III. Replies to the preliminary arguments of question 2
SYNDERESIS AND CONSCIENCE
advantage and not the affection for justice—that is, as a non-free appetite—it would not be in the will's power to fail to will advantages in this way, because it would be strictly the natural appetite of an intellectual nature in just the way that the appetite of a non-rational animal is the natural appetite of a sensory nature.
23 I therefore say that Anselm's claim that the will cannot fail to will advantages should be understood not as speaking of the whole power, which in fact can freely fail to will not only advantages but also things that are just, since it can freely both will and fail to will15 both advantages and just things. Rather, it should be understood to be true of the will insofar as it is affected strictly by the affection for the advantageous, that is, of the will as regarded as such an appetite, not including freedom in such an appetite.
But as such the will does not elicit any act in us. That is why I said in my answer, "if synderesis is something that has an elicited act" [n. 19].
24 On this same basis I reply to the third argument [n. 4] that natural will, as it naturally tends toward what is willed, does not have an elicited act regarding what is willed; rather, natural will is just a certain inclination in such a nature to the perfection that is most suited to it. This inclination is necessarily in the nature, although an act conforming to this inclination and nature is not elicited necessarily. For an act— whether it is an act that conforms to this inclination and so is called "natural" or one that opposes it and so is called "contrary to nature"—is not elicited except by a free will. However much the will wills the opposite of that to which it has an inclination, the inclination to that object is no less necessary; for as long as the nature is intact, so is that inclination.
25 To the last argument [n. 5] I say that this nature alone is free and has a mode of acting that is higher than that of any other created nature.
III. Replies to the preliminary arguments of question 2 26 To the arguments of the second question:
To the first argument [n. 8] I say that habits of the practical intellect are called good or bad on account of their suitability to the will, just as, conversely, the will can be called correct or wrong on account of its suitability to a correct or incorrect speculative act, which is formally in the intellect. Nonetheless, goodness belongs to the will just as correctness belongs to the intellect, but goodness is extended more to the practical than to the speculative intellect.
27 A reply to the other argument [n. 9] can be made on the basis of what the Philosopher says in Ethics VII [1147a19–22]: those who are experiencing passions say the words of Empedocles but do not at all know [what they are saying]. And thus
15 "both will and fail to will" = velle et non velle. Only Q adds velle et, but the second clause is obviously redundant without it.
ORDINATIO II, D. , QQ. –
it can be conceded that someone who in an unqualified sense has practical knowledge and is not merely "saying the words" is conscientious; and the more he has such knowledge, the more conscientious he is. The one whose view I disproved earlier would seem to be especially committed to saying this, since according to him16 reason is blinded in the very instant of time in which the will is bad; thus, even if conscience belongs to the will, no one has less conscience. Therefore, the argument applies equally to both sides of the debate, and it can be answered in the way
I explained above.
16 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. I q. 17 ad arg.