II. Reply to the preliminary argument
ORDINATIO I, D. , Q. UN.
Judas, when Judas is presented to the divine will, first God has a not-willing of glory for Judas—not, at first, a willing-against, according to the final position in distinction
415—and then, second, he can reflect on that negation of an act and will it. And thus what God willingly or voluntarily chooses is not that Judas will be a sinner to the end, or a willing-against glory for Judas, but rather his not-willing of glory for Judas.
II. Reply to the preliminary argument
In reply to the first argument [n. 1], I explained in distinction 416 how God does not foresee future sin solely in virtue of knowing that he will permit a person to remain a sinner to the end, and thus the person will be ultimately worthy of damnation; in addition, he must know that he will cooperate with this person in an act of sinning and will not cooperate with an act whose omission is a sin of omission. Nonetheless, concomitant with either of these permissions is God's foreseeing that he will not will that this person sin. And thus it is clear in what way divine permission is an act of will and in what way it isn't.
5 Cf. I d. 41 n. 45.
6 Cf. I d. 41 n. 50.