposite cannot be made true [at the same time] arises from the particular kind of possibility under discussion, not from the nature of possibility itself.13 Accordingly, that rule is false if taken in an unqualified sense.
IV. How certain propositions are to be understood
As for the fourth main topic, how certain propositions that arise in this discussion are to be understood, I say that the proposition "something willing a can not will a" must be distinguished in terms of the divided sense and the composed sense. There is one sense, the divided sense—"my will, which is now willing a, can successively will the opposite"—that is manifestly true. Another sense, the composed sense—"[possibly,]
13 This is a very expansive translation of dico quod hoc accidit gratia materiae quod suum oppositum non potest verificari, more literally, "I say that the fact that the opposite cannot be made true is accidental by reason of the matter."
THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF CONTINGENCY
what is willing a is simultaneously willing-against a"—is manifestly false, for it says that what is in fact impossible is possible.
58 There is yet another sense that is not manifest: "my will, which is willing a now can not will a."14 This proposition too must be distinguished in terms of the divided sense and the composed sense. One sense is this: "my will[, which is willing a now,] can not will a now"; this reading conjoins both actively willing a and actively not willing a with 'now' and states that this conjoining is possible. If the proposition is understood in this way, I say that it is impossible, since this composed sense predicates an opposite of its opposite. But there is another sense, the divided sense: "my will wills a now, and it is possibly true of my will that it does not will a now." Understood in that way, the proposition is true. Accordingly the Master15 is right to insist that these propositions be distinguished and understood in terms of the composed and divided sense.
59 Here's an example: "every human being who is white runs." If my words 'who is white' modify 'human being,' the sense is "every white human being runs," and that would be true in the composed sense, even granting that black people run too. But another way to understand it is that 'who is white' does not delimit the subject of the main clause but instead is a copulative proposition that predicates [running] virtually of everyone included in the scope of the word 'who.' If the proposition is understood in this way, there are two categorical propositions: one is "every human being runs" and the second is "everyone who is white runs." Similarly, taken in the divided sense,
"my will, which is willing a now, can not will a now" (and likewise "my will[, which] does not will a now[, can will a now]") includes two categorical propositions: one proposition expresses the factual claim that one of the opposites is actually true of a subject, and the other expresses the modal claim that the other opposite is possibly true of that same subject.16 So understood, the proposition says of my will both that it in fact does not will a and that, if not determined by that willing, that very same will of mine can will a. So when that modal claim is understood as included, it signifies, as the Master says,17 no more than this: in the very same instant in which one opposite is actually present, the other opposite is possibly present, in such a way that a power that is really one and the same is not [necessarily] determined to the opposite that is actually present, but only contingently so, and the other opposite can be present in it.
14 The ambiguity in the Latin is represented in English by the absence of a comma after the 'which' clause. If the comma is placed after 'a,' we have the composed sense; if the comma is placed after 'now,' we have the divided sense. (Note that there is no punctuation to speak of in the manuscripts.)
15 Peter Lombard, Sent. I d. 38 c. 2 n. 2; d. 49 c. 1 nn. 3–5.
16 Thus, in the divided sense, "my will, which is willing a, can not will a now" is understood as "my will is willing a now, and it is possible for my will not to will a now." Scotus, oddly, goes on to state instead the divided sense of "my will, which does not now will a, can will a now."
17 Peter Lombard, Sent. I d. 38 c. 2 n. 2.