II. Replies to the preliminary arguments
ORDINATIO II, DD. –, Q.
would not be true if sin did not take away anything from the perfection of a nature but merely prevented such perfections in second act.
An argument19 for the claim that sin corrupts grace is that grace is destroyed by mortal sin. If sin did not formally corrupt grace, grace would be compatible with mortal sin, which is absurd.
To the first I reply that what is wounded loses no part of itself, though its wholeness is undermined and it is thereby rendered less fit for its activities; indeed, it is deprived of the good use of itself. Thus a nature that remains intact (as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names c. 4) is wounded when it is made unfit for its right use, and that happens through the repeated lack of actual rectitude.
To the second I say that sin cannot efficiently cause the corruption of grace. Rather, it only causes it demeritoriously, in such a way that the will's turning itself away is naturally prior to God's ceasing to conserve grace.20 But every privation must be formally of some positive feature with which it is impossible for the privation to coexist. Therefore, sin is not formally the privation of grace, because sin does not destroy grace in virtue of incompossibility, but as demeritorious.
II. Replies to the preliminary arguments
Replies to the arguments:
To the first argument [n. 11]: "something said, done, or desired" identifies the material element in sin: "something desired" identifies the proximate matter and "something said" and "something done" the remote matter. "Contrary to the law of God" identifies the formal element in sin.
In reply to the second argument [n. 12] it is clear that the basis for the distinction in sins is in fact a distinction in privations, in the way in which privations can be distinguished [n. 59].
In reply to the third argument [n. 13] it is clear that corruption is formally this privation of this good, which would be in the act if the privation were not, and of which this privation is a privation. As for the argument from Augustine, evil does not harm the one in whom it exists in himself, by taking away something that belongs to his nature, but rather by taking away a perfection suited to him, namely, actual justice.
19 Thomas Aquinas, ST II-II q. 24 a. 10, a. 12 in corp.
20 Reading ita quod prius naturaliter avertit se voluntas quam Deus cesset conservare gratiam (Q) for the edition's ita quod prius naturaliter voluntas avertit se naturaliter quam Deus cesset naturaliter conservare gratiam. The second naturaliter is redundant after the first one (and only three of ten collated MSS have both), and the third naturaliter (though admittedly present in all the MSS besides Q) would have Scotus saying that God conserves grace "naturally," which is very odd.
IS SIN PER SE A CORRUPTION OF GOOD?
70 And if someone were to object that actual justice was not present and therefore cannot be corrupted, the response is evident from what I have said. For what follows is that it is not corrupted in the sense of being changed from being to non-being; rather, it is corrupted formally in that its privation is in him and the good of justice is not. It is in just this way that original sin corrupts original justice: it is a privation of original justice, not the destruction of original justice that had previously existed in someone.