II. Reply to the preliminary argument
ORDINATIO I, D. , Q. UN.
same circumstances are not fitting for an act as that act proceeds from different agents. After all, it is not fitting for a created will to will something good as intensely as it is fitting for the uncreated will to will it, and the intensity of an act with respect to an object is a great difference between a created agent and the uncreated agent. And, at any rate, whatever may be the case regarding conformity of the created will to the uncreated will in all the circumstances, conformity with respect to the goodness of the act and the object is not sufficient, because there can be a lack of conformity in other circumstances that are necessarily required for the goodness of an act of will.
II. Reply to the preliminary argument
To the argument for the affirmative [n. 1], I say that the cases are not analogous.
Truth in the intellect depends solely on the object: if the object is as it is understood, the intellect is true. The goodness of the will, by contrast, does not depend solely on the object, but on all the other circumstances, and especially on the end. Hence it is important to note that every volition of ours is ordered especially to the ultimate end, who is "Alpha and Omega, beginning and end,"2 to whom be "honor and glory for ever and ever."3
2 Revelation 1:8.
3 Romans 16:27.