II. Replies to the preliminary arguments in favor of the first view
ORDINATIO IV, D. , Q.
that if someone dismissed his wife, he should give her a bill. But this was a "human plan," not in the sense that it was from a human being, but as coming from the mouthpiece of the divine law.
As for the argument from Augustine [n. 76], I concede that by the delay that God required for writing the bill, he implied that such a dismissal was displeasing to him in an absolute sense. So it is not merely that someone who did not dismiss his wife acted better than someone who did, but also that someone who dismissed his wife acted badly—and yet not so badly that he sinned mortally against marriage, as he would have done if he had not been given permission by the law.
As for "On divorces" [n. 77], the reply is clear in the answer to the first argument
[n. 86]: it is true that Christ rejected divorce in the era of his Law.
II. Replies to the preliminary arguments in favor of the first view
As for the preliminary arguments for the first view:
The reply to the first [n. 69] is clear from the answer [nn. 86–8].27
As for the second argument [n. 70], I concede that marriage without qualification is a permanent obligation. But marriage in a certain respect can be a firm obligation for a certain time, even if it is not permanent. And in this sense I concede that in the Mosaic Law there was no marriage without qualification, except perhaps if someone willed to surpass the perfection of the Law by obligating himself permanently, which was not required of him insofar as he was contracting marriage under that Law.
Alternatively, one could say that if there was in fact perfect marriage, or marriage without qualification, then there was also an indissoluble obligation. This is true, except if the Lawgiver revoked this requirement or made a dispensation from it. And he did in fact make a dispensation for cases in which a woman was so displeasing to her husband that there was reason to fear uxoricide.28 And as I explained earlier
27 The edition, following A alone, adds:
As for the claim that it is against the natural law for "what God has joined together" [to be separated by human agency] [n. 69], I say that it is not against the natural law, because, on this view, it is neither against principles of the natural law nor against conclusions deduced immediately from principles that such a temporary contract should be made. Nor is it unqualifiedly against the upbringing of offspring, for God could have ordained things otherwise concerning the upbringing of offspring, though not as fittingly as he in fact has done. Nevertheless, [temporary marriage contracts] would have been against a certain good that is consonant with the natural law, namely, indissolubility. And God could make a dispensation contrary to such a good in order to avoid a greater evil.
28 Reading nimis displicebat viro ut timeretur uxoricidium (Q, from which PZN differ only in ways that do not affect the sense) for the edition's nimis displicebat viro suo, in tantum quod timeretur uxoricidium (A).