I. Reply to the question
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8 Second, through one's natural powers one can enjoy something, and such enjoyment is not necessarily inordinate. But there is no ordinate enjoyment with respect to any object other than God. Therefore, etc.
9 Furthermore, through frequent acts of loving God above all else one can acquire a habit that inclines one toward loving God above all else,1 and that habit is similar to the one by which we meritoriously love God above all else.2 Therefore, charity cannot exist in someone who has such a habit, because if it did, there would be two habits of the same species existing in the same subject, which seems untenable.
10 The antecedent is evident, because if (in keeping with the foregoing argument [nn.
6–8]) it can happen that someone loves God above all else through his natural capacities alone, it can therefore happen that he does so frequently, thereby generating such a habit. Therefore, etc.
11 And it cannot be said that these two habits are compatible with each other on the grounds that they belong to different species on account of their efficient causes, because an efficient cause by itself does not make for a difference in species, as is evident from Augustine, On the Trinity III.9.20, and Ambrose, On the Incarnation
[c. 9, n. 105]. They say that different origins do not make for diverse species. (The same passage in Ambrose makes this point clear in the case of a human being produced by creation and by generation: Adam and I belong to the same species.) Therefore, etc.
12 The Master takes the opposite view in the text, as does Augustine in On Christian
Teaching [I.26.27]. (Look it up in the Sentences.3) I. Reply to the question 13 In responding to this question there are three things that need to be investigated.
First, because habits are made evident through acts, we need to investigate whether the act of loving God above all else is right, so that there can be a virtue that inclines to that act. Second, we need to investigate the formal character of the object of this act and of the habit that inclines to its first act. Third, we need to investigate whether nature, without an infused habit, is capable of such an act.
A. Loving God above all else is a right act 14 On the first point, I say that loving God above all else is an act that conforms to natural right reason, which dictates that what is best should be loved the most, and consequently the act is right in and of itself. Indeed, its rightness is self-evident, as the 1 Q omits "that inclines one to love God above all else" (which awkwardly follows "and that habit is similar . . . " in the other MSS). The meaning is clearly the same whichever reading is followed.
2 Cf. Ordinatio I d. 17 nn. 129–42.
3 Peter Lombard, Sent. III d. 27 c. 2 nn. 1–2.
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rightness of a first principle in the domain of possible actions. For something should be loved the most, and that is nothing other than the highest Good, just as nothing other than the highest Truth should be most firmly held as true by the intellect. And this argument is confirmed by the consideration that moral precepts belong to the natural law; consequently, "You shall love the Lord your God,"4 etc., belongs to the natural law, and thus the fact that this act is right is known [naturally].
From this it follows that there can be a virtue that naturally inclines to that act—and it is a theological virtue, since it has to do with the theological object: that is, it has to do immediately with God. And not only that, but it also depends immediately on the first rule of human acts and has to be infused by God; for this virtue is apt to perfect the highest part of the soul, which receives its full and complete perfection in only one way: immediately from God.5
This virtue is distinct from faith, because its act is not understanding or believing. It is also distinct from hope, because its act is not desiring a good for the one loving insofar as it is advantageous for the one loving; instead, its act is tending toward the object for its own sake, even if per impossibile its advantageousness for the one loving were ruled out.
This virtue, which perfects the will insofar as it has the affection for justice, I call
"charity."
B. On the formal object of this act
1. THE VIEWS OF OTHERS: THREE APPROACHES
On the second point, one must adopt one of the following three approaches: either the formal object of such a habit is God in himself according to his absolute notion,6 or it is God insofar as he is a good suitable to the one loving,7 or, third, it is
God insofar as he includes both, that is, insofar as he is an infinite good in himself and to love God is to participate in God, as a finite good participates in the Infinite
Good.8
According to the second approach,9 granting that there is a natural love for God as a good for a creature insofar as God gives being to the creature by creating it, love for God insofar as he gives beatific being is from charity, and thus the object of charity is
God insofar as he is the beatific object for the one loving God.
4 Deuteronomy 6:5, Matthew 22:37.
5 Cf. Lectura II d. 24 nn. 9–12; Thomas Aquinas, ST II-II q. 17 a. 1 in corp.
6 Peter of Tarentaise, Sent III d. 29 q. un. a. 4 in corp.
7 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. X q. 6 in corp.
8 Bonaventure, Sent. III d. 29 a. un. q. 2 in corp. and ad 4; Richard Middleton, Sent. III d. 29 q. 2 in corp.; Giles of Rome, Quodl. IV q. 14 in corp.
9 Thomas Aquinas, ST II-II q. 23 a. 1 in corp, q. 26 a. 3 in corp.
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20 The third10 approach is put forward on account of the point just made [in n. 19], because the mere fact that someone is, by himself, the Supreme Good, an Infinite
Good, is not sufficient for his being supremely loved; along with this, it must also be the case that the Supreme Good is the good of the one who loves him insofar as the lover participates in him.
2. REFUTATION OF THE VIEWS
21 An argument against the first approach [n. 18]: If this were correct, then if, per impossibile, there were another God, he would have to be loved above all else through charity. That seems untenable in itself. It also seems untenable on the basis of the following argument: there cannot be two distinct things that ought to be loved above all else, because each of the two would have to be loved more than the other, and then one and the same thing would be loved more than itself.
22 Second, if being the unqualified Good were the basis for being worthy to be loved above all else, then being a greater good would be the basis for being worthy of greater love, and thus everyone would be bound to love a neighbor who is better than himself more than himself, which does not seem plausible.
23 The second approach [n. 19] does not seem plausible, because an act of charity, if it is perfect, has to do with God under the most perfect aspect of his worthiness to be loved. And the most perfect aspect of God's worthiness to be loved is not any comparison of God to a creature, but rather God's absolute nature in and of himself.
For God is better in himself, absolutely, than any relation of God to something other than himself could be.
24 Furthermore, if God qua beatific is the principal object of charity, I ask: what is this beatific aspect? Is it an aptitudinal relation—his being apt to beatify—or an actual relation—his actually beatifying?
If it is the first, and it is only by virtue of the nature to which such an aptitude belongs that an aptitude can perfectly terminate a perfect act—as it is always the case than an aptitude is not a perfection in itself, but necessarily includes the nature in which it is present—then one should not say that God is in this way the beatific object of charity.11
The second way does not seem plausible, because that relation, which is in the object insofar as God actually beatifies, follows the act. For there is no difference in the object between an actual and an aptitudinal relation other than the fact that an act
10 Following PBNYQ against the edition's "first." Since the argument that follows is a reason for supplementing the first approach with the second—in other words, an argument for the third approach—it is hard to see what reason the editors had for choosing the reading they did, apart from their usual allegiance to A.
11 Following Q. The edition has "then to say that God is in this way the object of charity is to say that he, insofar as he is such a nature, is the object of charity."
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is elicited with respect to that object. Therefore, to say this would be to posit that God has the formal character of the object of the act insofar as he terminates an act elicited by charity. Similarly, to desire a good as good for someone belongs to the affection for the advantageous, and the will is not perfected by charity with respect to that affection.
Furthermore, both actual and aptitudinal happiness, if they mean anything in God's case, mean nothing other than an actual or aptitudinal relation of reason. No relation of reason can be the formal object that terminates an act of charity.
And the arguments discussed in the prologue to Book I, in the question on the subject of theology,12 apply here. Therefore, etc.
Against the third approach it is argued that there clearly can't be a twofold formal character for a single act, so one or the other of these must be identified as the formal aspect of charity, not both at once. And on this basis it is argued further that something that is the formal character when it is conjoined with something else would, if it were by itself, be the formal object by itself, as is clear in the case of other formal characters (for example, if heat conjoined [with something else] is the formal character of heating, then it would still be the formal character of heating if it were by itself). Therefore, whichever one of these two is in fact the objective character would terminate the act by itself if it were by itself; consequently, the other would not terminate the act, and so neither does it terminate the act now.
Furthermore, if some intellectual creature existed from itself (that is, not from another as its efficient cause) and were intrinsically infinite (it has been claimed that this was the Philosopher's view about Intelligences other than the First13), such a creature could love God above all else—and, in accordance with right reason, no God other than the First—and yet it would not be a participation in the First, speaking in terms of efficient causality.
3. SCOTUS'S RESPONSE
As to this article, I say that the objective character of the act or habit of charity can be understood in three ways: first, as a characteristic that, in and of itself, is apt to be a characteristic that terminates [such an act or habit] in its own right; second, as a characteristic that precedes some act, such that an act is apt to be elicited for the sake of an object on the basis of that characteristic; third, as a characteristic that is concomitant with, or indeed quasi-consequent to, the elicited act.
The first characteristic is the proper objective characteristic, and no other characteristic is an objective characteristic in the strict and proper sense. This objective
12 Ordinatio prol. nn. 164–6.
13 Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 25, q. 3 in corp.; Quodl. VI q. 33 in corp.
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characteristic is the characteristic of God in himself. For the formal characteristic that terminates every theological act and habit is precisely God as this essence, and that is the case in any intellectual nature (as was discussed above in the question on the subject of theology, in the prologue to Book 114).
A brief proof of this: a power that has to do with some general object that is adequate for itself, whether as mover or as terminus, can be fully and perfectly brought to rest only in something that fully and perfectly possesses the characteristic of the power's adequate object. Every intellectual and volitional power has as its first adequate object, both as terminus and as mover, the whole of being. Therefore, such a power cannot be perfectly brought to rest in any being, created or uncreated, except one in which the characteristic of being is found fully and perfectly. Now the only such object is the First Being, and not under any relational characteristic, but qua
"this being."
31 The second characteristic can in a way be called an objective characteristic with respect to the act of loving taken strictly, because it is in a way suited by nature to arouse someone to love. In the present context, the character of this nature in relation to the one loving—namely its being a good that shares itself with the one loving—is this sort of characteristic. Thus, in our case someone15 is loved primarily because of his intrinsic worth, and secondarily because he is known to return our love, so that his returning our love is a special basis (ratio) of lovableness in him that arouses our love,16 a distinct basis from his intrinsic worth. So too in God's case, it is not only his infinite goodness—this nature as such—that arouses our love; rather, because this goodness has loved me by sharing himself with me, I therefore elicit an act of love toward him. Anything in which the characteristic of lovableness can manifest itself— in creating or redeeming or disposing someone to being made happy—can be assigned to this second stage of lovableness. And there is no distinction among these three: charity has no more to do with the third than with the first or second.
Rather, all of them are on a par as characteristics not merely of an intrinsically worthy good but of a good that shares itself and loves—and, because it loves, is worthy of being loved in return, as we read in 1 John 4:19, "We love God because he first loved us."
32 The third [sense of] characteristic, which is being an object that terminates an act, is not properly a formal objective characteristic because it naturally follows the elicited act; and yet, inasmuch as it always accompanies the act, it could be counted as a characteristic of the object. And in this way God is loved insofar as he is the object that beatifies the one loving him,17 just as it would be said that God loves insofar as he
14 Ordinatio prol. n. 206.
15 Reading aliquis with ZNYQ. The edition has aliquid ("something").
16 Reading alliciens ad amandum with PNYQ. The edition adds aliquid, which is clearly a mistake.
17 Reading in quantum est bonum beatificum diligentis (Q) for the edition's in quantum est bonum obiectum beatificum diligibilitatis (AZ).
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is supremely loved,18 which is not from the nature of the object, but through a characteristic in the object that is concomitant with the act.
An example of this threefold distinction [n. 29] would be as follows. Suppose one posited one supremely beautiful object, visible by its very nature; second, if one claimed that that object, when seen, gave the eye its power to see; third, if there were something that accompanies sight insofar as it is attained by the eye through its act of seeing, which is the formal basis for terminating the visual power's love (if the power of vision could first love such an object). The first is the characteristic of the nature as such, insofar as the characteristic of the object adequate for the power exists perfectly in such a nature, to as great a degree as it can exist in anything. The second is a characteristic that draws the power toward loving the object inasmuch as it has shared itself by giving the power to see. The third is a characteristic that accompanies the act in which vision is brought perfectly to rest. Taken absolutely, then, the first characteristic in vision (or of love in vision, if vision could love) would be the characteristic of this nature as such; only to a much lesser degree, and in a very improper sense, is it a characteristic of what is attained through an act.
From this it evidently follows that those who say that God is the object of charity insofar as he is the beatific object are completely mistaken, whether by 'beatific' they mean an actual relation (i.e., insofar as God is the terminus of an act of beatifying) or an aptitudinal relation, because (as I have argued [n. 24]), it is in virtue of his nature that God is the terminus of an aptitudinal relation.
C. Is an infused habit necessary?
1. HENRY OF GHENT'S VIEW
On the third topic, it has been argued19 that nature is not sufficient for this act without an infused habit.
The first reason is that nature is determined to one. Now nature is determined to desire its own being, according to On Generation and Corruption II [336b27–9].
Therefore, it cannot desire its own non-being, no matter what else might be true of it
(unless one were to say that it is determined to desire its own being only conditionally,20 which does not seem probable). Therefore, every intellectual nature is determined to desire its own being rather than God's being, if the two should be incompatible; for its desiring its own being is the one thing to which it is naturally determined, and no matter what other condition might hold for it, it cannot be inclined to the opposite—for if it were, it would desire its own being only conditionally.
18 Reading sicut diceretur Deus diligere in quantum summe diligitur (Q) for the edition's sicut diceretur diligi in quantum summe diligitur.
19 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. IV q. 11 in corp.
20 Reading condicionaliter (PZNYQ) for the edition's condicionatum.
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36 Moreover, it seems clear that natural appetite is only for what is suitable to the one desiring, and consequently it is primarily for the one for whom it desires what is suitable—which is, of course, the one loving (assuming that he primarily loves the suitable thing for his own sake). Therefore, natural appetite cannot have as its foremost concern what is suitable for another.
2. OTHERS' ARGUMENTS AGAINST HENRY'S VIEW
37 Some21 have argued against this view as follows:
First, a part loves the being of the whole more than its own being. This is made clear both in the macrocosm and in the microcosm:
In the macrocosm: water both ascends so that no vacuum will come about in the universe (as is evident in many experiments, for example, the one with the water rising in a vessel that has a candle burning above it, and in many others22), even though this is contrary to the particular natural inclination of the nature of water, since water is naturally heavy and consequently tends downward. But the universal inclination of nature wins out. For the good of the whole universe—the continuity or contiguity of its parts—is preserved thereby; it strives for this good.23 In this way water is inclined more to the universal good of the universe than to its own particular good.
38 This same thing is also evident in the microcosm: a hand puts itself in the way of harm to save the head, as though naturally desiring the safety of the head more than that of other parts of the body, and thus more than its own safety. For the safety of the head just is the safety of all the parts of the body, as far as the activities and functions of life are concerned.
39 And to take this point further, given that every creature is a participation in the divine goodness, every creature desires the being of the divine good more than the being of its own good; consequently, a rational creature can, in virtue of its natural powers, love the divine good more than any other good: more, even, than itself.
40 Moreover, a rational nature loves happiness supremely, as we gather from Augustine in On the Trinity XIII.5.8. Now it does not love the beatific object less than it loves happiness. Therefore, it loves the beatific object supremely, and so more than anything else—which means, more than itself. By way of confirmation: someone in a state of despair who kills himself hates his own being; and yet he does not hate happiness; for he desires happiness, if only he could have it. Therefore, he loves
21 Thomas Aquinas, Sent. III d. 29 q. 1 a. 3 in corp., ST II-II q. 26 a. 3 in corp.; Godfrey of Fontaines,
Quodl. X q. 6 in corp.
22 See Roger Bacon, Quaestiones supra libros quatuor Physicorum Aristot. IV (VIII 198–217) for a detailed discussion of such experiments.
23 The subject of 'strives' is probably meant to be "the universal inclination of nature." The MSS are quite varied here, though not in such a way as to cast doubt on the purport of the argument.
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happiness more than he loves himself; consequently, he loves the beatific object more than he loves himself.
3. A CAREFUL WEIGHING OF THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS
These arguments are not compelling:
The first argument [nn. 37–9] fails because those examples don't show what they are meant to show. They show only that the whole loves its own good, or its more important parts, more than it loves the good of a less important part.
This is clear in the first example, the one about water. For it cannot be the case that water moves itself upward for the sake of some good of the universe as a whole, because water has a natural form, a form that is determined to one action; so as long as that form remains numerically the same, it can never be the form responsible for water's doing the opposite action. Therefore, water does not move itself upward.
Rather, it is moved upward by another, extrinsic mover, to which the water, of its own nature, contributes nothing.24 Consequently, water is moved violently with respect to its own nature. So this is not a case of a part's loving the good of the whole [more than its own good25] or of saving the whole out of love; rather, the whole
(or the regulative power in the whole, to which the powers of the whole are attributed) moves a given part of the universe in a way that serves the well-being of the whole. What follows from this, then, is that the whole universe loves the wellbeing of the whole more than the well-being of a particular part.
The same conclusion emerges from the other example [n. 38]. The hand does not put itself in the way of harm for the sake of the whole body as a result of the hand's own appetite; rather, the human being who has these parts—one more important and another less important—puts the less important part, which he can lose without endangering the whole, in the way of harm in order to save the whole and the other part, whose loss would mean the complete destruction of the whole.
And so what you can conclude on this point is that God loves the well-being of the universe—or even his own well-being—more than the well-being of any one part; and he loves the well-being of an important part more than the well-being of a less important part. But there is no basis to conclude that any creature loves God's being or the being of the universe more than the creature's own being, just as, in those examples, the part would, if left to itself (that is, considered only in terms of its own inclination), never put itself at risk of non-being for the sake of another.
24 Reading cui etiam nihil confert quantum est ex natura sua with Q, which gives roughly the same sense as the majority of manuscripts. The edition follows A: cui etiam (quantum est ex natura sua) tantum convenit esse sursum ("and which by its very nature is suited to be above").
25 The bracketed material is in Q.
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45 The analogy fails in another respect as well. Suppose it were true, as the examples assume, that these parts are something that really belong to the whole, and that by saving the whole they save themselves because they have being in the whole.
Creatures are not parts in that way: they do not belong to God in the sense that God has them as a part, though they do belong to God as his effect or as participating in God.
46 And the second argument, the one about happiness [n. 40], is unsound because it considers only the affection for the advantageous. Granted, among things that are desired for the sake of the one loving, happiness is desired the most; but it is not loved the most. Rather, the one for whose sake happiness is desired is loved the most (just as an end is loved more than things that are for the end). Similarly, the premise about happiness26 is true only if one is talking about happiness in the universal sense, without specifying what happiness consists in. Understanding happiness in this second sense, there is no basis for the conclusion that anyone loves anything other than himself more than himself, since it is not specified that what happiness consists in is something other than the one loving.
4. SCOTUS'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST HENRY
47 So, instead of relying on these arguments, I offer two other arguments for the principal conclusion:27
The first is this: natural reason reveals to an intellectual creature that something exists that is worthy of supreme love, because in all essentially ordered objects and acts there is something supreme, and thus supreme love, and thus there is also a supremely lovable object. But natural right reason does not reveal anything as supremely lovable other than the Infinite Good; for if it did, charity would incline to the opposite of what right reason dictates, and thus it would not be a virtue.
Therefore, right reason dictates that only the Infinite Good is worthy of supreme love.
And consequently the will can supremely love the Infinite Good by its own natural powers. For the intellect cannot rightly dictate anything to which the will cannot naturally carry itself and tend, since if it could, the will would be naturally bad, or at any rate it would lack the freedom to tend to any given thing under the aspect of good as presented to it by the intellect. And this is what is said about angels in particular, that in the state of innocence they were not non-upright,28 since if they had been, they would not have been able to have a non-upright act; but they could in fact have a non-upright elicited act. And we are to suppose that they had some elicited act,
26 i.e., that a rational nature loves happiness supremely.
27 The edition comments: "Such a conclusion (n. 38), ineptly deduced from the arguments in nn. 37–8 and n. 40, is more clearly stated below at n. 52."
28 Cf. Ordinatio II dd. 4–5 n. 37.
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therefore an upright act; and there could be no upright act that was not an act of loving God above all else; therefore, etc.
The second argument is this: the Philosopher in Ethics IX [1169a18–20] holds that the courageous citizen ought to face death for the good and utility of the commonwealth. Now the Philosopher would not maintain that such a citizen would have some reward in the next life, as is clear from the many passages in which he expresses uncertainty about whether the soul is immortal or mortal and evidently favors the view that it is mortal.29 (At any rate, if someone following natural reason is uncertain about a future life, no one ought to risk what is certainly the loss of good and virtue within the commonwealth for the sake of a future life about which he is uncertain.)
Therefore, leaving aside any consideration of a future reward, it is consonant with right reason for any courageous citizen to will his own non-being in order to preserve the good of the commonwealth. But according to right reason, the divine good30 should be loved more than the good of any particular thing; therefore, according to right reason everyone should will his own non-being for the sake of the divine good.
It has been argued31 that in facing death for the sake of the good of virtue, the courageous person experiences the greatest good of virtue and the greatest pleasure; and for the sake of these very great, albeit short-lived, goods, he ought to elicit and love such an act in preference to an ignominious life. For as Aristotle maintains in Ethics IX.9 [1169a22–5], one intense act is better than any number of non-intense acts; so in this the courageous citizen is not choosing his own non-being but his best possible being through an act of virtue; and according to right reason this best possible being should be chosen over lacking an act of virtue, though possessing many other advantages.
Against this: If for the sake of preserving the safety and well-being of X I will that Y not exist, I unqualifiedly love X more than Y. Now a courageous person of the sort we're describing wills for the sake of the well-being of the commonwealth that both he and his act of virtue not exist. Therefore, he unqualifiedly loves the common good, which he wills to be preserved, more than himself or his act of virtue; it is not to save himself or his act of virtue that he faces death, but to save the commonwealth. And so the previous argument [n. 48] stands.
A third argument,32 a theological consideration, is also given: If by exercising solely one's natural powers someone can have a perfect act of virtue in loving God above all else, someone who found that he was disposed to such an act could know that he is in 29 Scotus discusses Aristotle's treatment of this issue in Ordinatio IV d. 43 q. 2 nn. 93–102.
30 To bonum divinum the edition adds et politicum, which BNQ omit.
31 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl X q. 6 in corp.
32 Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 46 q. 4 in corp.
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a state of charity, since apart from charity there would be no such disposition to love
God above all else.
52 The consequent is false; therefore, so is the antecedent.
5. SCOTUS'S VIEW
53 As for this article [n. 35], on the strength of the two arguments—the conformity of right reason and the will [n. 47] and the courageous citizen [n. 48]—I concede the conclusion that any will, at any rate in the condition of human nature as originally created, can, by exercising solely its natural powers, love God above all else.
54 To make this clear, I first explain how we should understand "above all else"; second, in what way a rational creature is obligated to that act; and third, notwithstanding this, what the habit of charity is necessary for. a. How we should understand "above all else"
As for the first point, I say that "above all else" can be understood either extensively or intensively: extensively, in the sense that one loves God more than all other things, for example, because on the basis of some affection one would sooner will that all other things not exist than that God not exist; intensively, for example, one wills well-being for God with a greater affection than one wills it for anything else.
56 Taking "above all else" extensively, there is consensus33 that no single thing other than God, nor even all other things at once, are as estimable as God.
57 As for "above all else" taken intensively, a distinction has been proposed,34 according to which one love exceeds another either because it is warmer or gentler or because it is stronger or firmer; and these loves are said to exceed one another.35 For example, it is said that a mother loves a son more warmly and gently, but a father loves him more strongly and firmly because he would face greater danger for love of his son.
In keeping with this distinction, it would be said that loving God above all else should be a matter of the firmness of one's love, such that nothing else could tear one away from that love; but love for God need not be above all else with respect to gentleness, warmth, and sweetness, since one finds oneself loving a creature more warmly at one time than one loves God at some other time, as is clear in the case of those who feel jealousy. This is confirmed by the fact that if a human being in this present state could love God supremely, above all else, both extensively and 33 Peter Lombard, Sent. III d. 29 c. 1 nn. 2–3 and c. 2 n. 6; William of Auxerre, Summa III tr. 14 c. 4;
Bonaventure, Sent. III d. 29 a. un. q. 2 in corp.; Thomas Aquinas, ST II-II q. 26 a. 2 in corp., a. 3 in corp.; and others.
34 Bonaventure, Sent. III d. 30 a. un. q. 6 in corp., d. 27 a. 2 q. 6 in corp.
35 That is, on the proposed distinction, love A can be greater than love B insofar as it is warmer and gentler, and at the same time love B can be greater than love A insofar as it is stronger or firmer. The word for 'or' is sive, so 'gentler' is intended as a rough synonym for 'warmer' and 'firmer' for 'stronger.'
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intensively, he could fulfill the commandment of Deuteronomy 6:5, "You shall love the Lord your God," etc. But both the Master, in the text of the Sentences, and Augustine hold the opposite; they claim that this commandment is not one for us to fulfill but one for us to strive toward.36
Against this distinction [n. 57] I argue that only what is loved more firmly is loved more: what I love more is what I am less willing to see harmed and more prepared, out of love, to face difficulty in order to preserve its well-being, since being prepared to face such difficulty follows from love—I am talking about the love that is an act of will, not the one that is a passion of the sensory appetite. So even if people who do not love more firmly are sometimes said to love more warmly or gently, this is not because they have more intellectual love, but perhaps because they have a stronger passion, that is, a stronger sensory love, just as others who are called devout sometimes feel a greater sweetness than others who are much more steady and firm in the love of God, who are a hundred times more ready to suffer martyrdom for God's sake than the "devout" are. Nor is that sweetness an act elicited by the will; rather, it is a passion bestowed as a reward37 for an act of will, a passion by which God draws his little ones to himself and nourishes them, lest they faint on the way.38
I therefore say that "above all else" should be understood in both ways: both extensively and intensively. For just as I am obligated to love God above all else extensively, so too am I obligated to love him above all else intensively, with a greater affection than I love absolutely anything else. I say "greater" in the sense that it is more incompatible with the opposite effect [namely, an act of hating God]; on the contrary, such affection could be more easily inclined to the opposite of love for anything else than to the opposite of love for God.
As for the further point about the commandment [n. 57]: by parity of reasoning, one should say that we should have been commanded to have the vision of God, not so that we might fulfill the commandment but so that we might know what we ought to strive toward. That's perfectly obviously false.
And so I say that that commandment can be fulfilled in this life, both as to extent and as to intensity, in keeping with the approach set forth above [n. 53]. But it cannot be fulfilled as to all the conditions that are expressed by the addition "with all your heart,
36 Peter Lombard, Sent. III d. 27 c. 6 n. 2; he cites Augustine, De perfectione iustitiae hominis c. 8 n. 19.
37 reading retributa with all the MSS other than AP. The edition reads acquisita ("acquired"), which is difficult to construe with the dative form of the word for 'act' and moreover smacks of Pelagianism.
38 "little ones" recalls Luke 10:21, "I thank you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that you have hidden these things from the learned and wise and have revealed them to little ones"; "lest they faint on the way" comes from Matthew 15:32, just before the feeding of the four thousand, where Jesus says, "I have compassion for the crowd, because they have been with me now for three days and have nothing to eat; and I do not want to send them away hungry, lest they faint on the way."
THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUE OF CHARITY
with all your mind," etc.,39 because in this life there cannot be such a great mustering of one's powers, with all hindrances removed, that the will can be drawn with as vigorous an impulse as it could be if one's powers were united and mustered and all hindrances were removed. And we should understand what Augustine and the Master say about the commandment's not being fulfilled in this life as applying to this sort of intensity, with all hindrances removed and all powers mustered; for in this present life the [wayward] propensity of the lower powers hinders the higher powers from achieving their perfect acts. b. In what way a rational creature is obligated to love God above all else
On this point I say that the affirmative commandment of Deuteronomy 6 and Matthew 22,
"You shall love the Lord your God," etc., does not merely obligate us not to will the opposite (that is, to refrain from an act of hating God), but it also obligates us at some time to elicit an act. For that act concerns the end, and all moral goodness in acts concerning things that are for the end is derived from the goodness of the act concerning the end. So if human beings are obligated at some time to have a virtuous act, they are obligated at some time to have the act required by that commandment concerning the end that they are required to love for its own sake. And when, exactly, is perhaps determined by another divine commandment: "Keep the Sabbath holy"40 and "Let each of you stay where you are,"41 recollecting yourself and ascending to your God; and by way of specification the Church has required that one is to hear mass on the Lord's Day ("De consecratione," d. 1, "Masses").42 The commandment to love one's neighbor is different, as will become clear in the next question
[d. 28, nn. 17–20]. c. What the habit of charity is necessary for
As for the third topic of this article, the habit of charity, I say what I said elsewhere, in Book 1, d. 17 [nn. 64, 69–70, 80]: with respect to the intensity of the substance of the act, this habit gives an act an intensity beyond that which the power by itself, and with equal effort, could give to its own act.
And however much more perfect a created power would be [if it had such charity], that is how much more imperfect it would be if it did not have the created charity that corresponds to it proportionally. I mean arithmetic proportion; in terms of geometric proportion the difference in perfection would be equal: for clearly a greater will that lacks the charity proportionate to it falls short exactly as much, in terms of geometrical proportion, as a lesser will lacking the charity proportionate to it.
39 Deuteronomy 6:5, Matthew 22:37, Mark 12:30: "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind and with all your strength."
40 Exodus 20:8; for further discussion of this commandment, see Ordinatio III d. 37 nn. 21–4.
41 Exodus 16:29–30.
42 Decretum pars 3 'De consecratione' d. 1 c. 64. Scotus treats the Sunday obligation extensively at Ordinatio III d. 9 nn. 18–20.