II. Replies to the arguments
ORDINATIO III, D. , Q. UN.
But as for the circumstance of the act—namely, its being accepted by God—I explained in Book I, d. 17 [nn. 129, 152], that this is principally from charity43 and less principally from the will.
So, in short, I say here what I said there about the necessity of habits for acts, and particularly for acts of charity, with respect to a circumstance of the act; with respect to the substance of the act, however, I say what I said there.44
And as for the condition of the habit—namely, its being infused—I say the same thing here that I said about faith45 and hope:46 no one can prove such infused habits by natural reason; they are held solely as a matter of faith. And it seems appropriate that all three would have this in common, since when it comes to eliciting acts that have to do directly with God, it seems likely that the higher part can be fully and completely perfected only by God's direct action.
II. Replies to the arguments
Replies to the arguments given in the course of this question.
A. Replies to the preliminary arguments
Replies to the preliminary arguments:
As to the first [n. 2], I concede that charity can properly be called friendship, though not if we take friendship in the very strictest sense, as the Philosopher was speaking of it in the passage cited. But if, in keeping with Aristotle's meaning, we extend it to include God, we find something superior to friendship.47 For the superiority of the object does not destroy anything that is a perfection in the object, but only what is an imperfection. And so the argument fails: the intrinsic worth of what is lovable, and the loved object's reciprocating love, are essential conditions in what is lovable; but its equality [with the lover] in these two respects is a concomitant condition, not a matter of perfection. Quite the opposite, in fact: [the superior friend] would not be more perfect if he reciprocated love. Now God in fact has reciprocation of love and intrinsic worth or love-worthiness in a more excellent way, and there can be friendship with God, which deserves the name of "super-friendship."
43 Reading hoc est a caritate principaliter with Q. The edition, following the reading of most MSS, has ille actus est in actu principaliter a caritate. If ille actus is indeed what Scotus wrote, it must be a slip of the pen for illa circumstantia; Scotus does not elsewhere call a circumstance of an act an "act in an act."
44 Cf. ibid, nn. 53, 65, 92–7.
45 See Lectura III d. 23 nn. 48, 56–7; the question on faith was not revised for the Ordinatio.
46 d. 26 n. 132.
47 The edition has amicitiă, which I take it is meant to suggest that the word is nominative (rather than, as I have translated, an ablative of comparison). I cannot construe the Latin in accordance with that suggestion.
THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUE OF CHARITY
69 And if someone were to argue that equality is a defining characteristic of friendship, that's true, presupposing intrinsic worth, which is the first defining characteristic of what is lovable. Equality is a defining characteristic of friendship taken strictly, whereas superiority is more a characteristic of a habit that is like friendship or more perfect than friendship; and it is this latter habit that I am calling "charity" in the present discussion.
70 To the second argument [n. 3], I say that not only can God be loved above all else through charity, but he can be loved above all else even through purely natural powers (at least in the condition of human nature as originally created).
71 And as for the Philosopher's principle in Ethics IX [n. 4], I say that the authoritative passage should be understood as applying to the awareness of friendship—I become aware that I have friendship toward someone when [I find that] I desire for him the same sorts of things I desire for myself—but not as an essential defining characteristic of friendship, as though the only kind of friendship were friendship in the strict sense, between equals; it is in that latter kind of friendship that the measure of friendship to oneself is the measure of friendship to another, and not vice versa.48
72 As for the argument there about oneness [n. 5], I say that there are two features that come together in the lovable object: goodness and oneness. And although sometimes oneness exceeds goodness, goodness nevertheless compensates in some other respect.
73 As for the third argument [n. 6], I concede the conclusion; but still, as I have explained [nn. 63–6], charity is not superfluous.
74 To the fourth argument [n. 9], I say that no habit of the same species as charity can be acquired through acts, even though it is possible to acquire a friendship that tends toward God as object under the same aspect [under which he is the object of charity], and even to do so through an act similar [to an act of charity], since [friendship of a sort that involves] loving God above all else can be acquired through acts. For any nature that cannot exist from an efficient cause of the same species as another is not of the same species as that which can exist from such an efficient cause of such a species, since an effect of the same species can exist from causes that are similar in species. And therefore charity, which can only be infused, cannot be of the same species as any friendship that can be acquired through acts.
B. Replies to the two arguments put forward in the second article 75 I reply as follows to the two arguments for the alternative position in the article "On the formal object of charity":
To the first [n. 21], I say that positing two gods destroys the nature of charity. For every habit tends of its own nature toward something one. To posit that a habit tends
48 Reading with Q.
ORDINATIO III, D. , Q. UN.
toward more than one is to posit that that habit is not that habit. For example, if there is an unqualifiedly proper habit of a first principle, to posit some other habit of the first principle is to posit that the latter habit is not of that first principle as proper.
Thus I say that positing that there is more than one god amounts to saying that both, and neither, should be loved through charity.
To the second [n. 22], I say that what holds for "more" and "less" in a given order is not analogous to what holds for what is highest in that order, as far as the activity of something outside that order on things within it is concerned. For it can be the case that something's activity necessarily requires the highest thing in that order if it is to be completely perfect, and yet it is not necessarily ordered in a similar way to the other things that belong to that order. There is an example in the case of colors: there can be completely perfect vision only of a completely perfect visible color, and yet it need not be the case that vision is more perfect when it is of a color that is closer to the completely perfect visible color. The reason for this is that an act rests in something because that thing fully possesses the defining feature of the total object
[of the power]. That object is in other things in a diminished way. It may be that one thing exceeds another to some degree, but in such things there is no feature that necessarily causes rest, even if the power is naturally free. Therefore, although it is true both that only the infinite good fully satisfies the will, and that it does so precisely because it is the infinite good, it need not be the case that any finite good satisfies the will more or less in accordance with its [greater or lesser] degree of goodness, because those degrees are accidental with reference to the external object that satisfies the will.
Ordinatio III, d. 28, q. un.
"Ought one to love one's neighbor by the same habit by which one loves God?"
1 Concerning distinction 28, I ask whether one ought to love one's neighbor by the same habit by which one loves God.
2 Arguments for the negative:
For one habit there is one object. The formal character of the object, goodness, is not the same in God as it is in one's neighbor. Therefore, etc.
3 Also, the habit by which one loves God is a theological habit; therefore, it has to do with God alone as object, and not with anything created.
4 One might respond1 that this is true with respect to the principal object, but the habit in question does have to do with something other than God only insofar as that thing is attributed to God.
5 On the contrary: if attribution were sufficient, it would follow that there could be one intellectual habit, and even one appetitive habit, for all things. For all intelligibles are attributed to one thing, and likewise all moral virtues are attributed to one thing, because all moral virtues are attributed to happiness as what is intrinsically desirable.
6 Furthermore, another argument on the main question: the habit of a principle is distinct from the habit of a conclusion. Therefore, something similar holds for appetitive habits: the habit of the end is distinct from the habit of what is for the end. Charity is the habit of the end. Therefore, etc.
7 1 John speaks in favor of the affirmative.2
1 Bonaventure, Sent. III d. 27 a. 1 q. 2 in corp. and ad 3.
2 1 John 4:21, "We have this commandment from God, that one who loves God should also love his brother."