I. Reply to the question
Ordinatio I, d. 44, q. un.
"Can God make things otherwise than as it is well-ordered for him to make them?"
Concerning distinction 44, in which the Master discusses whether God was able to make things better than he in fact made them, I ask this question: can God make things otherwise than as it is well-ordered for him to make them?
It seems that he cannot:
If he could, he could make things in a disordered way. The consequent is false; therefore, the antecedent is also false.
On the contrary:
For things to be made otherwise than as they were made does not involve a contradiction; nor is the universe necessary. Therefore, etc.
I. Reply to the question
I reply: In the case of any agent that acts through will and intellect and has the power to act in conformity with a correct law, and yet does not necessarily act in conformity with a correct law, one must distinguish ordered power from absolute power. The reason for this is that such an agent can act in conformity with that correct law, and in that case the agent acts according to ordered power (it is ordered power insofar as it is a principle of carrying out certain things in conformity with a correct law1), and can also act outside that law or contrary to it, and in this there is absolute power, which goes beyond ordered power. And so not just in God's case, but in the case of any free agent that can act both in accordance with the dictate of a correct law and outside or contrary to such a law, one must distinguish between ordered and absolute power. This is why the jurists2 say that one can do something either de facto—that is, by one's absolute power—or de iure—that is, by one's ordered power, in accordance with the laws.
1 Many MSS add "in accordance with the order pre-established by that law," a phrase that (unlike the shorter reading in the edition) actually explains why this power should be called "ordered."
2 Decretales Gregorii IX lib. 1 tit. 3 c. 13, and the Gloss on that text.
CAN GOD MAKE THINGS OTHERWISE THAN AS IS WELL-ORDERED?
4 But when the correct law according to which the agent ought to act ordinately is not in the agent's power, he cannot go beyond his ordered power regarding any objects without acting inordinately regarding those objects. For it is necessary (as far as such an agent is concerned) that that law remain in effect and that an action not in conformity with that correct law is neither correct nor well-ordered, since such an agent is bound to act according to that rule to which he is subject. Hence, all who are subject to the divine law act inordinately if they do not act according to the divine law.
5 By contrast, when the law and the correctness of the law are in the agent's power, such that the law is correct only because that agent has established it, the agent in virtue of his freedom can order things otherwise than as that correct law dictates; and yet in doing so he can act ordinately, because he can establish another correct law according to which he is acting ordinately. Nor in that case does his absolute power unqualifiedly go beyond his ordered power, because it would be ordered power according to the other law, just as it was according to the prior law; but it does go beyond his ordered power strictly according to the prior law, against which and beyond which he acts. One could give an example of this involving a prince, his subjects, and positive law.
6 Applying this to the question at hand, I say that some general laws that dictate correctly are pre-established by the divine will, and not indeed by the divine intellect as it precedes an act of the divine will, as was said in distinction 38 [nn. 5–6, 9–10].
Rather, when the intellect presents such a law—for example, "Everyone who is to be glorified will first be given grace"—to the divine will, if it pleases his will, which is free, the law is correct; and so on for other laws.
7 Therefore, we say that God acts according to his ordered power insofar as he has the power to act in accordance with those correct laws as pre-established by him, whereas we speak of his absolute power insofar as he has the power to do many things that are not in accordance with those pre-established laws, but instead outside them. For because God can do anything that does not involve a contradiction, and can act in any way that does not involve a contradiction (and there are many such ways other than [the way he in fact acts]), when he does so, he is said to act according to his absolute power.
8 Accordingly, I say that there are many other things he can do ordinately; and when the correctness of the law according to which someone is said to act rightly and ordinately is in the power of the agent himself, there is no contradiction involved in the claim that many things other than those that are made in conformity with these laws can be made ordinately. Therefore, just as he can act otherwise, so also can he establish a different law;3 and if that law were established by God, it would be correct,
3 "a different law": aliam legem (IΣ). The edition follows most MSS in reading aliam legem rectam,
"a different, correct, law," but 'correct' pre-empts the argument of the rest of the sentence and therefore seems out of place.
ORDINATIO I, D. , Q. UN.
because no law is correct except insofar as it is established by the divine will's acceptance. And so his absolute power for something does not extend to anything beyond what would be done ordinately if it were done: it would not of course be done ordinately according to this order, but it would be done ordinately according to another order, an order that the divine will could in fact establish, just as it can act
[in accordance with such an order].
It is also important to note that there are two ways in which something can be ordinate and be done ordinately. One way is according to a universal order, that is, as prescribed by a general law: for example, according to a general law it is ordinate that everyone who is a sinner to the end is to be damned (as a king might establish a law that every murderer must die). The second way is according to a particular order, that is, according to this particular judgment to which the law taken universally does not extend. For a law concerns universal cases, whereas what concerns a particular case is not a law but a judgment according to the law, which is a conclusion from the law4
(for example, that this murderer must die5).
I therefore say that God not only can act otherwise than as is ordinate according to a particular order but also can act otherwise than as is ordinate according to a universal order—in other words, [otherwise than] as accords with laws of justice—because both things that are outside that order and things that are contrary to it can be done ordinately by God through his absolute power.
By contrast, we speak of God's ordered power only with reference to an order that consists in a universal law, not with reference to an order that consists in a correct law about some particular. This is evident from the fact that it is possible for God to save someone whom he does not save, someone who nonetheless ultimately dies in a state of sin and is damned. Now this is not to concede that God can save Judas, who is already damned (not even that is impossible in terms of God's absolute power, since it does not involve a contradiction); therefore, God's saving Judas is impossible in the same way in which God's saving this person [whom he will not in fact save] is possible: therefore, by his ordered power God can save this person (which is true) but not Judas—not, indeed, according to some particular order (which, as it were, encompasses only this one particular possible action) but according to a universal order, in that if God did save this person, his doing so would be consistent with correct laws (laws that he had truly set up beforehand) concerning the salvation and damnation of individuals. For it would be consistent with the law that one who is wicked to the end will be damned, which is the law set up beforehand concerning those who are to be damned, since this person is not yet a sinner to the end; instead, he can be not a sinner, especially while he is still in this present life, because God by 4 "which is a conclusion from the law": reading quod est conclusio legis for the edition's eius quod est contra legem (A), "of that which is contrary to the law."
5 Many of the best MSS omit this and the previous parenthetical phrase.