I. Reply to the question
ORDINATIO II, D. , Q.
they preferred to be subordinate to God rather than to Lucifer. Therefore, their first sin was not pride.13
I. Reply to the question
The usual answer to the question is in the affirmative, on the strength of the argument by process of elimination given earlier [n. 27]. But in order to get at the truth of the question, we must show, first, what the badness was in the first angel who sinned, and second, to what kind of sin that badness belongs.
A. What was the badness in the first angel who sinned?
I. CONCERNING ORDERED AND DISORDERED ACTS OF THE WILL
Regarding the first question, we must examine the order of the acts of the will. On that point I hold that there are, at the most general level, two sorts of acts of will: willing and willing-against. For willing-against is a positive act of will by which it spurns what is unsuitable or draws back from an unsuitable object. Willing, by contrast, is an act by which the will accepts some suitable object. There are, further, two sorts of willing, which we can call friendship-willing and desire-willing: friendship-willing is the willing of an object for which I will good, and desirewilling is the willing of an object that I will for some other loved thing.
The order of these acts is clear: every willing-against presupposes some willing. After all, the only reason I spurn something is that it is incompatible with something that I accept as suitable. This is what Anselm says in On the Fall of the Devil 3, giving his example of the miser, the coin, and the bread. And the order of the two willings is also clear, since desire presupposes friendship-willing. For since the thing loved is, with respect to the thing desired, like the end for which I will the good (since it is on account of the thing loved that I desire for it the good that I will for it), and since the end is the primary object of will, it is evident that friendship-willing precedes desire-willing.
And from what has been proved it follows, further, that there is a similar progression in disordered acts of will. For no willing-against is the first disordered act of a will, since the will can have an act of willing-against only in virtue of some willing. And if that willing were well-ordered, accepting an object with the appropriate circumstances, then any willing-against that the will would have consequent upon that willing would likewise be well-ordered. In the same way, if a friendship-willing is well-ordered, the desire-willing consequent upon it will also be well-ordered. For if my love for the thing for which I will good is well-ordered, my desiring the good for that thing will also be well-ordered.
13 Cf. Bonaventure, Sent. II d. 5 a. 2 q. 1 arg. 2 in opp.; Thomas Aquinas, Sent. II d. 6 q. 1 a. 2 arg. 2 and ad 2, ST I q. 63 a. 8 arg. 2 and ad 2.
WAS THE ANGEL'S FIRST SIN FORMALLY PRIDE?
2. THE FIRST DISORDERED FRIENDSHIP-WILLING
37 It follows, therefore, that the unqualifiedly first disordered act of will was the first friendship-willing of that for which the angel willed good. Now that object was not God, since the angel could not have had a friendship-love toward God that was disordered in terms of its intensity, since God is so much worthy of love that by his very nature alone, as an object, he makes an act of friendship-love directed to himself—even a perfectly intense one—completely good. Nor is it plausible that the angel loved something other than himself too intensely by an act of friendship, for three reasons: because his natural inclination inclined him to love himself more than it inclined him to love any other created thing, because it does not seem that he understood any other created thing in the way he understood himself, and because friendship is founded on oneness (Ethics VIII [1158a10–13]) and things that are worthy of love for the sake of another derive from those that are worthy of love for one's own sake (Ethics IX [1168b1–10]). Therefore, his first disordered act was an act of friendship toward himself.
38 This is what Augustine says in the last chapter of City of God XIV: "Two loves created two cities. Love of God, to the point of contempt for self, created the City of God; love of self, to the point of contempt for God, created the city of the devil." So the ultimate root of the city of the devil was his disordered friendship-love for himself, a root that grew into contempt for God, in which that wickedness reached its pinnacle. Thus it is clear what the unqualifiedly first disorder of the will was in the first disordered willing.
3. THE FIRST DISORDERED DESIRE-WILLING
39 We still need to determine what the first disorder was in his desire-willing. a. The desire for happiness
On that score, we evidently ought to say that he first desired happiness for himself immoderately. I argue for this as follows:
First, his first disordered desire did not proceed from the affection for justice, as indeed no sin proceeded from the affection for justice. Therefore, it proceeded from the affection for the advantageous, since every elicited act of the will is elicited either in accordance with the affection for justice or in accordance with the affection for the advantageous, according to Anselm. The maximal advantageous thing is maximally desired by a will that does not follow the rule of justice, and so such a thing will be desired by it first, since nothing regulates that non-upright will other than its disordered and immoderate desire for that maximal advantageous thing. Now the maximal advantageous thing is complete happiness. Therefore, etc. This argument is derived from Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil 4: look for it there.
41 Second, the first sin in desiring was a willing, since the only reason someone spurns something for himself (that is, takes care to avoid getting or experiencing something) is that he desires the opposite for himself. Now the angel's desire for that
ORDINATIO II, D. , Q.
thing was a case of love for the honorable, for the useful, or for the pleasant, since there is no love other than these three. It was not a case of love for the honorable, since if it had been, the angel would not have sinned. Nor was it a case of love for the useful, since that is not a first love; for since what is useful is useful for something, no one desires what is useful prior to desiring the thing that it's useful for. Therefore, he first sinned by loving something excessively as the supremely pleasant thing. Now the supremely pleasant thing is the honorable good, that is, happiness itself as such.
Therefore, etc. This argument can be derived from the Philosopher, Ethics VIII [1155b18–21], and from the generally accepted distinction of the good as useful, pleasant, and honorable.
Third, there is a persuasive argument that goes like this: Every appetitive power whose act is consequent upon an act of an apprehensive power desires first the delightful thing that is supremely suitable to its associated cognitive power—or else it desires delight in the desirable thing, since in such a desirable thing the appetite is most fully satisfied. This is evident in the case of the appetite that is consequent on the apprehension of the sense of taste or of hearing or of touch. For any such appetite desires the supremely perfect object of the apprehensive power whose act it follows in desiring. For that reason a will separated from all sensory appetite first desires that which is supremely suited to the intellect; that desire is consequent upon that thing's suitability—or else it first desires delight in such an object, and consequently it desires happiness, which includes that object and act and the resulting delight.
Fourth, there is a persuasive argument that goes like this: What is first desired by a will not governed by justice is that which would be desired exclusively by the will if that object were the only object in existence, and apart from which nothing else is desired. Delight is such a thing. For if one were sad, one would not desire excellence or anything else; rather, one would desire delight or something like it.
So as to this second step, that is, as to the angel's sin [of desire],14 it seems that the angel first desired happiness. For just as the first sin of the visual appetite would be in desiring the most beautiful thing that is visible to its cognitive power, in which it would take the most complete delight and its desire would be fully satisfied, so also for a will conjoined to a sensory appetite, when that will does not follow justice or the rule of reason, its first object of desire is evidently something supremely delightful to that sensory appetite with which the will, in acting, is especially in conformity. So in human beings, which of the sensory appetites is in control varies with the variety of temperaments. If indeed each cognitive power has its own appetite, and the variety of temperaments results in different cognitive powers and their corresponding appetites being predominant in different people, then in any given person, I say, the will is
14 The first step was the sin of inordinate friendship-love for himself; the second step is the sin of inordinate desire-love of his own happiness.
WAS THE ANGEL'S FIRST SIN FORMALLY PRIDE?
principally inclined to its act in accordance with the predominant sensory appetite.
Therefore, one person who follows his first inclination apart from the rule of justice will be inclined first to lust, while another will be inclined first to pride, and another to something else.
45 Therefore, a will entirely separated from sensory appetite, and consequently not inclined to anything on account of sensory appetite, will, if it departs from justice, follow the absolute inclination of the will qua will. And that inclination is evidently toward the greatest object suited to the will or appetitive power, which is also the greatest perfection of the intellect or cognitive power. For that in which a cognitive power is most fully perfected is that in which the appetitive power corresponding to it is most fully perfected. Therefore, [the angel's first sin of desire] was an immoderate desire for happiness, since happiness is the object of the will.
46 Now you might argue against this view:
First, according to Augustine in On the Trinity XIII.5.8, "Happiness is desired by all."
Now whatever exists uniformly in all is evidently natural. Therefore, happiness is naturally desired. Now natural desire is always correct, because it is from God. Therefore, a will consonant with natural desire is always correct, since what is consonant with something correct is itself correct. Therefore, no one sins in desiring happiness.
47 Furthermore, according to Metaphysics II [993b4–5], no intellect errs concerning first principles. Therefore, neither does the will err concerning the ultimate end.
The inference is proved through the analogy drawn by the Philosopher in Ethics VII [1151a16–17] and Physics II [200a15–16]: "What a principle is in speculative matters, the end is in matters of action."
48 Furthermore, third: the good angels had an affection for the advantageous, just as the evil ones did. But according to Anselm in De concordia [q. 3 c. 13], "One cannot fail to will advantageous things." So the good angels willed the advantageous in just the same way that the evil angels did. Therefore, they all sinned equally if they sinned from the affection for the advantageous. Therefore, etc.
49 In order to make clear how these arguments are to be answered, I first distinguish what is meant by the affection for justice and the affection for the advantageous, of which Anselm speaks in On the Fall of the Devil 4.
Justice can be understood as infused justice, which is called gratuitous; or as acquired justice, which is called moral; or as innate justice, which is the will's freedom itself. Now imagine, in keeping with Anselm's thought-experiment in On the Fall of the Devil, that there is an angel who has only the affection for the advantageous and not the affection for justice—that is, an angel having intellectual appetite merely as such, and not as free. Such an angel would not be able not to will advantageous things, or even not to will them supremely. Nor would this willing be imputed to the angel as a sin, since that appetite would be related to its associated cognitive power as
ORDINATIO II, D. , Q.
the visual appetite is in fact related to vision: it would necessarily follow what is shown by its cognitive power and its own inclination to the best thing shown to it by that power, since it would not have the wherewithal to moderate itself. So that affection for justice, which is the first controller of the affection for the advantageous—both as to the fact that the will need not actually desire that to which the affection for the advantageous inclines it, and as to the fact that it need not desire it supremely (as much, that is, as the affection for the advantageous inclines it)—that affection for justice, I say, is the will's innate freedom, because it is the first controller of the affection for the advantageous.
Now Anselm frequently speaks not only of the act of acquired justice but also of the act of infused justice; for he says that justice is lost through mortal sin, which is true only of infused justice. Nevertheless, in distinguishing the two primary features of these two affections—the one inclining the will above all to what is advantageous, and the other controlling it so that it need not follow that inclination in eliciting its act— he makes it clear that they are nothing other than the will insofar as it is intellectual appetite and the will insofar as it is free. For, as I have said, as strictly intellectual appetite it would be actually supremely inclined to the best intelligible thing, just as the visual appetite is supremely inclined to the best visible thing. But insofar as the will is free, it can moderate itself in eliciting its act so that it does not follow that inclination either as to the substance of the act, or as to the intensity, to which the power is naturally inclined.
Now suppose there were a strictly appetitive power15 whose act followed upon the inclination of its associated apprehensive power in the way that the visual appetite follows upon the inclination of the sense of sight and upon [actual] sight. Although that power would not be able to desire anything but what is intelligible (just as the visual appetite cannot desire anything but what is visible), it would nonetheless not be able to sin, because it would not have the power to desire any thing, or in any way, other than as its cognitive power directed and inclined it. But that very same power, once it is made free (because what that comes to is for a single thing to include virtually a plurality of perfective characteristics that it would not include if it lacked the characteristic of freedom)—that power itself, I say, is able, thanks to its freedom, to moderate itself in willing, even with respect to the willing to which its affection for the advantageous inclines it, even if its affection for the advantageous inclines it to the greatest possible degree to will the advantageous. And precisely because it is able to moderate itself, it is obligated to moderate itself so that it conforms to the rule of justice that it receives from a higher will. Accordingly, it is clear that a free will is not required to will happiness in every way in which a will that was merely intellective appetite, without freedom, would will it; instead, in eliciting its act a free will is
15 That is, an appetitive power that lacked freedom.
WAS THE ANGEL'S FIRST SIN FORMALLY PRIDE?
required to moderate its appetite qua intellective appetite—in other words, to moderate its affection for the advantageous—so that it does not will immoderately.
52 Now there are three ways in which a will that is capable of moderating itself can will immoderately the happiness that is appropriate for it: with respect to intensity (that is, by willing happiness with greater fervor than is appropriate), with respect to precipitance (that is, by willing happiness for itself more hastily than is appropriate), or with respect to its cause (that is, by willing happiness for itself in a way that is not appropriate for it, say, apart from merits). Or perhaps there are other ways that we need not concern ourselves with here.
53 It is probable that the angel's will transgressed in one of these ways. The first possible way was by desiring happiness for himself insofar as it is his own good more than he loved happiness in itself: in other words, by desiring his own possession of that good as beatific object—as his good—more than he desired it to be in another, as in his
God. And in this is the supreme perversity of the will, which is using things that ought to be enjoyed and enjoying things that ought to be used, according to Augustine in question 30 of 83 Diverse Questions. A second possible way is that he could have desired to have happiness straightaway, whereas God wanted him to have it only after some time as a wayfarer. And a third way was by desiring to have it through his own natural powers, rather than by grace, whereas God wanted him to have it on the basis of merits.
54 His free will, then, ought to have moderated its affection in these respects, which it was the job of right reason to discern. For he ought to have desired happiness less for himself than for God, and at the time at which God willed him to have it, and on the basis of merits as God willed him to desire it. Therefore, if in any of these respects he followed the affection for the advantageous and did not moderate it in accordance with justice (through infused justice, if he had it, or through acquired justice, or through the innate or natural justice that is the very freedom of the will), he sinned.
55 On this basis, then, I reply to the objections. To the first [n. 46]: Natural will is not immoderate of itself. It merely inclines in the manner of nature, and there is no immoderateness in that, since it inclines in just the way that it has been given the power to incline, and it has no power to do anything else. But it is in the power of the will as free to follow that inclination in its elicited act or not.
56 So I concede the claim that there is a natural will for happiness. But this is not a will that is actually immoderate in an elicited act, since the inclination of natural appetite is not an elicited act, but merely a first perfection. And this first perfection is not immoderate, just as the nature to which it belongs is not immoderate. Nonetheless, the natural will is inclined to its object by the affection for the advantageous in such a way that if it did have an elicited act from itself, it would not be able to restrain itself from eliciting the act to the highest degree possible for it. But in fact that will as
ORDINATIO II, D. , Q.
having only the natural affection for the advantageous is not the cause of any elicited act. Only the will as free is the cause of any elicited act; and so, as eliciting an act, the will has the wherewithal to moderate its passion.
As for the premise that a will consonant with natural will is always correct, because natural will is always correct, I reply and say that if a will is consonant with what natural will would elicit if it acted by itself, it is not correct. For the will has a rule in acting that a natural will acting on its own would not have, and the will is bound to follow this higher will. Consequently, the will has the power to moderate that natural inclination and the power not to moderate it, since it is in the will's power to stop short of doing everything it has the power to do.
To the second objection [n. 47] I say, on the same basis, that it is not in the intellect's power to withhold its assent from the truths that it apprehends, for insofar as the truth of principles is evident from their terms or the truth of conclusions is evident from principles, it has to assent, because it lacks freedom. But the will has the power, with respect to both itself and inferior powers, to prevent that inclination from having complete sway in eliciting an act, or even to prevent the act from being elicited at all. For the will can avert the intellect from considering the speculative matters concerning which it has an inclination, and it is bound to avert the intellect if speculating about those things is a sin materially for the intellect or formally for the will. In the same way, the will is bound to moderate its inclination toward the ultimate end so that it does not will it immoderately, that is, in some way other than how it ought to will it, or will it for oneself rather than for its own sake.
Alternatively, it can be said that just as an act of intellect considering principles in themselves cannot be false, so too an act of will loving the end in itself cannot be bad; and this act is an act of friendship, not an act of desire. Nonetheless, just as an act of intellect can be false by attributing the truth of the first cause to some created principle to which such truth does not belong, so too an act of will can be bad by desiring the goodness of the end for something other than the ultimate end, in a way that is not appropriate for that other thing.
To the third objection [n. 48] I say that there was as great a natural inclination to happiness in the good angels as there was in the bad angels—even greater, if the good angels had better natural gifts, since this inclination is proportional to the perfection of one's natural gifts. Nonetheless, the good, in eliciting their act, did not exercise their will in accordance with its imperfect character—that is, as merely intellective appetite (acting, in other words, in the way they would have desired to act from [merely] intellective appetite). Rather, they exercised their will in accordance with its perfect character, which is freedom—acting according to their will in the way that is fitting for someone acting freely insofar as he performs a free act, in conformity with the rule determined by a superior will, and thus justly.
WAS THE ANGEL'S FIRST SIN FORMALLY PRIDE?
61 As for the claim that one cannot fail to will advantageous things, I respond that the good angels were neither able nor willing to will-against happiness for themselves, and indeed [to do otherwise than will happiness] by desiring it for themselves. But they did not will happiness for themselves more than they willed God's well-being for God's sake; rather, they willed their own happiness less, because thanks to their freedom they were able to moderate that willing in that way.
62 Now you might object that if that's true, they weren't really desiring happiness for themselves in the right way; they were merely moderating that desire in the right way.
I reply that having a perfect act of desiring a good for oneself, so that through that act the object is loved more for its own sake [than for the sake of the one desiring], comes from the affection for justice; for that in virtue of which I love something for its own sake is that in virtue of which I will something for its own sake. And in this way the good angels were able to desire happiness in such a way that, in possessing happiness, they would more perfectly love the supreme good—and this act of desiring happiness would be meritorious, because it does not involve using what ought to be enjoyed, but enjoying it, since the good that I desire for myself, I desire in order that I might love that good for its own sake all the more. b. The desire for excellence
Now that we have seen what the angel's first disordered desire was for, it can be stated that he went on to desire, in a disordered way, a certain good for himself: namely, excellence in comparison with others. Or else he had a disordered willing-against by willing-against the opposite of what he desired: namely, by willing-against happiness being in himself less than being in God (in fact, being
God), or willing-against waiting for happiness until his period of wayfaring had passed, or willing-against having it on the basis of merits rather than from himself, and consequently willing-against being subordinate to God—and finally, willingagainst the very being of God, in which his wickedness appears to have reached its pinnacle. For just as no act is formally better than loving God, so too no act is formally worse than hating God.
B. The kind of sin to which the badness in the first sinful angel belonged 64 As for the second topic [n. 33], we still need to investigate what sort of sins the following were: the angel's immoderate friendship-love [nn. 37–8]; his immoderate desire for happiness [nn. 40–62], which he desired in one of the three ways explained earlier [n. 53]; and the inordinate willing-against that followed (whichever of the aforementioned willings-against it might have been [n. 63]).
65 The standard view16 concerning the first sin is that it was pride.
16 Isidore, Sententiae I c. 10 nn. 7–8; Alcuin, Interrogationes et responsiones in Genesim n. 93; Rupert of Deutz, De Gloria et honore Filii hominis, super Matthaeum XIII, De glorificatione et processione Spiritus
Sancti I c. 8, De Victoria Verbi Dei I c. 8; William of Auxerre, Summa aurea II tr. 3 c. 2; William of Auvergne, De universo II-II c. 58; Albert the Great, Sent. II d. 5 a. 2 in corp. and ad argg., a. 3 in corp.,
ORDINATIO II, D. , Q.
This is evidently what Augustine holds in City of God XIV.13, where he claims that presumption is "being too pleased with oneself," which is why Scripture calls the proud "those who are pleased with themselves." Therefore, because immoderate delight in oneself is being immoderately pleased with oneself, [the angel's first sin] was pride, properly speaking, and thus presumption.
But there is evidently a controversial point here. If pride, properly speaking, is an immoderate desire for one's own excellence, and being immoderately pleased with oneself is evidently not, properly speaking, an immoderate desire for excellence, how does being immoderately pleased with oneself count as pride?
Also, second: someone who is presumptuous evidently puts himself ahead of others, either with regard to the goods that he really does have or with regard to those that he believes himself to have. But immoderate self-love does not seem to be selfpreference of this sort. For immoderate friendship-love for oneself and immoderate friendship-love for another (say, for one's neighbor) are evidently bad in the same way; but someone who loves another person immoderately is called lustful rather than presumptuous. So someone who loves himself immoderately is not called presumptuous either.
In reply to these arguments [nn. 66–7] I say that someone who immoderately loves some good wills immoderately that that good be a great, indeed the greatest possible, good. He wills this immoderately because, without willing that anything more should accrue to that good so that it will increase, he wills that it be greater in itself than it is.
And when he cannot achieve its being greater or better in itself than it is (since that's impossible), he consequently wills that it be as great as it can possibly be, either in comparison or in opinion: in comparison, meaning that he wills that it be preeminent over the goods of others; in opinion, meaning that others believe that his good is as great as possible. Accordingly the will to be preeminent or to rule over all others follows the will by which someone immoderately wills his own good.
So to the first argument [n. 66] I say that someone who is presumptuous (in the sense in which presumption is the first species of pride17) does not will that his own good be preeminent over the goods of others in terms of any superiority; he does not even will that it be preeminent in terms of reputation (as is the case for someone who desires praise). Rather, he wills that it be great in and of itself; he wills it to be so great that, without anything additional accruing to that good, it is greater than all other goods that he does not love in this way. Accordingly one can concede that the ST II tr. 5 q. 21 n. 2 in corp.; Bonaventure, Sent. II d. 5 a. 1 q. 1 in corp.; Thomas Aquinas, Sent. II d. 5 q. 1 a.
3 in corp.; Richard Middleton, Sent. II d. 5 princ. 1 q. 1 in corp.
17 For the four species of pride, see Gregory, Moralia in Iob XXIII c. 6 n. 13; Peter Lombard, Sent. II d. 42 c. 7 n. 2; Alexander of Hales, ST II-II n. 508 in corp.; Thomas Aquinas, Sent II d. 42 q. 2 a. 4 in corp.,
De malo q. 8 a. 4 in corp., ST II-II q. 162 a. 4 in corp.
WAS THE ANGEL'S FIRST SIN FORMALLY PRIDE?
immoderate self-love that is the "root of the city of the devil" is presumption, because someone who immoderately loves himself wills that he be as great a good as would be proportionate to his act of self-love. This is a way, and indeed a good way, to understand Augustine's claim in City of God XIV.13 that someone who is immoderately pleased with himself is proud (in the first species of pride): not by desiring the excellence that is a certain relation, but by desiring the excellence that is intrinsic greatness, from which excellence in relation to others follows.
70 To the second argument [n. 67] I say that presumption is not a sin of the intellect, as though the presumptuous person's intellect judged himself to be, or presented himself as being, greater than he in fact is. Rather, it is a sin of the will, which immoderately desires that its own good be greater than it in fact is; and from this follows a darkening of the intellect. As for the additional claim that this immoderate willing of oneself is evidently not pride, just as immoderate willing of one's neighbor is not, look elsewhere for my reply.18
71 But as for the disordered character of his desire-willing [n. 64], that desire for happiness was evidently not pride, properly speaking—not, at any rate, the first species of pride. This is clear because if presumption, as explained in the preceding article [n. 69], pertained to the first disordered friendship-willing, it does not pertain to any desire-willing. And if this sin should be assigned to any general class of sin, it is evidently more consonant with the sin of lust: for although lust, properly speaking, is a sin in carnal acts, one can nonetheless speak of lust in any case of immoderate desire for something delightful qua delightful, provided that what is desired is not excellence (and that desire for happiness was not a desire for excellence).19
72 As for the disordered character of the third act, the act of willing-against [n. 64], it is sufficiently clear that each of those willings-against was avarice or envy.
73 Someone might object that that disordered desire [n. 71] was not the sin of lust, so it must have been some other sin, properly speaking; and, by process of elimination, it was evidently not any sin other than pride (and this is proved20 on the basis of the celebrated and widely accepted classification of seven mortal sins). I reply: whether mortal sins are distinguished on the basis of bad habits that are opposed to good habits (such as the seven good habits, four moral and three theological) or—what seems more probable—on the basis of good acts (such as the acts corresponding to 18 See n. 74, as well as n. 69.
19 'Excellence' here has the relational sense, not the sense of intrinsic greatness (see n. 69).
20 Cassian, De institutis coenobiorum V c. 1, Collationes collat. 5 c. 2, 23, and especially c. 16; Gregory,
Moralia in Iob XXXI c. 45 n. 87; Isidore, Differentiae II c. 40 n. 161, Quest. in Vet. Test. In Deut c. 16 nn.
3–4; Alexander of Hales, ST II-II n. 498 opinion 3 and in corp., n. 496 in corp., and n. 497 in corp. and ad 6;
Bonaventure, Sent. II d. 42 dub. 3 arg. 1–2 in opp. and in corp.; Thomas Aquinas, Sent. II d. 42 q. 2 a. 3 in corp., d. 5 q. 1 a. 3 in corp., De malo q. 8 a. 1 arg. un. and in corp., ST I-II q. 84 a. 4 arg. in opp. and in corp.,
II-II q. 132 a. 4 in corp. and q. 162 a. 8 in corp.; Richard Middleton, Sent. II d. 42.