II. Replies to the preliminary arguments
ARE THE MORAL VIRTUES CONNECTED?
the intellect if it has faith and in the will if it has charity and hope. See Gratian, "On penitence," distinction 3, Sed quod.84
117 But if someone were to ask whether faith and hope apart from charity would be virtues, it can be said (as was said earlier about the [moral] virtues [n. 105]) that they can be perfect in their species, that is, as principles of their proper acts concerning their proper objects; but apart from charity they cannot have that ultimate perfection that they have in attaining the end to which they are ordered by charity. And this is in fact a perfection both in the moral virtues and in the theological virtues, even though it is typically said that the perfection consists in attaining the end through some elicited action, or exists through some ordering of the acts of the moral or theological virtues to the end. But in fact it can be said that this perfection consists strictly85 in [the virtue's] being accepted by God, who orders it to happiness.86 Indeed, no virtue or act of a virtue is accepted apart from charity,87 which "alone divides the children of the kingdom from the children of perdition."88
II. Replies to the preliminary arguments 119 Replies to the preliminary arguments:
I concede the first two [nn. 2–3], since they include what was said in the first article
[n. 33].
120 To the third argument [n. 4] I reply that although from frequent acts of a certain sort a quality is generated that is apt to be a moral virtue (since it is apt to be in harmony with right reason, and it would be a virtue if it coexisted with right reason in the agent), nonetheless, because there is no correct dictate in the act, the rule for correct action is lacking. And for that reason this choice, which is apt to be correct, is not in fact correct, because it is not subject to the proper rule. Consequently, even if repeated action generates a certain quality, it does not generate a habit for choosing correctly, and consequently it does not generate a virtue.
121 I concede the fourth argument [n. 5], since its conclusion is what was said in the second article about the connection of the moral virtues with prudence [n. 72].
122 To the other arguments that follow, the ones about incompossible virtues [nn. 7–8],
I concede that although one could respond that no virtues, even at the species-level,
84 Gratian, Decretum pars 2 causa 33 q. 3 'De poenitentia', d. 3 c. 41–2.
85 "strictly": or "chiefly" (PNQ).
86 Cf. Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 17 n. 129.
87 Reading Sic quippe nulla virtus nec eius actus acceptatur sine caritate (Q) for the edition's sic quippe nulla virtus moralis, nec infusa nec actus moralis etiam, acceptatur sine caritate ("Indeed, no moral virtue, not even an infused one, nor any moral act either, is accepted apart from charity"—the limitation to moral virtues and acts makes no sense given that Scotus has just said that his point applies to both moral and theological virtues).
88 Augustine, De Trin. XV.18.32; cf. Scotus, Ordinatio II d. 27 n. 8.
ORDINATIO III, D. , Q. UN.
are incompossible, nonetheless, as examples for our present purposes, they do support the conclusion89 that diverse species of the same genus of moral virtue, or of diverse genera, are not necessarily connected; and that was conceded in the first article of this question [n. 32].
89 Reading concludunt (Q) for the edition's includunt. The edition (incorrectly) shows no variant readings for includunt; concludunt is clearly the word that is needed.
Ordinatio III, d. 37, q. un.
"Do all the precepts of the Decalogue belong to the natural law?"
1 Concerning distinction 37, I ask whether all the precepts of the Decalogue belong to the natural law.
2 For the negative:
It does not appear that God can make dispensations from precepts that belong to the natural law. But God did make dispensations that appear to be contrary to precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore, etc.
3 Proof of the major premise: Precepts belonging to the natural law are either practical principles known from their terms or conclusions that follow necessarily from such principles. In either case, they have necessary truth. Therefore, God cannot make them false. Therefore, he cannot make what they mark out as good to be anything but good, and he cannot make what they prohibit to be anything but bad; and thus he cannot cause something illicit to be licit.
4 Proof of the minor premise: Killing, theft, and adultery are contrary to precepts of the Decalogue, as is clear from Exodus 20:13–15, "You shall not kill," and so forth. Yet apparently God gave dispensations from those precepts. In the case of murder, this is evident from Genesis 22 in the story of Abraham and his son, whom he was commanded to sacrifice. As for theft, this is evident from Exodus 11 and 12, in which God commands the children of Israel to despoil the Egyptians; this despoiling is a taking of someone else's property without the owner's consent, which is the definition of theft.1 As for adultery, see Hosea 1:2: "Make children of fornications."
5 Moreover, in Romans 7:7 the Apostle says, "I would not have known covetousness if the law had not said, 'You shall not covet.'" But things that are known on the basis of the natural law are known to be required or prohibited even if they are not written
1 Scotus takes the wording of his definition of theft—furtum est contrectatio rei alienae, invito domino— from Bonaventure, Sent. III d. 37 dub. 7. Its ultimate source is Iustiniani Institutiones IV c. 1 n. 1.