II. Replies to the preliminary arguments
ORDINATIO III, D. , Q. UN.
not to flee in a time of persecution,36 in accordance with what is said in John [10:12–13], "The hireling, who is not a shepherd (pastor), sees the wolf approaching and flees." Augustine has an excellent discussion of this in a letter [Epist. 228, ad
Honoratum]; see Henry, Quodlibet XV, q. 16. By contrast, someone else who is in the state of acquiring perfection and is not a pastor is not bound of necessity not to flee if he can do otherwise, though he is bound not to scandalize his neighbor in fleeing, and sometimes his fleeing would be scandalous when a weak person's would not be: for from the fact that he, who had chosen "the narrow way" [Matthew 7:14], did not risk his life to defend the faith, his neighbors would judge that one should not risk one's life for such a cause, or that such a person did not have proper regard for the faith.
II. Replies to the preliminary arguments
As to the arguments concerning this question:
To the first [n. 2] I say that Abraham was not speaking contrary to what he had in his mind, for as Josephus recounts in his book Antiquities, when Abraham was walking alone with his son, having left the servants behind, he told his son about how he had been miraculously conceived and how, if he were sacrificed, God would miraculously revive him; and it is believed that Abraham firmly expected this to happen, since he did not doubt God's promise that "in Isaac will your seed be named"
[Genesis 21:12]. So although Abraham did intend to sacrifice Isaac, he nonetheless believed37 that God would miraculously revive him and he would return with him to the servants. So when he said, "We will return to you," he was speaking in accordance with what he believed in his heart. And one should not lightly ascribe any lie to Abraham, whose life was very exemplary.
As for the argument about Jacob [n. 3], although some writers38 labor mightily to clear him and other fathers of the Old Testament of having lied—even though in other passages39 they acknowledge that the fathers had an imperfect law and a modest amount of grace, whereas we have a perfect law and abundant grace, and they do not deny that we sometimes lie or have lied40—it does not seem terribly reasonable to deny that they sometimes lied or could lie. And if that's the case, then even if we praise their good deeds and take them as an example, we do not take their bad
36 "a pastor is sometimes bound not to flee in a time of persecution": reading tempore persecutionis tenetur pastor non fugere quandoque for the edition's in articulo illo de fuga in tempore passionis pastor tenetur quandoque non fugere.
37 "believed" (Q); BNY have "understood", the edition "intended."
38 Alexander of Hales, ST II-II nn. 404, 405, 406 in corp., III n. 390 ad argg. in opp.; William of Auxerre,
Summa III tr. 45 c. 4 qq. 1–4; Bonaventure, Sent III d. 38 a. un. q. 2 ad 1–3 in opp.; Thomas Aquinas, ST II-II q. 110 a. 3 ad 3, a. 4 ad 4; Richard Middleton, Sent. III d. 38 q. 3 ad 2–3; and others.
39 Alexander of Hales, ST III n. 269, 270, 273 in corp.; Bonaventure, Sent III d. 40 a. un. q. 1 in corp., qq. 2, 3 in corp.; Thomas Aquinas, Sent III d. 40 q. 1 a. 2 in corp., a. 3 in corp., a. 4 qc. 3 in corp.
40 Alexander of Hales, ST II-II nn. 407–8, III n. 390 in corp.; William of Auxerre, Summa III tr. 52 c. 6;
Bonaventure, Sent. III d. 38 a. un. q. 4 and ad 4.
IS EVERY LIE A SIN?
deeds as an example or obstinately defend or excuse them. It is said,41 to be sure, that such statements of theirs can be understood figuratively or by means of interpretations other than what the words straightforwardly express, but we need not waste our time with such interpretations.
38 But in reply to the argument about Joseph [n. 4], since he upheld the divine law perfectly [cf. Genesis 39:2–23], it can be said that his lie against his brothers was nothing but a humorous lie, as is evident from the outcome: for in the end he revealed the truth to them [Genesis 45:1–4], and in the meantime, while he was frightening them, he punished them as they deserved to be punished [cf. Genesis 42:9–44:34].
For their treachery in selling their brother into slavery in Egypt amply deserved to be punished not merely by such fear but even by a greater punishment.
39 As for the other arguments:
There is no need to excuse Rahab and the midwives and Rachel [n. 5], and their deeds are not commended in Scripture as far as their lying is concerned. Rather, what is commended is Rahab's foresight in looking after herself and those who belonged to her and securing their safety [Joshua 6:25].
40 As for the argument about the midwives—that "God built up their houses" [n. 5]— there are various views, as the Master of the Histories recounts in his commentary on that passage.42 And perhaps a fairly probable view is that they had a good movement of piety, and God rewarded them for that temporally, because the associated sin earned demerit, such that they would not be rewarded eternally. But it can be said with greater probability that that was a serviceable lie, because it was useful for saving the children of the Jews and it harmed no one, and so God rewarded them for the good movement of their wills; and yet he did not deny them eternal life because of that sin, which in them was venial.
41 But in this connection one might wonder: should one sometimes choose such a lie or venial sin along with a great movement of piety, or should one always avoid both?
The fact that a venial sin is in no way to be chosen seems to argue in favor of the latter.
But there is evidently an argument in favor of the former as well: a venial sin will be erased in one way or another43 (either in this life or in the next), whereas a great movement of piety, which has great merit, merits some degree of reward that will
41 Alexander of Hales, ST II-II n. 404 in corp.; Bonaventure, Sent. III d. 38 a. un. q. 2 ad 2; Richard
Middleton, Sent. III d. 38 q. 3 ad 1; Thomas Aquinas, Summa II-II q. 110 a. 3 ad 3.
42 Peter Comestor, Historia scholastica in Ex. c. 3: "Augustine says that the midwives sinned venially.
Gregory apparently claims that they sinned mortally, for he says that the reward for their kindness could have been rendered to them in eternal life, but it was diverted into earthly compensation because of the guilt of their lie." Cf. Augustine, Quaest. in Heptateuchum II q. 1, De mendacio c. 5 n. 7, c. 17 n. 34; Gregory,
Moral. XVIII c. 3 n. 6.
43 Reading delebitur qualitercumque (NYQ) for the edition's delebitur in tempore et non manebit in aeternum.
ORDINATIO III, D. , Q. UN.
be eternal.44 And it does not seem that in order to avoid an evil that is of itself temporal,45 one should forgo something that of itself is a cause46 of an eternal good.
I take no stand on this question.
Now about the midwives, it can be said that they sinned only venially, because their lie was entirely serviceable. And the movement of piety, assuming that the other requirements for merit were met, had great merit, so that they merited eternal life and temporal goods as well, since in those days God rewarded his worshipers with temporal goods.
One approach47 to the argument about Judith is to say that she was not lying in any way, because she intended to direct the excessive words that she said to Holofernes not to him, but to God. Now she was not necessarily bound to speak outwardly in the way that her listener intended; rather, she could speak according to her own intention as speaker. Nonetheless, it is said that in speaking to a prelate, to whom one is bound to reply in good faith, one should reply according to the intention of the one asking the question; thus, if in such a case one were to reply using words that would be false if they were directed to the hearer48 but true if they were directed to God, one is not speaking truthfully, because in this case one is not permitted to address God.
But if this view were right, nothing in human speech would appear certain, and evidently no one could possess certainty about anything his neighbor says. At any rate, evidently no one would be lying when speaking in the second person, no matter what he said, as long as he could make it true by directing it to God. Now if I am bound to tell you, but not some third party, the truth, then I could be disobedient by not telling you the truth, whereas I will not be disobedient by not telling that third party the truth. But it is not clear how I would be lying to you any more than to him.49
So if the words she said, which appear to be excessive, cannot be saved in any other way, there does not seem to be anything untoward in conceding that she lied: serviceably for her own people, but harmfully for the one whose death she intended.
But the serviceableness outweighs the harmfulness, since the good of the commonwealth (especially one that worships God) outweighs the temporal good of a private person (especially an unbeliever). Nor is it any objection that in warring against anyone one ought to safeguard the faith—so much so that any unfaithfulness or lie on the part of any Christian (even in a war against an unbeliever) is damned—although one is
44 Reading meretur aliquem gradum praemii qui erit aeternus (BNYQ, with some variants) for the edition's meretur magnum praemium quia aeternum, vel saltem aliquem gradum praemii qui erit aeternus.
45 Reading quod est ex se temporale (NYQ) for the edition's quod non est ex se aeternum sed temporale.
46 The edition adds aliquo modo ("in some way"), which BNYQ omit.
47 The editors were not able to identify the source of this view.
48 Reading audientem (PBQ) for the edition's intentionem vel auctoritatem (A).
49 The last two sentences read with the majority of MSS against the edition.
IS EVERY LIE A SIN?
allowed to use certain precautions of war that do not of themselves conflict with the truth or include a lie.
46 And if Judith arrayed herself with the intention of captivating Holofernes by her appearance, and thereby willed that he sin mortally with her, and to will that another sin mortally is to sin mortally oneself, then it does not appear altogether certain that she kept herself free from all mortal sin. And thus her deed is recounted in Scripture and retold by the Church as something praiseworthy in certain respects in which it exemplified true piety, but there are other aspects of what she did that are neither praiseworthy nor permissible.
47 In reply to the last argument, concerning dissimulation [n. 6], I say that someone can dissimulate through certain persuasive signs,50 by indicating that one possesses certain goods that one actually lacks (for example, through genuflections and gestures of worship someone might portray a devoutness that he does not actually possess). Such dissimulation is hypocrisy and a mortal sin.
48 Or someone might pretend that he does not possess certain bad features, either by giving indications opposed to those bad features or by not giving the indications that typically go along with such bad features. The first of these evidently belongs to hypocrisy. For example, a lustful man, hearing talk about women, might spit as a sign of his solemn devotion to chastity, though in his heart he feels exactly the opposite.
The second is not something bad:51 indeed, so far as it can exist in a bad person, it's praiseworthy, since it is blameworthy to proclaim one's sin in the way that some are said to have done: "Like Sodom they proclaimed their sin and did not keep silent."52
For though what exists inwardly, in the heart, is bad, to add a sign outwardly is to add one bad thing to another.
49 Now in indifferent things someone can do certain acts that by their nature are signs of something, and someone else can do other acts that are not signs by their very nature but that he knows will be taken as signs by those who are present. For example, by its nature sweating is a sign of exhaustion or of some bodily weakness; whereas drooling, so that saliva runs down one's beard, is not by its nature a sign of madness (for someone in his right mind can produce saliva so that it runs down his beard). Yet someone can know that those who are near him will take his drooling as a sign of insanity or madness (say, because those are the typical marks of insanity in that region).
50 So I say that dissimulations of the first and second sort are, without exception, sins; and I say that frequently they are mortal sins, because they are instances of hypocrisy.
50 Reading signa probabilia (Q) for the edition's argumenta probabilia.
51 Reading non est malum aliquod. The edition adds reprehensibile, which it conjectures from AN's respective; I follow the other MSS in leaving the word out altogether.
52 Isaiah 3:9. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST II-II q. 111 a. 1 arg. 4, ad 4.
ORDINATIO III, D. , Q. UN.
The third sort of dissimulation is praiseworthy so long as it is not accompanied by some other evil—so that one refrains from showing one bad thing for the sake of some other bad thing. The first sort of dissimulation in indifferent things might perhaps be bad in certain people, though not because of the matter: for example, if someone could make himself sweat even though he had done no labor (as certain jesters use their bodies for certain movements that signify dispositions that are not present in them and did not previously exist in them). The second sort of dissimulation in indifferent things is no sin.
And David's dissimulation [n. 6] was of this last kind. There's no need to excuse
Jehu's dissimulation, because to the dissimulation that could perhaps be excused he added a lie: "I have a great sacrifice for Baal" [2 Kings 10:19]. Though he intended this lie to be a serviceable one because it would help destroy the worship of Baal, yet by its nature it was a harmful lie: not only because it procured the death of others but because, so far as it could, it invited people to the worship of Baal. And although Jehu is commended [2 Kings 10:30] because he destroyed and persecuted the worship of Baal, he is reproached [2 Kings 10:29, 31] because he did not abandon Jeroboam's calves and was not a true worshiper of the God of Israel.