I. What praxis is
THEOLOGY, PRAXIS, AND PRACTICAL SCIENCE
Also, in Ethics VI [1139a3–15] he distinguishes the calculative [part of the soul] from the scientific on the basis of whether the object is contingent or necessary;10 so science is practical per se in virtue of its object, and therefore not because praxis is its end.
Also, in De anima III [433a26–30] he assigns as the object of practical science not just any good, but a contingent good that can be carried out in action; therefore, a science is practical per se in virtue of its object, and therefore not because praxis is its end.
227 In order to answer these questions I assume one general point on which everyone agrees: a practical habit is in some way extended to praxis. So what needs particular investigation is, first, what the praxis is to which practical cognition is said to be extended; second, in what way practical cognition is extended to this praxis; and third, from what source cognition has such extension.
I. What praxis is 228 So I say first that the praxis to which practical cognition is extended is an act that (a) belongs to a power other than the intellect, (b) is naturally posterior to intellection, and (c) is apt to be elicited in conformity with correct intellection in order for it to be correct.
The first condition (a) is obvious, because staying strictly within the acts of the intellect there is no extension of the intellect, since it does not tend outside itself except as its act concerns the act of some other power.
And if you were to say11 that one act of the intellect is extended to another act that is directed by the first act, that doesn't make the second act praxis in the sense we're discussing now, nor does it make the first cognition practical. For if it did, then logic would be practical, since it gives direction in acts of discursive reasoning.
229 The second condition (b) is evident, because acts that have no order to the intellect, such as vegetative acts, as well as acts that naturally precede the intellect, such as sensitive acts, are not called praxes, and practical knowledge is not extended to them as they are prior to intellection. Similarly, an act of the power of sensory appetite insofar as it precedes an act of intellect is not praxis; for as such it is common to us and non-rational animals. Nor is there any practical cognition with respect to these acts, except inasmuch as practical cognition in some way moderates these acts and they follow the moderating intellection as moderated by it.
230 From these two conditions follows a corollary: the praxis to which a practical habit is extended is nothing other than an elicited or commanded act of will. For no other act distinct from intellection is essentially posterior to intellection: take any
10 Cf. Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 36 q. 4 in corp.
11 Ibid. a. 36 q. 4 in corp., Quodl. VIII q. 1 in corp.
ORDINATIO PROLOGUE, PART , QQ. AND (OMITTING NN. –)
other act, and some act of that same character can be prior to intellection, as is clear from running through the acts of all the other powers.
This is evident, second, because praxis is an act that is within the power of the cognizer. This is proved from Ethics VI [1140b22]: an artisan needs a virtue by which to act correctly, but he would not need a virtue with respect to acting correctly unless doing so were within his power; therefore, production is within the artisan's power. A fortiori, action is within the power of the prudent person, since that person is formally virtuous. From this something further follows: given that all praxis is within the power of the cognizer, and nothing is within the power of the will other than an elicited or commanded act, the claim [that praxis is nothing other than an elicited or commanded act of will] follows as before.
One might object to this condition on the grounds that it seems to imply that some intellection is praxis, since some intellection can be an act commanded by the will just as the act of another power is commanded by the will. And then it would follow further that the first condition—that praxis is an act of a power other than the intellect—is also false. I reply: although speculative thinking is an act and thus praxis in an extended sense of the word, yet in the sense of 'praxis' that restricts it to acts to which the intellect can be extended, no intellection is praxis. And it is in this latter sense that we understand 'praxis' when we say that practical cognition is extended to praxis. So the argument "intellection is commanded by the will; therefore, it is praxis" is a non-sequitur; instead, what follows is "therefore, it is praxis or practical." For such intellection is apt to be denominated quasi-accidentally from the praxis to which it can be extended, but it cannot be the terminus of such extension. Nevertheless, I gladly concede the converse, that every praxis is an elicited or commanded act of will. Hence, to infer from this second condition the opposite of the first is to commit the fallacy of the consequent by affirming the consequent.
The third condition (c) is proved in two ways. First, it is proved from the Philosopher's statement in Ethics VI [1139a22–5] that correct choice necessarily requires correct reason. This is true not only of choice taken in the strict sense but, by parity of reasoning, of any correct volition: it requires correct reason in conformity with which it is elicited. Now every praxis either is a volition or follows from a volition, as we established in the foregoing corollary [n. 230]. Therefore, every praxis is apt to be elicited in conformity with correct reason in order to be correct itself. Second, it is proved from Augustine's statement in De Trinitate XV [6.10, 7.3; see also X.3.5, 7.10,
9.12–10.14, 10.16; XIV.4.7] that the intellect understands itself and other things.
Therefore, just as it can judge its own act, so too it can judge the acts of other powers; therefore, it can judge an act that is naturally posterior to its own act, and its judgment is naturally prior to that act's being elicited. And consequently, if the intellect judges correctly, that naturally posterior act must be elicited in conformity with the intellect's judgment in order to be correct.