II. In what way practical cognition is extended to praxis
THEOLOGY, PRAXIS, AND PRACTICAL SCIENCE
234 From the second and third conditions of praxis it follows that an act commanded by the will is not praxis primarily, but rather quasi-accidentally, since it is not primarily posterior to intellection or primarily apt to be elicited in conformity with correct reason. Therefore, there must be some other act that is primarily praxis; that is nothing other than volition, because it is through volition that a commanded act meets those conditions. Therefore, praxis in its primary sense is found in an elicited act of will.
And then further: whenever something is primarily F, if it is conjoined with something else, it would still be F if it could be separated from that other thing. So if an act of the will can be separated from the act of another power, it will still be praxis if separated from that posterior act. Now there is such a separation in the case of anything that can be an object of an act of will but cannot be the object of an act of another power, as are all immaterial things; so with regard to all such things the act of will, and it alone, is praxis.
235 Second, this same conclusion is proved from the drift of the Philosopher's argument in De anima III [433a17–18, 22–3] where he is seeking the principle of motion. After concluding that there are two principles of motion—will or appetite, and reason—he adds, "Intellect does not move without appetite, for will is appetite." And then he says that sometimes two appetites are contrary to each other, which is why one must posit one mover in species, since the two appetites share the common character of an intermediate species, namely, appetite.12 Therefore, he explicitly holds that just as the sensory appetite has the character of a mover in common with sense and imagination, the will has the character of a mover in common with intellect and reason. So just as an act of the sensory appetite, when it follows an act of the intellect, is genuinely praxis, even if it does not pass into anything external, so too an act of will, which is identified as equally a principle of motion, will be genuinely praxis, because it always follows an act of intellect. And this is the case even if that act of will is by itself, without a commanded act, indeed even if it is accompanied by an act in the sensory appetite that is opposed to the act the will commands. For the will as having that sometimes contrary appetite is a principle of motion and action whose action is praxis.
II. In what way practical cognition is extended to praxis 236 From what was said on the first topic [nn. 228–35] it is clear what to say about the second topic. This extension consists in a twofold aptitudinal relation, namely, of conformity and natural priority. As for priority, that is clear from the statement already quoted from Ethics VI [nn. 231, 233]; and we find conformity in that same
12 Aristotle, De anima III.10, 433b5–13.