I. Reply to the question
JUSTICE AND MERCY
I. Reply to the question A. Divine justice: its definition and distinctions 7 First, concerning the definition of justice:
8 Anselm gives the most general definition of justice in On Truth 12: "justice is rectitude of will preserved for its own sake."
9 This definition is made more specific to capture the notion of justice as Aristotle discusses it in Ethics V [1129b30–1130a9]. He adds—over and above Anselm's definition—that it is "toward another."
10 It is clear that justice, understood in either of these ways, characterizes God. For (to take the first definition) God has rectitude of will—indeed, a will that cannot deviate from rectitude—because his will is the first rule; and [his rectitude of will] is preserved for its own sake, not in a sense of 'preserved' that implies that the one preserving takes on something or undergoes something, but 'preserved for its own sake' in the sense that his rectitude is always spontaneously possessed for its own sake.
11 And it is clear that he has justice in the second sense as well, since he can have rectitude toward another, and so in every action of his toward another there is rectitude.
12 This second justice is subdivided. Either it is quasi-universal justice toward another, for example, toward the legislator or the law, insofar as a certain rule is determined by the legislator (some call this "legal justice"4), or it is particular justice toward another, for example, in some determinate matter pertaining to the law.
13 This second subdivision is further subdivided, since it can be either toward one who is unqualifiedly another or toward oneself as if to another. The second disjunct is evident from what I said in the material on penitence,5 namely, that there is punitive justice not only toward one who is unqualifiedly another but toward oneself as if to another, because the confessor, as an agent of the Judge, is entrusted with punishing himself as one who is guilty.
14 The first of these, legal justice, could be attributed to God if there were any law prior to the determination of his will, such that his will would rightly conform to that law, and to that legislator as if to another. And there is in fact this law: "God is to be loved"—if, indeed, that should be called a law and not a practical principle of law; it is, at any rate, a practical truth that precedes any determination on the part of the divine will.
4 Thomas Aquinas, Sent. Eth. V c. 2; ST I-II q. 70 a. 3 ad 2.
5 Ordinatio IV d. 14 n. 154, d. 16 nn. 18–24.
ORDINATIO IV, D. , QQ. –
Now particular justice to oneself as if to another is in God because his will is determined by rectitude to will that which befits its own goodness. And this is a sort of paying back what he owes to himself—that is,6 to his own goodness—as if to another—if, indeed, this can be called particular, since it is universal in a way, namely, virtually.
And these two disjuncts, legal justice and particular justice to oneself as if to another, are quasi-identical in God, because they are the rectitude of the divine will with respect to its own goodness.
So now we can discuss the last division: justice that is unqualifiedly toward another.
This is divided into commutative and distributive, which is how justice is distinguished in us, as is clear from Ethics V [1130b10–1131a9]. What is required for distributive justice is equality of proportion, not of quantity; what is required for commutative justice (according to some7) is equality of quantity and not merely equality of proportion. (These things are expounded there.8)
As applied to the present question: commutative justice properly concerns punishment and reward, such that rewards are given as if in exchange (quasi commutando) for merits and punishments for sins.
Distributive justice concerns natures9 and superadded perfections, such that perfection proportionate to a nature is distributed to that nature. Just as in human distributive justice the goods that pertain to various statuses are distributed proportionally to persons according to their status in the republic, so too in the hierarchy of the universe, the Hierarch, God the Ruler, distributes to a nobler nature the nobler perfections that are appropriate for such a nature and to an inferior nature the perfections that are appropriate for it.
Commutative justice cannot exist in God in an unqualified sense with respect to a creature, because there cannot be unqualified equality; but there can be equality in a way, according to proportion, as between a master and servant. For it is fitting for a generous master to reward his servant with a greater good than the servant can deserve, provided that there is a proportion of this sort: just as the servant does what is his to do, the master gives in return what is his to give. And in the same way it is fitting for the master to punish less than the servant deserves.
Distributive justice, by contrast, can exist in God in an unqualified sense, because
God can unqualifiedly give natures the perfections that are due them or appropriate to them according to their degree of perfection.
6 Reading id est (PZNQ) for the edition's et (A).
7 Thomas Aquinas, Sent. IV d. 46 a. 1 a. 1 qc. 1 in corp.
8 Ibid. and Thomas Aquinas, ST I q. 21 a. 1 in corp., II-II q. 61 a. 2 in corp., Sent. Eth. V c. 4.
9 The edition has Distributiva respicit quasi naturas. I have followed Q in omitting quasi.
JUSTICE AND MERCY
22 Thus only two of the subdivisions of justice as a whole [in nn. 10–17] can belong to God: the first sort of justice is the rectitude of the divine will as ordered to what befits the divine will itself, and the second is the rectitude of the divine will as ordered to what is demanded by a creature.10 This distinction can be drawn from Anselm,
Proslogion 10, where he says, speaking to God, "When you punish the wicked, it is just, because this accords with their merits." As to the second sort of justice, he immediately adds, "When you spare the wicked, it is just, not because it befits their merits but because it befits your goodness."
23 The distinction between these two sorts of justice is said to be so great that God cannot act contrary to or outside the bounds of the first justice, but he can act outside the bounds of the second, though not universally, since he cannot damn one who is just or blessed.
24 Someone might object11 that there cannot be two distinct justices in God, because if there were, one (the first) would be the rule and the other (the second) would be ruled by it, whereas in fact there can be no ruled rectitude in the divine will. And this is proved in our case: that which inclines to our proper end is one and the same as that which inclines to things that are for the end qua for the end; therefore, if that which inclines to the end were unqualifiedly perfect, it would incline in an unqualifiedly perfect way to things that are for the end, as is evident in the case of the charity of the blessed. Now the first divine justice is unqualifiedly perfect; therefore, no other justice in addition to that first justice is required in the divine will.
25 As for the claim that God sometimes cannot act outside the bounds of his second justice [n. 23], that does not seem probable, because God can, without qualification, do—and thus will—anything that does not involve a contradiction. Now he cannot will anything that he cannot will rightly, since his will is the first rule. Therefore, God can rightly will whatever does not involve a contradiction. And thus, when this second justice determines the divine will to something the opposite of which does not involve a contradiction, God can will, and rightly will, [the opposite,] and can act outside the bounds of that second justice.
26 As for the first argument [n. 24], [the defenders of this view12] might well concede that there is not a twofold justice in God, but only a single justice that nonetheless has, as it were, distinct effects: willing in conformity with what befits its own goodness and willing in conformity with the demands of a creature.
10 in ordine ad exigentiam eius quod est in creatura: exigentia is a strong word—'demand,' 'requirement,' 'claim'—but the idea that what is in a creature could require something of God or have a claim on God is implied by the earlier description of the perfections appropriate to a creature as debitae, "due" or "owed." Scotus will, in any event, reject the idea that creatures have any sort of claim on God: see nn. 35, 46.
11 Thomas Aquinas, Sent. IV d. 46 q. 1 a. 1 qc. 3 in corp. and ad 1.
12 The edition says that the subject should be "the objectors," but the objectors hardly need to concede their own objection.
ORDINATIO IV, D. , QQ. –
But the second argument [n. 25] seems quite conclusive, since the second justice could incline the divine will to anything to which the first justice inclines it, since it inclines determinately and in the manner of nature. It does not incline in such a way that the divine will can will outside its bounds and contrary to it. And thus it turns out that that there is no distinction between these two justices such that God can act outside the bounds of one but not of the other.
B. Scotus's answer
Without bothering to disprove these distinctions, I will answer the question briefly: there is only one justice in God, one both really and conceptually. Nonetheless, in addition to this justice one can—extending the notion of justice—identify a certain justice, or rather something just, in creatures.
1. JUSTICE IN GOD
To elaborate on the first point: Justice, properly speaking, is the rectitude of a will that has been habituated; consequently, it inclines quasi-naturally to another or to oneself as if to another. And the divine will does not have any rectitude that inclines it determinately to anything other than to its own goodness as if to another, for it is related only contingently to any other object, in such a way that it can incline equally to it and to its opposite. It follows, therefore, that God has only one justice: the justice that inclines him to render to his own goodness what befits his goodness.
And thus God also has one act—one both really and conceptually—to which this justice, which concerns his own goodness,13 determinately inclines him. But that act has to do with many secondary objects consequently, in the same way in which I explained in Book I, d. [35, nn. 28–33 and 40–52], that the divine intellect, in addition to having one first object and one act, has to do with many secondary objects. But there is a difference between the two cases: the intellect necessarily has to do with its secondary objects, whereas the will is related only contingently to its secondary objects. And therefore not only does the act of the divine will, like that of the divine intellect, not depend on those secondary objects, but the divine will is not determined necessarily to those objects, whereas the divine intellect is determined necessarily to those objects.
Now if we should wish14 to distinguish what is really one act into conceptually many acts, as in the case of the divine intellect we distinguish what is really one intellection into conceptually many intellections insofar as it goes forth to many secondary objects,
I say that there are not conceptually quasi-distinct justices with respect to those secondary objects, or even one justice, however distinguished or not distinguished.
13 Reading bonitatis (ZNQ) for the edition's voluntatis (AP), "will."
14 "should wish" = velimus (ZNQ). The edition has volumus, "want."
JUSTICE AND MERCY
For a habit inclines in the manner of nature, and thus determinately, to one, in such a way that a power habituated by that habit cannot tend toward the opposite.
32 But the divine will is not inclined by anything in itself so determinately that it cannot be justly inclined to the opposite of that thing: for as it can will the opposite without contradiction, so too can it will the opposite justly. Otherwise it would be able to will absolutely and not justly, which is absurd.
33 And this is what Anselm says in Proslogion 11: "Only what you will is just, and what you do not will is not just." Thus, if one were to posit in the divine intellect some intellective habit with respect to itself and other things, one could more justifiably distinguish conceptually distinct habits insofar as it inclines toward many secondary objects than one can in the present case; for in the former case the divine intellect is inclined to a given secondary object determinately, but that is not true in the case of the divine will.
34 Nonetheless, it can be said that this one and only justice, which inclines determinately only to the first act, modifies secondary acts, though it does not modify any of them necessarily, in such a way that it could not modify the opposite act; nor does it in some way precede the will, inclining it in the manner of nature to any secondary act. Rather, the will first determines itself to any given secondary object. And this act is modified by that first justice in virtue of the fact that it is consonant with the will to which it is adequated, just as if the rectitude of the first justice inclined [the will to that secondary object].
2. JUSTICE IN CREATURES
35 In the second way, something just is said to be in a creature in virtue of the correspondence of one created thing to another. For example, it is just on the part of a creature for fire to be hot and water cold, for fire to be above and water below, and things of that sort, because this created nature demands that as something corresponding to it. It's analogous to the way we could say in political matters that, granted that justice would exist only in the ruler, nonetheless there would in a way be something just in the things that are to be set in order by the ruler, namely, that suchand-such things should be disposed in such-and-such a way, because the things themselves, as apt to be used by the citizens, demand this.
36 But the first, intrinsic divine justice does not determine the divine will to what is just in this way: neither with respect to its first act, since that act does not have to do with such an object, nor with respect to its secondary act, since—as it concerns such an object—this justice inclines determinately, as has been explained [nn. 31–3].15
15 That is, divine justice inclines determinately, and since there is no justice in God inclining his will determinately to any secondary act/object (n. 32), divine justice does not incline to any secondary
ORDINATIO IV, D. , QQ. –
C. Problems with this definition of divine justice, and their solution
Objections to these claims:
First, justice16 cannot be in any will unless it inclines in accordance with a dictate of prudence, and consequently in accordance with the conclusion of a practical syllogism. But the divine intellect does not make syllogisms, since it does not reason discursively.
Also, the divine intellect apprehends a possible action before the divine will wills it, and the will cannot be out of harmony with the intellect's apprehension. Now the intellect apprehends this possible action determinately, not indifferently as this-orthat, for if it apprehended it indifferently it would be in error. Therefore, the will wills this possible action determinately, and thus it cannot will the opposite if it is to will rightly.
Also, if it is just for Peter to be saved, and God wills this justly, then it is unjust for Peter to be damned. And thus if God can will that Peter be damned, he can will something unjust.
To the first [n. 37] I say that if in us there can be a moral virtue that inclines in accordance with the conclusion of a practical syllogism, a fortiori there is in us an upright appetitive habit17 that inclines in conformity with the first practical principle, since that principle is truer and consequently more upright. Now justice in God, which is one both really and conceptually, as I have said [n. 28], inclines in conformity with the first practical principle, namely, "God is to be loved."
But if you insist on the strict use of terminology and say that because it does not incline in conformity with a practical syllogism it is not a special virtue, I will concede that the justice that is in God is a quasi-universal and root virtue from the rectitude of which all particular justices are apt to proceed, although not necessarily.
To the second [n. 38] I say that the divine intellect does apprehend a possible action before the will wills it, but it does not apprehend determinately that this action is to be done (where 'apprehend' means 'dictate'). Rather, it offers that possible action to the divine will as something neutral; and when the will through its own volition determines that this action is to be done, the intellect as a consequence apprehends
"This is to be done" as true, as I explained in the material on future contingents.18 act/object at all. The reading of the Wadding edition expresses the same point rather more perspicuously: "nor with respect to its secondary act, since as it concerns a secondary object, this justice does not incline determinately, as has been explained."
16 The edition, following A alone, has "this justice." But "this justice," given the context, would have to mean divine justice; and the argument that follows is clearly about justice as such, not about divine justice.
17 Reading habitus rectus appetitivus (PNQ) for the edition's habitus practicus appetitus, "practical habit of the appetite."
18 Lectura I d. 39 nn. 62–5.
JUSTICE AND MERCY
43 Even granting that the intellect apprehends of something in particular that it is to be done, prior to the will's willing it—as it apprehends that God is to be loved—this does not follow by natural necessity: "the divine intellect apprehends this, and the divine will cannot be out of harmony with the divine intellect, therefore the divine will wills this by natural necessity." For the will cannot be out of harmony with the intellect in terms of the object, so that it might either will or will-against what the intellect presents as to-be-willed, but it can be out of harmony with the will in the way in which it tends toward that object—or, to put this more accurately, there is a distinction in that the intellect tends toward the object in its way, naturally, and the will in its way, freely. And powers that always tend toward the same object in their characteristic ways of tending are always in harmony with each other: thus, imagination and intellect are not out of harmony if imagination tends toward an object as singular and intellect tends toward that same object as universal.
44 To the third argument [n. 39] I say that in political matters the legislator is intrinsically concerned with what is unqualifiedly just, which is what is just in terms of the public good, but in a certain respect he is concerned with these partial justices,19 though always in proportion to what is just in terms of the public good.
And for that reason it is just in certain instances not to observe just laws concerning those partial justices—namely, when observing them would be detrimental to public justice, that is, to the well-being of the republic. In the same way, God is determined in an unqualified sense to public justice: not to a justice that is common in the sense of being an aggregate of particular justices, as is the case in a city, but to a justice that is common in the sense of eminently containing particular justices, which is what is just as befitting God's own goodness.20 By contrast, any other justice is particular, and now this is just and now that, as it is ordered to or congruous with this
[universal] justice.
45 So I say that God can will that Peter be damned, and will it justly, because this particular instance of justice, Peter's being saved, is not required necessarily for public justice, such that its opposite could not be ordered to that same public justice, that is, to the befitting of God's own goodness. For God's goodness is indeed an end that does not determinately, necessarily, require any [particular] thing for the end.
19 In this paragraph and the next, the word 'justice' always represents the Latin iustum, "what is just," rather than iustitia. (I do this for obvious reasons of English idiom.) Note the distinction between iustitia and iustum in nn. 28, 35.
20 This is an expansive translation of Ita Deus simpliciter determinatur ad iustum publicum, non communitate aggregationis, sicut est in civitate, sed communitate eminentis continentiae, quod est iustum condecens bonitatem suam. A translation as close to fully literal as possible, short of lapsing into gibberish, would be as follows: "Thus God is unqualifiedly determined to public justice, not with respect to a commonness of aggregation, as there is in a city, but with respect to a commonness of eminent containment, which is the justice befitting his own goodness."