II. Replies to the preliminary arguments
ORDINATIO I, D. , PART , Q. (OMITTING NN. –)
that one who is happy is one who has whatever he can will ordinately, not only whatever he actually wills right now; otherwise a wayfarer could be happy at a time when he thinks of only one thing that he has, and has ordinately. Now the will can ordinately will to have charity, since it can will not only to have the substance of an act of enjoyment but also to have its enjoyment accepted by God. Therefore, if the will does not have this, it does not have whatever it can will ordinately. I shall discuss later, in distinction 17 [part 1, qq. 1–2], in what way charity is required, not only for the act to receive acceptance but also for the sake of a certain intrinsic level of perfection in the act.
II. Replies to the preliminary arguments
Replies to the preliminary arguments.
To the first argument [n. 77] I say that something is either aptitudinally suitable or actually suitable. What is aptitudinally suitable is what is suitable for something in its own right and in virtue of the nature of the thing. What is aptitudinally suitable is actually suitable for everything that lacks power over whether something is suitable or unsuitable; and therefore whatever is suitable to something naturally or aptitudinally according to natural or sensory appetite is also actually suitable to that thing.
But the will has power over whether something is actually suitable to it or not, since nothing is actually suitable to the will unless it actually pleases the will. For this reason I deny the minor premise, namely, "the end is necessarily suitable to the will."
For this is not true of actual suitability, but only of aptitudinal suitability.
Alternatively: even if aptitudinal suitability by itself is sufficient for delight, it is not sufficient for enjoyment. Indeed, it is in virtue of enjoyment that something becomes actually suitable, whether it is aptitudinally suitable or not. If the first assumption in this reply is true,28 one should deny the inference, "delight, therefore enjoyment."
To the second argument [n. 78] I say that the difference in modes of acting—properly speaking vs metaphorically—ruins the comparison as far as necessity is concerned.
Alternatively, just as something that necessarily acts-properly-speaking moves something contingently, so too something that necessarily acts-metaphorically moves something contingently. For an end—say, a natural agent—that necessarily moves something as efficient cause necessarily metaphorically-moves it, because that end is necessarily loved or naturally desired, whereas an end that moves something contingently as an efficient cause metaphorically-moves it contingently. In the present case, however, the efficient cause causes contingently and the end metaphoricallymoves contingently.
28 That is, if aptitudinal suitability by itself is sufficient for delight.
MUST A WILL ENJOY AN END APPREHENDED BY THE INTELLECT?
158 To the third argument [n. 79] I say that this "something immovable" need not be an elicited act. For a plurality of various and movable heatings do not presuppose one immovable heating; rather, they presuppose one first act, heat, which is a sufficient principle for eliciting all those various acts. Thus, in the present case, volitions do not presuppose one immovable volition; for if they did, a will that wills something for the end would always be the subject of two acts, or at least it would be the subject of one act that refers this to that. Rather, volitions presuppose a first act, the will, which is a sufficient basis for eliciting those various volitions.
Ordinatio I, d. 8, part 2, q. un., nn. 223–5, 269–74, 281–301 "Is God alone immutable?"
Concerning God's immutability, which the Master discusses in the second part of distinction 8 (though evidently one could derive immutability from God's simplicity, which I have already discussed [nn. 1–26]1), I ask whether God alone is immutable.
Arguments for the negative:
If God is immutable, he is related immutably to everything to which he is related immediately; therefore, something else is immutable.
Proof of the first inference: something immutable that is, of itself, a first agent cannot be related in diverse ways to its effect. For if something sometimes acts and sometimes does not act, this seems to be a consequence of some change on its part: for this cannot be attributed to its patient's coming newly into proximity to it, or to the removal of impediments, since a first agent does not require either of these things.
Proof of the second inference: whatever is related necessarily to something necessary is itself necessary.
Arguments for the affirmative:
Augustine, On the Trinity VI.6.8 and VII.5.10: "Every creature is mutable," and "only God is immutable."
And in 1 Timothy 6:16 we read, "He alone has immortality," which Augustine in On the Trinity I.1.2 explains by saying that "true immortality is immutability."2
1 Lombard, however, discusses immutability first and then simplicity: Sent. I d. 8 c. 2, 3–8.
2 Because I have not translated the whole question here, it might be helpful to have an outline of the rest of the question. Scotus goes on to argue that God is unqualifiedly immutable (nn. 226–9) and then investigates whether anything other than God is immutable (nn. 230–93). On the second issue, he says, there appears to be a dispute between theologians and philosophers, so Scotus begins by determining what the philosophers (chiefly Aristotle and Avicenna) actually meant, first by considering Henry of Ghent's view on the matter (nn. 232–49) and then by giving his own reading (nn. 250–8). He then offers arguments both for (nn. 259–62) and against the philosophers' view (examining and criticizing Henry's arguments in nn. 263–74 and then offering his own arguments in nn. 275–91). He then offers his own answer to the question (nn. 292–3). Finally, Scotus responds to the preliminary argument (nn. 294–301) and to the arguments for the philosophers' view (nn. 302–6); there the question ends. The translation provides