I. Reply to the question
ORDINATIO III, D. , Q. UN.
an intrinsic difference to an object of will but only to a sensory good, which is an object of the sensory appetite.
On the contrary:
"Virtue is a habit concerned with choice," according to the definition of virtue in Ethics II [1106b36–1107a1]. And choice is an act of either the will or reason, according to the Philosopher in Ethics VI [1139a22–3], "for it is either deliberative desire or [desiderative deliberation]." These belong to the will, whose act presupposes reason's cognition. A habit belongs to the power to which the relevant act belongs per se. Therefore, a moral habit belongs per se to the will itself.
Moreover, virtue has as its per se object the intrinsically worthy good, which is a per se object of the will.
Moreover, virtue is a principle of a praiseworthy act, according to Ethics II [1106a15–17]; but one does not deserve praise unless one acts voluntarily. Therefore, virtue, through which one acts in a praiseworthy way, belongs to the power to which acting freely belongs per se. That's the will.
I. Reply to the question A. Aquinas's view
One view4 is that the Philosopher answered this question in the negative, because wherever he discusses the moral virtues,5 he seems to concede that they are in the sensory part, whereas he never says that they are in the intellect, with the exception of justice (Ethics V [1229a6–9, 1134a1–2]).
The following arguments are given for this view:
First,6 the will is intrinsically determined to the good as such. For either the good as such is its proper object, as distinguished from the good-here-and-now (which is the object of the sensory appetite), or else, if the will can tend toward the goodhere-and-now, it can be sufficiently determined to tend or not tend toward such a good by reason's presentation of that good (it is, after all, clear that the apprehended object, as apprehended, moves the will). And thus it makes no sense to posit a habit in the will; rather, all that is needed is for the intellect to be adequately perfected so that it presents the object in the right way.
4 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II q. 56 a. 4 ad 3, a. 5 arg. in opp.; De virt. in comm. a. 4 in corp., a. 5 arg. 1 in opp.; In Pol. I c. 10; Sent. III d. 26 q. 2 a. 2 in corp. Concerning justice in particular, see Sent. III d. 33 q. 2 a.
4 qc. 3 in corp.; De virt. in comm. a. 5 in corp.
5 Reading with Q. The edition has "in the negative, or otherwise he spoke inadequately about the moral virtues, for wherever he discusses them."
6 Thomas Aquinas, De virt. in comm. a. 5 in corp.; Sent. III d. 23 q. 1 a. 4 qc. 4 in corp., d. 33 q. 2 a. 4 in corp.; ST I-II q. 56 a. 6 in corp., q. 57 a. 5 in corp., q. 58, a. 4 in corp.; In Eth. VI c. 10.
ARE THE MORAL VIRTUES IN THE WILL AS IN A SUBJECT?
12 Second,7 there is an argument based on the freedom of the will. Because the will, which is free, can sufficiently determine itself, it does not require anything else to determine it. There is a different way of arguing this same point:8 if the will acts freely, then being determined to action is incompatible with the nature of the will.9
But virtue inclines after the manner of nature. Thus, virtue is incompatible with the will's manner of acting, and so there is no virtue in the will.
13 Third,10 because "where there are extremes, there is an intermediate,"11 it follows that where there are excessive passions, there is virtue, which "moderates the passions."12
Passions are in the sensory appetite, not in the will.
14 Fourth,13 if there could be virtue in the will resulting from upright acts of will (which are distinct from acts of the sensory appetite), it would follow that an angel could acquire moral virtues from its upright moral volitions.14 That conclusion seems untenable, and it is contrary to the explicit position of the Philosopher in Ethics
X [1178b8–18], where he denies that separated substances possess moral virtues.
B. Henry of Ghent's view, which refutes Aquinas's
1. HENRY'S VIEW IN ITSELF
15 This view is refuted by arguments similar to those offered in favor of the view:
The first15 is based on the authority of Aristotle. For in Politics I [1260a14–20] he says, "The ruler must have virtue in order to rule rightly, a more preeminent virtue than the slave must have in order to obey rightly"; and he assigns the ruler's virtue to the higher part of the soul and the slave's to the lower part.
16 Moreover, they concede that justice is in the will [n. 13]. Therefore, the general arguments about the will and moral virtue [nn. 11–14] are not conclusive. And the authoritative passage from the Philosopher in Ethics I [1102b30–1] about what can obey reason should not be understood to be exclusively about the sensory appetite, because if that is all Aristotle means by what can obey reason, his division of the soul insofar as it is capable of moral virtue is inadequate. And thus, given his aim in discussing the soul, his division is inadequate; for he is discussing the soul insofar as it can acquire moral virtue, and in fact the soul can acquire justice. And that, at any rate, is enough to show that the 7 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II q. 13 a. 2 in corp; De veritate q. 22 a. 5 in corp., a. 6 in corp.
8 The argument that follows is not found in Aquinas; Scotus has assembled it from remarks found in ST I-II q. 10 a. 1 ad 1, a. 2 in corp., and a. 3 in corp.
9 Reading si libere agit, repugnat sibi determinari ad agendum (Q) for the edition's si libere agit ex se, repugnat sibi 'velle determinate', ipsam inclinans ad agendum.
10 Thomas Aquinas, In Eth. II c. 6; De virt. in comm. a. 4 in corp., a. 5 in corp.
11 Eth. Eud. III.4, 1231b34–35.
12 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II q. 59 a. 4 in corp., a. 5 ad 1, II-II q. 123 a. 4 ad 2.
13 Scotus derives this argument from Thomas Aquinas, De virt. in comm. a. 5 in corp.
14 Reading with Q. The edition has "from its upright volitions of moral virtues."
15 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. IV q. 22 in corp.
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soul can acquire moral virtue; but as they themselves understand that twofold division, justice belongs neither to reason nor to what can obey reason.16
Moreover, before the definition of virtue, around the middle of Book I [1097b34–1098a5], the Philosopher says the following, with the purpose of investigating the nature of happiness: "Excluding, therefore, the nutritive part, what comes next is the sensory part, which is evidently common to all animals. There remains an active part: one part of which acts as responsive to reason's persuasion, the other part of which acts as possessing reason and understanding." On the basis of this text it is clear that Aristotle first excludes the sensory part, since in that part there is no activity of a human being as human being, and activity in accordance with the moral virtues is precisely that sort of activity. Consequently, the moral virtues are not to be located primarily in the sensory part. Therefore, what is left—that is, the active part in one who has reason—is in and of itself a part of the soul that outstrips the whole sensory part. And Aristotle divides that part into a part that has understanding and a part that is responsive to reason's persuasion; since clearly by "the part that has understanding" he means the intellect, he must understand "the part that is responsive to reason's persuasion" as the will.
One can see very explicitly in his writings that he sometimes describes the will as "capable of obeying reason," but he also sometimes describes the sensory appetite as "capable of obeying reason," as he does at the end of Ethics I. There are two ways of understanding 'capable of obeying reason,' corresponding to the two ways of understanding 'rational.' 'Rational' can be understood strictly and in its primary sense, as applying exclusively to the intellect; it can also be understood neither strictly nor in its primary sense, and yet in an unqualified sense, as applying to the will. (It applies to the sensory appetite in a third way, not properly but merely transumptively.) So that intermediate part, the will, is sometimes described as 'rational' on the basis of one extreme, sometimes as 'capable of obeying reason' on the basis of the other extreme.
For if we take 'reason' strictly, the will is responsive to reason's persuasion; but if we take 'reason' more broadly (though not improperly, but just for what belongs to mind), the will is itself rational. The sensory appetite, however, is not responsive to reason's persuasion, but capable of obeying reason.17 These descriptions can be easily established: what is truly free is responsive to reason's persuasion, not (properly speaking) capable of obeying reason;18 whereas the sensory appetite, which is not free, is not properly responsive to reason's persuasion, but capable of obeying reason, because it can be subject to reason's command.
16 Reading with Q.
17 Reading Appetitus autem sensitivus non est persuasibilis a ratione sed obedibilis rationi with Q. The edition has Appetitus sensitivus non tantum est persuasibilis, set etiam obedibilis est. Since Scotus goes on to distinguish "responsive to persuasion" from "capable of obeying," and to say that the former does not, whereas the latter does, characterize the sensory appetite, the edition's reading cannot be correct.
18 Reading sed non proprie obedibile for the edition's sed non proprie persuasibile sed obedibile (A).
ARE THE MORAL VIRTUES IN THE WILL AS IN A SUBJECT?
18 Furthermore, many authorities can be cited in favor of this position:
One is Augustine, On the Morals of the Church I.15, where he claims that the four moral virtues are nothing other than well-ordered love, or well-ordered loves. Look it up there.
19 Augustine speaks about this at great length in City of God XIV.5–6. Look it up there.
20 Avicenna speaks about this in the last chapter of Metaphysics IX.
2. AGAINST THE ARGUMENTS FOR AQUINAS'S VIEW
21 Furthermore, the arguments offered in support of the first view can be used to support the opposite conclusion:19
22 The first argument [n. 11] does so as follows: the will is undetermined to opposites— not merely to opposite objects, but to opposite ways of acting, that is, to acting rightly and not rightly. Therefore, the will needs something determinative inclining it to act rightly, and that will be a virtue. The inference is evident: the only reason there is any need to posit virtues in powers is so that they can regulate powers that in and of themselves can act both rightly and not rightly. Proof of the antecedent: the will can choose anything presented to it in which the character of its primary object is presented; but in choosing such things, it can act not rightly.
23 Now you might say,20 "it is sufficient [for right action] that reason present the object rightly; therefore, there is no need for virtue in the will, but only in reason." But that's false, because then it would have to be the case that reason is mistaken in its presentation of the object before the will chooses wrongly, and thus before the first sin in the will there would be error in the intellect—which is irrational: it would mean that there was punishment before there was any guilt.21
24 Moreover, even if one granted22 that the will could be sufficiently determined through the intellect to choose rightly, it does not follow that no habit is generated in the will.23 For24 the intellect is more determined to judge rightly [than the will is to choose rightly], since insofar as the intellect has an activity prior to the will's act,
19 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. IV q. 22 in corp.
20 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II q. 8 a. 2 in corp., q. 13 a. 1 in corp., a. 6 in corp., q. 15 a. 4 in corp., q. 19 a. 3 in corp. and ad 1, a. 4.
21 See Henry of Ghent, Quodl. I q. 17 in corp.; Scotus, Lectura II d. 25 nn. 33–5, 40–3.
22 Thomas Aquinas, De virt. in comm. a. 6 in corp.; Sent. II d. 24 q. 3 a. 3 ad 2, III d. 33 q. 1 a. 1 qc. 2 in corp.; ST I-II q. 58 a. 4 in corp., a. 5 in corp.
23 Reading ea (=will) with ZBQ for the edition's eo (=intellect). Since the argument he's refuting purports to show that there is no habit in the will, it would hardly be germane for him to respond by saying that there can be a habit in the intellect. And the argument he proceeds to give is obviously an argument for positing a habit in the will.
24 The edition, rejecting the unanimous reading of the MSS, instead has the following: "it does not follow that there is not generated in it [the intellect] a habit with which the intellect is more determined to judge rightly."
ORDINATIO III, D. , Q. UN.
it acts purely naturally. And yet no one denies that a habit for judging rightly—namely, prudence—is generated in the intellect from frequent acts. So since the will is not, in and of itself, a power that is more determined to one than is the intellect, a certain upright disposition inclining the will to similar acts can be generated from frequent elicited acts of will. I call that a virtue.
Moreover,25 habits are not posited only to enable powers to act rightly, but also to enable them to act readily and with pleasure.26 Now even if the will could be determined by reason to choose rightly, it could not be determined to do so readily and with pleasure without a habit of its own. A proof of this: suppose someone who was formerly vicious begins to be called back toward good, and his right reason dictates that he choose something contrary to his vice; if he does choose accordingly, he won't do so with pleasure. For his whole vicious habit is not corrupted right away in that first act; indeed, it is hardly, if at all, diminished. This is obvious from experience: someone newly converted chooses what is good with difficulty, and it would be pleasant for him to choose in accordance with his prior bad pattern of behavior. Therefore, in order for the will to have pleasure in doing what reason dictates, it needs a habit for eliciting an act that conforms to that habit.
So to the first argument [n. 11] I respond that it equivocates on "the good as such."
That can be understood either as contrasted with the apparent good or as contrasted with some particular good. If understood in the first way, the good as such is not the adequate object of the will, because in that case the will could not have an act concerning an apparent good; for no power can have an act concerning something in which the character of its first object is not found. And thus the will of every wayfarer would be confirmed [in perfect goodness] just on the basis of its object, or prevented from the possibility of sinning. If "the good as such" is understood in the second way, it can be conceded that the good qua good is the object of an appetitive power27 and of its associated cognitive power. Now sense (according to the received opinion) cognizes the singular, and intellect cognizes the universal. Therefore, the sensory appetite has as its object the good-here-and-now—that is to say, the singular good with its individuating conditions—whereas the will has as its object the good as it is presented to the will by the intellect, which is the universal good and the good as such.
As for the further point made in that argument, that all that is needed is for reason to present the object rightly, that is contrary to the following: "Error: that the will cannot act contrary [to the intellect] either concerning the universal or concerning the particular."28
25 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. IV q. 22 in corp.
26 Aristotle, Nic. Eth. I.9, 1009a14; II.5, 1106a15–17; Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 17 n. 7.
27 Reading appetitivae with the majority of MSS. The edition, reading with A, has appetibile a voluntate.
28 Cf. Condemnation of 1277, a. 129.
ARE THE MORAL VIRTUES IN THE WILL AS IN A SUBJECT?
28 Here is how the second argument [n. 12] is used to support the opposite conclusion.
Something that has action within its power needs to be disposed through virtue more than something that does not have action within its power. For something that does not have action within its power does not act in a praiseworthy or blameworthy way, whereas something that does have action within its power does. Therefore, it needs that through which it can act in a praiseworthy way: and that is identified as a virtue.
Now the will has its own action within its power, and the sensory appetite does not.
Therefore, etc.29
29 It also seems incredible that the very thing on account of which human beings are praised for their actions is in them strictly according to what they have in common with non-rational animals.30
30 And it won't do to argue here that a natural agent is determined to acting, and therefore so is the will, because the will is a power that acts naturally.31 For everyone agrees that there are no habits in purely natural agents, because they are already inclined as much as they can be, in and of themselves. By contrast, people agree that there can be a habit in the intellect (which acts more naturally than the will does) because the intellect is not inclined as much as it can be, in and of itself. And that lack of determination does not derive from the imperfection of the active power, but rather from its lack of limitation, which is a perfection of an active power. Other, purely natural, active powers are limited to one in such a way that they cannot act in a contrary, or at any rate in a contradictory, way. The will is not limited in this way, as was said in Book II, d. 25.32
31 And the other proof that is added there—that virtue inclines after the manner of nature, which is contrary to the will's manner of acting—would establish33 that charity and hope aren't in the will either, which is contrary to the universal consensus of theologians.
32 So in reply to those two proofs [n. 12]:
In reply to the first: although the will in virtue of its freedom can determine itself in acting, nonetheless, it is capable of receiving, as a consequence of its action, a certain disposition that is left behind in it and inclines it to similar action. For that unique determination of the will is not through a natural form (the sort of operative form there is in fire); rather, it results from free action, which proceeds from a power that is indeterminate and is thus capable of being determined through a habit.
29 The whole paragraph reads with Q.
30 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II q. 13 a. 2 ad 2–3.
31 Cf. ibid. in corp.; De veritate q. 22 a. 5 in corp.
32 Lectura II d. 25 nn. 37, 93.
33 Reading with Q. The edition has "after the manner of nature—is not valid, because it would establish contra eos" [where contra eos, which appears only in ANY, presumably means "contrary to the views of the very people offering the argument"].
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The reply to the second proof is evident from what I said in Book I, d. 17 [nn. 32, 40,
69–70], and Book II, d. 25,34 about how a secondary cause that acts naturally can concur with a prior cause that acts freely, and how the effect is said to be free in virtue of the freedom of the principal cause, whereas a habit—if it is even a cause of the substance of an act—is a secondary cause with respect to the will.
Here is how the third argument, the one about moderating the passions [n. 13], is used to support the opposite conclusion.
For one thing, there are passions in the will, according to Augustine in City of God
XIV.5–6. So if for the sake of moderating passion virtue has to be posited in the highest part of the power in which passion is located, it follows that because there are passions in the highest part of the soul—that is, the will—virtues are posited in the will.35
Moreover, moderating a passion can be understood in two ways: moderating a present passion, or moderating a future passion.
There are two ways in which a present passion can be moderated. One is by diminishing the passion that is apt to be caused by the object in itself, so that the passion is not immoderate in the way that the object would be apt to please the sensory power if that power were left to itself. The other is to refer that pleasure to an end that is suitable according to right reason, and to which that pleasure would not be referred simply in virtue of the absolute character of the object of the sensory appetite.
Moderating a future passion can be understood as either avoiding an object that is apt to give immoderate pleasure or as having dealings only with objects that are apt to give moderate pleasure. In these cases a future passion is not moderated in itself; rather, one takes precautions so that no immoderate passion comes to be present.
No matter in which of these ways one understands moderating passion, it can characterize the will more than the sensory appetite, if passion is or will be in the sensory appetite.
As for a present passion, if it is possible for it to be diminished, the will, because it acts freely, is more able to diminish it than is the sensory appetite, which is acted on by the object (or acts in cooperation with it) to the utmost extent possible. And the will is more able to refer something to an end consonant with right reason than is the sensory appetite, since the will is reason's own appetitive power and is thus properly
34 Lectura II d. 25 nn. 69–74.
35 Reading Igitur si propter moderationem passionum ponenda sit virtus in supremo ipsius potentiae in qua est passio, sequitur quod cum <in> suprema parte animae, scilicet voluntate, sint aliquae passiones, quod ibi ponentur virtutes with Q. The edition has et propter hoc, si propter actionem et passionem ponenda sit virtus in illa potentia in qua est passio et actio voluntatis, sequitur quod cum passiones aliquae sint in suprema parte animae, quod ibi ponantur virtutes. The intrusion of actio into an argument that has been about passio is puzzling, though it appears in almost all the MSS. Q's reading is preferable as giving a response that is fully germane and introduces no irrelevant ideas.
ARE THE MORAL VIRTUES IN THE WILL AS IN A SUBJECT?
capable of relating something to the end that reason presents. Indeed, use, which is referring something to an appropriate end, is not an act of the sensory appetite, but of the will. For properly speaking one does not say that sensory powers relate one thing to another, as will, intellect, and reason do.
If we're talking about taking precautions against immoderate passions and allowing only moderate passions, it seems perfectly clear that the will is more able to have an upright act concerning the future than the sensory appetite is, because the cognitive power associated with the will—namely, reason—can deliberate about future things, but sense cannot.36
37 So it is clear how these arguments given for the view I am opposing can be made into arguments for the opposite of that view: (1) because the will is not upright in and of itself but can be made upright with respect to its proper operation, (2) because the will is indeterminate and can be made determinate no less than the intellect (which can have habits, as everyone agrees), (3) because the will is apt to have its own pleasure in its own operation and thus to have a habit by which it acts with pleasure,
(4) because the will, being free, has the principal role in performing human actions, and praiseworthy human actions require virtue, the ground of praise, in their principal agent, (5) because the will is more able to moderate passions through a habit in the requisite way than the sensory appetite is (if the sensory appetite even has passions).
3. AGAINST THE CONCLUSION OF AQUINAS'S VIEW
38 In addition to these arguments [nn. 15–37], there is the following argument against one who holds this view. Given that, according to him, in the state of innocence there would be no passion in the sensory appetite opposed to right reason,37 it would not be necessary to posit virtue in that sensory appetite. And yet there would have been virtues in that state, because human beings in that state would have been perfect through the virtues, as the Master says in this distinction.38
39 The authority of Augustine in Letter 35 or 3639 speaks in favor of this conclusion.
40 Also, Augustine says in the Soliloquies [I.6.13] that "perfect reason is the soul attaining its end."
41 Also, City of God XI.15.40
36 The edition notes: Scotus does not turn the fourth argument [n. 14] on its head here, but he gives it a fuller statement below [nn. 46–7] and then subjects it to examination [nn. 49–56].
37 ST I q. 95 a. 2 in corp.
38 Peter Lombard, Sent. III d. 33 c. 1 nn. 2–3.
39 Augustine, Epist. 155, ad Macedonium c. 3 n. 12.
40 Augustine, De civitate Dei XIV.6, XV.22.
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Also, the Master identifies acts that can remain in heaven; they are not acts of the sensory appetite.41
C. Scotus's view
In reply to the question it can be said that although the will could have an upright and morally good act without any habit, and the intellect can make a right judgment without any intellectual habit (indeed, the intellect's first right act and the will's first upright act precede any habit of whatever degree, since any habit is first generated from acts), nonetheless, just as the habit of prudence is generated in the intellect either from its first act or from several elicited acts, so too an upright virtue, inclining the will to choose rightly, is generated in the will either from its first upright choice in conformity with a dictate of right reason or from several upright choices.
Proof: the will's choosing is naturally prior to will's or reason's giving any command to the sensory appetite. For it seems that reason affects the sensory appetite only through the mediation of the will, which is properly rational appetite; and the will wills something in its own right before it commands a lower power to act with respect to42 that thing. After all, it's not because the will commands an inferior power that the will wills something, but the other way around. So in that prior stage, the will can, through upright choices (for the will is every bit as indeterminate and capable of becoming determinate as the intellect is), generate a habit in itself that inclines it to choose rightly. And a habit in the will is a virtue in the most proper sense, since it is in the most proper sense a habit concerned with choice that inclines one to act [rightly], the sort of habit that is generated through upright choices.
It can, however, be conceded that if the will, in willing, can command the sensory appetite either in moderating its passion or in commanding pursuit or avoidance as43 acts of the sensory appetite, through those upright commands the will can leave behind a habit in the sensory appetite, a habit that inclines the sensory appetite to be moved pleasurably toward similar things by reason's command. And although this habit that is left behind is not properly a virtue, because it is not a habit concerned with choice or a habit that inclines toward choosing, one can nevertheless concede that it is a virtue in some sense, because it inclines toward those things that are consonant with right reason.
D. Objections to Scotus's view
Against the first point [nn. 43–4] one might object that if this were the case, there could be moral virtues in an angel [cf. n. 14]. Proof: an angel can have upright willings concerning things that are apt to cause passions in the sensory appetite, and 41 Peter Lombard, Sent. III d. 33 c. 3 nn. 1–4.
42 Reading circa with ZNYQ for the edition's contra.
43 Reading sicut with Q for the edition's si sint, and repunctuating.
ARE THE MORAL VIRTUES IN THE WILL AS IN A SUBJECT?
thus a virtue would be generated in the angel as a result of many such upright willings. Confirmation: there can be upright choice not only regarding passions that are present in the sensory appetite but also regarding passions presented by the intellect, even if those passions never will be and never have been present, as was discussed in the question on practical science in the prologue to Book I.44 Therefore, through such choices a virtue is generated in the will, with no counterpart in the sensory appetite.
47 Moreover, if moral virtue were in the will, then the will would be nobler than prudence, because the perfection of a nobler perfectible is a nobler perfection.45
The consequent is contrary to the Philosopher in Ethics VI [1143a8–9]; therefore, so is the antecedent.
48 Against the second point [n. 45] one might argue that if a quality inclining the sensory appetite to similar acts can be generated in it solely from being moved by the will's command, and that quality is a virtue, then by parity of reasoning a moral habit could be generated in the body if it is frequently moved by the will's command—and not only in the body, but in inanimate and non-rational things that the will uses.
E. Response to objections 49 To the first objection [n. 46] it can be conceded that if an angel were created in a purely natural state, not having moral virtues in the will, they could be generated in the angel through many upright choices—not of course regarding passions present in the sensory appetite (and also not regarding passions that were or will be or can be present), but only concerning such passions presented in the abstract by the intellect.
If the intellect made such a presentation and dictated that one should choose thus-andso when experiencing those passions (supposing one had the capacity to experience them), the angel's will could, as a result of many choices, have an upright moral habit consonant with such a dictate.
50 Proof of this: First, any will that does not necessarily lack a perfection suitable for a will can suitably have any perfection that can characterize a will. Now willing something good in the domain of possible actions, not only for oneself but also for another (and this not only with reference to the divine good, but insofar as it is a good belonging to the agent himself) is a perfection that can characterize a will. And an angel's will is not necessarily imperfect. Therefore, it is possible for an angel to possess a habit by which he wills for me the good of temperance as a good that is suitable for me. This habit can't be called charity because (as I have said) it is not concerned exclusively with a good ordered to loving God; it is directed at what is good about temperance distinctively. And this habit is none other than temperance, because the formal character of a habit does not vary depending on whether it is
44 Ordinatio prol. n. 288.
45 Ibid. n. 353.
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"for me" or "for you." Therefore, just as I choose this good for myself by what is formally the habit of temperance, so too someone else can will this good for me by a habit of the same character. And thus in the angel there will be temperance by which he wills this good for me.
And in this same way, it can be inferred that the character of the moral virtues can be posited in God, in the same way that everyone concedes that there is charity in God, though without its accidentality.46
And thus on the basis of this argument about angels [n. 46], which is offered as a refutation of my position, one can actually produce an argument in its favor: for an angel's will can will for me the good that is my own habit of temperance qua this particular sort of good; therefore, he can will that through a habit of temperance, as I have argued [n. 50]; and thus there will be temperance in the angel—and not in a sensory part, so in another part [namely, the will].
And if someone should object that this is contrary to the Philosopher, who in Ethics
X [1178b8–18] denies that the gods possess moral virtues, I reply: perhaps he denied that they possess any accidental habit because he held, as others did,47 that they are naturally good.
Alternatively, if you don't like positing moral virtues in them, you could deny the inference made in the argument offered against my position [n. 46]. This could be done in either of the following ways:
One way is to say that virtue does not concern just any good, but good that is difficult; and this sort of good, which is said to be an object of virtue,48 is difficult only for someone who has a sensory appetite that is apt to be drawn to something opposed to that good, at least with respect to some circumstance. And in virtue of the sensory appetite's being inclined in this way, the will is apt to share in the sensory appetite's pleasure in that same thing. As a result, it is difficult for the will to tend to a good characterized by all the appropriate circumstances.49 Now the will of an angel, who has no sensory appetite, is not apt to share in the pleasure of a sensory appetite,50 and thus it tends without difficulty toward the moral good, that is, a good characterized by the right circumstances.
46 By way of explaining what is meant by 'accidentality,' the edition cites Peter Lombard for the claim that divine love is not susceptible to variation in intensity (intension or remission). Alternatively (and, it seems to me, more plausibly), Scotus means that charity is not an accident in God.
47 Augustine, De civitate Dei IV.18.
48 The edition has "which is said to be this sort of object of will." All the MSS but AZ omit "this sort of";
Q alone has "virtue" for "will."
49 Reading bonum debite circumstantionatum (SBQ) for the edition's bonum indebite circumstantionatum.
50 Reading Voluntas autem angeli non est coniuncta appetitui sensitivo, non est nata condelectari sibi with Q.
ARE THE MORAL VIRTUES IN THE WILL AS IN A SUBJECT?
55 The other way is to say that there are two kinds of volition: simple volition, which is a kind of taking-pleasure in an object; and efficacious volition, by which the one willing makes an effort to obtain the thing willed for himself unless he is prevented from doing so. Only the second properly counts as choice in the way that the Philosopher speaks of it in Ethics III [1111b20–3]: "There is will of impossible things, but not choice." For no one chooses—that is, efficaciously wills and as a result makes an effort to obtain—what is impossible, though perhaps someone could will impossible things in the sense of a simple taking-pleasure in them. (Perhaps that's how the first angel sinned, or could have sinned, by willing something impossible, namely, equality with God.)51
56 So it can be said that in things that have a sensory appetite, the will can be the principle of many choices with respect to the moral good, and this efficacious volition is choice, which alone is apt to generate a habit. That habit, though prior to any habit in the sensory appetite, is nonetheless apt to be a principle for commanding the sensory appetite. By contrast, in an angel there can be simple volition, but not a volition apt to command.
57 In reply to the second objection [n. 47]: although it could be said that not every perfection of a nobler perfectible power must itself be nobler—for in a nobler power there can be a perfection that is less noble than some perfection in a less noble power—it must nevertheless be the case that the highest perfection of a nobler power exceeds the highest perfection of a less noble power. But moral virtue is not the highest perfection of the will, and prudence is not the highest perfection of the intellect. Rather, charity is the highest perfection of the will and faith is the highest perfection of the intellect, and charity evidently exceeds faith.
58 But that response does not seem adequate, because a nobler power evidently has a nobler act with respect to one and the same object when both powers act to their utmost. For in that sort of case, neither power exceeds the other in terms of the object
(since it's the same object), but only in terms of the powers: and it is precisely in that respect that the nobler power exceeds the less noble. Therefore, since both the practical intellect and the will have an act concerning the moral good, which is one and the same object, if both of them act perfectly (the intellect in dictating and the will in choosing), the correct choice will be unqualifiedly nobler than the correct dictate. And consequently the habit generated from correct choices will be unqualifiedly more perfect than the habit generated from correct dictates52—which I concede.
51 See Ordinatio II d. 6 n. 11.
52 Reading habitus generatus ex electionibus rectis erit nobilior habitu generato ex dictaminibus rectis with NYQ. The edition reads habitus generatus ex electionibus erit perfectior simpliciter habitu generato ex actibus nobilioribus, which is manifestly incorrect, since it implies that correct dictates are nobler than correct choices, which Scotus has just explicitly denied.