I. Reply to the question
Ordinatio IV, d. 17, q. un., nn. 1–2, 17–33 Sacramental confession and the natural law
1 "Here the question arises," etc.1
2 Concerning distinction 17, I ask whether it is necessary for a sinner's salvation that he confess all his sins to a priest.
I. Reply to the question 17 In this question there are three things that need to be investigated: (1) by what precept is a Christian required to confess to a priest a sin he has committed? (2) what does the precept about confession include? (3) what about that precept of the Church requires further explanation?
A. By what precept is a Christian required to confess to a priest a sin he has committed?
1. OF NATURAL LAW AND POSITIVE DIVINE OR ECCLESIASTICAL LAW
18 As to the first question, we cannot find any precept by which someone is required to make a confession other than (a) a precept of natural law or (b) a precept of positive law, either (b1) divine or (b2) ecclesiastical.
19 Now a practical truth that belongs to the natural law is one whose truth is known from its terms (and in that case it is a principle in the natural law, just as in speculative matters a principle is known from its terms) or2 one that follows manifestly from such a truth known in such a way (and this sort of truth is a demonstrated practical conclusion). Strictly speaking, nothing belongs to the natural law other than a principle or a demonstrated conclusion. But in an extended sense, a practical truth that is consonant with the principles and conclusions of the natural
1 Lombard, Sent. IV d. 17 c. 1 n. 1.
2 Reading vel (Q) for the edition's sive, and repunctuating.
ORDINATIO IV, D. , Q. UN., NN. –, –
law is sometimes said to belong to the natural law insofar as everyone knows right away that it coheres with (convenire) the natural law [in the strict sense]. And from this it is evident that Gratian3 spoke incorrectly about the natural law when he claimed that everything in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments belongs to the natural law. For not everything in Scripture is a practical principle known from its terms, or a demonstrated practical conclusion, or a truth manifestly consonant with such principles and conclusions. So we should interpret Gratian as extending the notion of natural law to include law established (positum) by the Author of Nature, as distinguished from positive law that is established by someone who is not the Author of Nature.
What belongs to (b1) divine positive law is clear from previous discussions.4 For all things contained in Scripture that are to be observed for some specified period of time and yet are not known from their terms or demonstrable from truths known in that way, and are not straightaway manifestly consonant with such truths, merely belong to divine positive law. All the ceremonies of the Jews in the time of that law, and all the ceremonies of Christians in the time of our law, are matters of divine positive law. For it is not known from terms or demonstrated or manifestly consonant with such truths that God is to be worshiped in the sacrifices of the Old Law, for whatever period of time, or that God is to be worshiped in our ceremonies, for example in the offering of the Eucharist and the singing of Psalms—though these are consonant with the natural law in the sense that they do not contradict it.
This too is clear: precepts that belong to the natural law, whether in its strict or its extended sense, are always uniform, whereas these ceremonies are not, since there were different ceremonies in the time of the other law.
What belongs to (b2) is clear, because beyond positive divine law, which is contained in Holy Scripture, the Church has established many laws both for the sake of more honorable conduct in moral matters and for the sake of greater reverence in receiving and administering the sacraments.
2. THE APPLICATION OF THESE REMARKS TO THE QUESTION AT HAND
a. The ages of the natural law and of the Mosaic Law
I say to the question at hand that one is not bound by a precept of the natural law to the sort of confession of sin that is being asked about here. For if one were, this obligation would have obtained in every age and under every law. And that's false, since there was no such obligation in the age of innocence or in the age of the Mosaic Law.
3 Decretum pars 1 d. 1, d.6.
4 Ordinatio IV d. 1 nn. 223–57, 343–5, 357, 370–81, 389–92.
SACRAMENTAL CONFESSION AND THE NATURAL LAW
23 Now you might object by drawing on the Gloss5 on Genesis 3:9, "Adam, where are you?," which speaks of "the voice of one accusing and asking for a confession."
Therefore, there was confession in the time of the natural law, after the fall.
24 Similarly, we read [in Leviticus] that Aaron and his sons were required to confess the sins of the children of Israel, and it says several times that those who sinned against the Law were required to confess their sin and offer such and such a sacrifice.
25 This is also confirmed by the fact that there are many authoritative passages in the Old Testament about making a confession, such as "A just man first accuses himself."6
26 Furthermore, one can show as follows that this is a conclusion following from principles of the natural law: "Every guilty person ought to be judged" and "No one should be the judge in his own case" are known; therefore, a guilty person ought to be judged by another. He cannot be judged by another unless he is accused before that other; and if his sin was hidden, he cannot be accused except by himself.
Therefore, he ought to accuse himself before another by whom he will be judged.
And it is more consonant with reason that this be done in secret than in public if the sin was hidden. Indeed, it is perhaps well-known-enough to natural reason that if a sin is hidden, the accusation ought to be hidden. Therefore, from propositions known by the natural law, or at least very manifestly consonant with it, it follows that secret confession of one's own sin ought to be made to another; and given that, there is no one more reasonable to whom one could make such a confession than to a priest.
27 I reply to the first [n. 23]: Adam should not have hidden his sin from God, since God is the judge to whom every sin is manifest and before whom every guilty person ought to acknowledge his sin; and God sought this confession from him. Not only did
Adam not make this confession, but he also excused his sin by throwing it back on his wife, saying, "The woman whom you gave me,"7 etc. So this passage does not establish that the natural law required confession to a human being, though it did require confession to God as accuser.
28 Reply to the second argument [n. 24]: the sort of confession we are talking about here was not made anywhere in the Mosaic Law. Rather, confession of hidden sins was made to God alone, whereas confession regarding public offenses and the observance of legal requirements was made both by individuals, when a given person would offer sacrifice for such wrongdoing, and in the general confession of the priest on behalf of the people:8 "We have sinned, we have acted unjustly,"9 etc. And in this way the 5 Glossa interl. Genesis 3:9.
6 Proverbs 18:17.
7 Genesis 3:12.
8 Reading generalis confessio sacerdotis pro populo (PZNQ) for the edition's generalis confessio sacerdotum (A).
9 Psalm 105:6.
ORDINATIO IV, D. , Q. UN., NN. –, –
priest's public confession was a certain disposition to ask for God's mercy on the people, in the same way that now, in the Church, by the confession that we are talking about we confess that we have sinned and ask for mercy for ourselves and for all people.
To the third argument [n. 25] I say that all the authoritative passages from the Old
Testament used to prove [the necessity of] confession in the sense that we are talking about here merely use the word 'confession' but do not have the relevant meaning. So what sort of confession are they talking about? I say that they are talking about either the general confession that the priests10 and Daniel11 and many other holy Jews12 made or about the confession of an individual's public transgression in failing to observe legal requirements, such as the irregularities that make one unclean in the eyes of the Law.13
As for that argument [n. 26], I concede that that proposition is known by the natural light, or at least is highly consonant with a proposition known [by the natural light]— namely, "A guilty person ought to be judged, since no transgression ought to be left unpunished in the universe, if there is one Governor of the universe, and he is just," which is naturally known or highly consonant with naturally known truths. And I concede the further claim that a guilty person ought to be judged by another.
But who that other is is not known by natural reason or even through any truths consonant with natural reason, except insofar as it applies to God, who is the rewarder of merits and punisher of sins. And in that case we can deny the further claim that that other cannot judge unless an accusation is made before him, since
God knows sins even before they are committed, without any accusation. Or suppose we grant that the proposition "the sinner should accuse himself of his fault before that Judge, because the sinner alone knows it" is consonant with truth known [by the natural light]. It still doesn't follow that a sinner should confess his sin to anyone other than God, and I concede that this sort of confession belonged to the natural law: that is, it is consonant with truths known from the natural law. For14 in every age after the Fall, just people who had faith that God was the just Governor of the universe15 would, after they had sinned against the law of God, confess their sins to God, asking for his forgiveness, knowing that apart from such forgiveness he, as a just judge, would punish them for their sin.
Now you might argue that a sinner ought to accuse himself before another, who is his judge. But that can't be proved through truths known by the natural law or manifestly consonant with such truths, since no sinner can be a judge of human sin except
10 Leviticus 4:1–12, 6:17–23; Numbers 15:25–6, 18:1–7; etc.
11 Daniel 9:4–19.
12 Exodus 32:31–2; 2 Chronicles 6:21–42; etc.
13 See Matthew 15:1–20; Mark 7:1–23.
14 Reading quia (PQ) for the edition's quod.
15 Reading rector universi iustus (Q) for the edition's rector universi et iustus punitor.
SACRAMENTAL CONFESSION AND THE NATURAL LAW
as a minister of the supreme Judge—and being a minister of the supreme Judge in judging or punishing sin is something entrusted to each person with regard to himself, more so than to one person with regard to another. For God has entrusted each person with being God's minister in judging his own sin by imposing sadness and displeasure on himself, whereas it is not as evident that God has entrusted anyone with being his minister in carrying out judgment against another for that other's sin.
33 You might argue that in civic affairs one person judges another. I reply: that is true of matters that can become known to someone in his capacity as judge: that is, public matters.
Ordinatio IV, d. 21, q. 2
"Is a confessor bound in every case to conceal a sin disclosed to him in confession?"
Second, I ask whether a confessor is bound in every case to conceal a sin disclosed to him in confession.
It seems that he is not:
It is licit for anyone to give up a right of his own. Now a penitent has the right for his sin to be concealed; therefore, it is licit for him to give up this right by giving permission to his confessor, so that the confessor is not bound to conceal it.
Also, Bernard says in On Commandment and Dispensation, chapter 4,1 "What was instituted for the sake of charity should not militate against charity." Now the concealment of a confessed sin would in certain circumstances militate against charity. Therefore, etc. Proof of the minor premise: whenever a confessed sin would be against the common good—for example, the crime of heresy or treason to the state—and especially if it was evident from the confession that the act was not just done already but still going to be done, it is evidently contrary to charity to shortchange the common good for the sake of a good of a private person.
Also, suppose certain men have agreed to kill a priest in the woods, and this priest is traveling with them. Before they reach the woods, one of them repents and confesses to that very priest. The priest is not bound to run the risk of death at the hands of the other men, who have not repented, without cause; therefore, he is also not bound to enter the woods. But by the act of not entering the woods he reveals to his other companions the confession of the one fellow-traveler who confessed, since he would not have abandoned their company had that one not confessed to him. Therefore, in this and similar cases it is licit to reveal a confession.2
1 Bernard, De praecepto et dispensatione, Epist. ad abbatem Columbrensem, c. 2 n. 5. Cf. Richard
Middleton, Sent. IV d. 21 princ. 4 q. 2 arg. 1 (he too says "chapter 4"); Thomas Aquinas, Sent. IV d. 21 q. 3 a. 1 qc. 1 arg. 1, and Peter of Tarentaise, Sent. IV d. 21 q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1, and others also cite Bernard.
2 Cf. Richard Middleton, Sent. IV d. 21 princ. 4 q. 2 arg. 5.
IS THE SEAL OF CONFESSION EXCEPTIONLESS?
59 Also, a priest absolves de facto a simoniacal bishop whom he cannot absolve de iure.3
This priest is bound to confess the particulars and circumstances of this sin, for4 it is a mortal sin, and these circumstances aggravate the sin. But in making this confession he reveals the sin of that simoniacal bishop. Therefore, etc.
60 Also, it is licit to reveal what is not a sin or a circumstance of a sin, such as the person—be it X or Y—with whom the penitent sinned, provided that this is not an aggravating circumstance.
61 Also, an abbot who has a monk in some place that belongs to his monastery knows, through the monk's confession, that the monk sinned in that place and that he has some questionable associates there, by whom he is frequently enticed to sin. It seems that he could take thought for the salvation of the monk's5 soul, so he could remove the monk from that responsibility or duty, so that the monk will not have such an occasion for sin. But by the act of removing him, he reveals the monk's confession, since he would not perform any such act if the monk had not confessed to him; moreover, as a result of the abbot's act, other people could come to know the monk's sin, at least generally.
62 Also, in the Decretals, "On the sentence of excommunication," Cum non ab homine:6
"You ought to avoid the company of someone who has incurred a sentence of excommunication for laying hands upon a cleric, unless perhaps you are the only one who knows about it, in which case you should merely avoid him privately." And it continues, "in order that, overwhelmed by the blush of shame, he might be impelled to make satisfaction for his hidden transgression." From this we can evidently conclude that if I know secretly, or through his confession, that he has incurred a sentence of excommunication, I ought to avoid him privately, so that he might be overwhelmed with shame. Therefore, it is licit to inflict shame on someone on account of his confession. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, it is licit to reveal his sin.
63 On the contrary:
"On penitence," distinction 6 (and quoted in the text):7 "Let a priest take care above all things that he not tell anyone about the sins that have been confessed to him, for if he tells anything, he must be deposed and pass all the days of his life wandering in ignominy."
3 According to canon law, only the pope, or someone with a special license from the pope, could absolve someone from the sin of simony (roughly, the buying and selling of ecclesiastical office). See Extravagantes
Communes V tit. 9 c. 3.
4 Reading quia (PZNQ) for the edition's quod (A).
5 Reading eius (NQ) for the edition's suae (PZ), which would mean the abbot's soul rather than the monk's (though in fact Scotus is pretty careless about the distinction between eius and suus).
6 Gregory IX, Decretales V tit. 39 c. 14.
7 Gratian, Decretum pars 2 causa 33 q. 3, "De poenitentia," d. 6 c. 2; Lombard, Sent. IV d. 21 c. 9 n. 1.