I. Reply to the question
ORDINATIO III, D. , Q. UN.
I. Reply to the question
Concerning this question there are three things that need to be investigated: the first is how the habit by which God is loved has to do with one's neighbor as lovable object, the second concerns the habit that one ought to have with regard to one's neighbor, and the third is who one's neighbor is.
A. The habit of charity with respect to God and one's neighbor
To the first I say, as was discussed in Book I, d. 17 [n. 29], that 'charity' is the name for the habit by which God is held dear (carus).3
But God could be held dear with a private love, such that the lover does not want God to have any other lovers, as is evident in jealous men who hold their wives too dear.
But this habit would be neither ordinate nor perfect:
I say it would not be ordinate because God, who is the universal good, does not will to be the individual, private good of any person, nor, according to right reason, should anyone appropriate the universal good to himself. And so this habit or love that inclines one to that good as one's own individual good, not to be loved or possessed by anyone else, would be an inordinate love.
It would also not be perfect because one who loves something perfectly wills that the beloved be loved by another, as is evident from what Richard says in On the Trinity
III c. 11.4
So by infusing the love by which the soul tends5 perfectly and ordinately to himself, God gives the habit by which he is held dear as the universal good and as a good that is to be loved in company with others. And thus this habit, which in itself has to do with God, also inclines one to will that God be possessed and loved by another—at any rate by one whose friendship is pleasing to him, or not displeasing for some period during which it is pleasing to him. Therefore, just as this habit inclines one to love God ordinately and perfectly in himself, so too it inclines one to will that God be loved by oneself and by anyone else whose friendship is pleasing to God.
From this it is clear how the habit of charity is one habit: it does not have more than one primary object; rather, it has God alone as its primary object insofar as he is good
3 According to the critical edition, "God is held dear insofar as by a special acceptance he accepts a creature who is furnished with the habit of charity as worthy of eternal life." But that's not a matter of our holding God dear; it's a matter of God's holding us dear. The edition's note is thus inconsistent with Scotus's formulation and is immediately contradicted by the account of "holding dear" that follows in the text.
4 Richard of St Victor, De Trin. III c. 11, c. 15, c. 19.
5 For "the soul tends" the edition, following a reading found only in A, has "all things tend." It need hardly be said that Scotus cannot think that all things are capable of perfect and ordinate love of God as the common good that is to be loved in company with others, or that God infuses love into all things.
LOVE OF NEIGHBOR
in himself and the first good. Secondarily, it involves willing that God be loved by everyone, because6 such love for God is perfect, and willing that everyone possess him through love to the extent that they are capable, [because that] is ordinate love for God. And in willing this I love both myself and my neighbor out of charity, by willing that I and my neighbor love God in himself, which is unqualifiedly good and an act of justice. Thus, only God in himself is the first object [of charity], whereas all other things are intermediate objects of quasi-reflex acts through which I tend toward the infinite good, which is God. And it is one and the same habit that is the principle of both the direct act and the reflex act.
13 Against this, some have objected7 that it is not by the same habit that I understand
God and understand that someone else understands God; therefore, by analogy, it is not by the same habit that I will God's well-being and will that someone else will
God's well-being.
14 I reply: the act on which there is reflection can be signified by a noun; in that case, the noun signifies the act according to its quiddity. Or it can be signified by a verb; in that case, the verb signifies the act as it is in the supposit or the act in concretion with the supposit. In the first way, it is universally possible for there to be reflection on the direct act by the same habit by which the direct act is elicited in the first place. That is the case not only for appetitive acts but also for intellectual acts: it is by the same habit by which I understand something that I understand an understanding of it, whether that understanding inheres in someone else or in me. The second way is expressed by an infinitive.8 And in this latter way, if the act is considered in relation to willing, it is not necessarily understood qua present. For example, I can will that you run, albeit not now, but later. By contrast, if the act is considered in relation to knowing, then because only what is true is known, and knowing is not a doing unless it is a doing in the present on the part of that supposit, knowing is not reflected on an act signified in this way unless that act is present in the supposit in which it is signified to be present. And because it is possible for both the knowledge and the reflex act to be in me at the same time, and it need not be the case that that act exists in anyone else, I do not have the reflex act concerning that act as it is signified by a verb and said of some other supposit.
6 Reading quia (PZBNY) for the edition's si.
7 Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 54 q. 9 in corp.; William of Auxerre, Summa III tr. 14 c. 3.
8 Though in English by a gerund: we would not say that to will is in someone, but that willing is in someone. I will use the gerund in what follows. For "an infinitive" the edition, following three MSS
(including A), reads "an infinite verb and [a verb] in the infinitive mood, for example, 'to know,' 'to will,' 'to understand,' and so forth." An "infinite verb" is a verb plus a negation (e.g. non scit: see Scotus's In Periherm. II q. 1 nn. 9–10). Since there is not a hint in this discussion that the direct act must be a negative act (a failure or withholding)—quite the contrary, in fact—the edition's reading has to be wrong. I have followed the majority of MSS.
ORDINATIO III, D. , Q. UN.
It is therefore clear that although it is not by the same habit that I know God and know that you know God, it is by the same habit that I will God and will that you will
God: and in doing so I am loving you out of charity, because in doing so I will that you will that there be an act of justice in yourself. In this regard one's neighbor is not regarded as a secondary object of charity but as an object that is altogether accidental to the object of charity, as something that can join me in a perfect and ordinate love for the Beloved. I love my neighbor in order that he might love God along with me, and in so doing I love him quasi-accidentally, not for his sake, but for the sake of the object that I will to be loved by him. And in willing that this object be loved by him,
I will something unqualifiedly good—a good of justice—for him.
B. The habit that one ought to have with respect to one's neighbor
On the second topic, I say that just as the negation of a conclusion that does not follow necessarily from a principle is compatible with the assertion of the principle
(for not every error concerning a conclusion destroys the assertion9 of a principle), so too, given that love of a finite good does not follow necessarily from love of the Infinite Good, destruction of the love of God does not follow necessarily, in virtue of the nature of acts of love, from the destruction of the love of a neighbor—and this is the case whether we understand the "destruction" of love as a contrary or as a contradictory. And there is even less reason to think that there would be a contradiction in virtue of the nature of the habit if there were charity toward God but not toward a neighbor.
So this act concerning another exists insofar as a commandment has been given about loving another; and for this act one ought to make use of that habit, or at least not act against that habit. Otherwise, the act and habit directed to God would be destroyed, not by some natural contradiction, but because of demerit. For a transgression of the commandment does not positively corrupt the act, or even the habit, of loving God; rather, it earns demerit, so that God withdraws himself, with the result that neither the act nor the habit can be present.
And this is clearly the case as far as the habit is concerned, because this habit, which by its nature is not private but common, is apt to incline one to love God nonprivately; and thus a private act of love that destroys love of neighbor cannot in any way be an act of that habit. This fact evinces the great perfection of this habit, because even if acquired envy could be greater, in terms of its intensity in eliciting acts, than infused charity of a modest degree, this habit—because it is ordinate and perfect in the genus of appetitive habits—cannot have to do with God otherwise than as the universal good who should be loved in common with others. Consequently, it cannot be the principle of any act that involves both love of God and the contrary of love of neighbor.
9 "the assertion" = NYQ; other MSS and the edition have "the truth or the assertion."