I. Scotus's view
Ordinatio III, d. 34, q. un., nn.
1–5, 24–38, 45–83 "Are the virtues, gifts, beatitudes, and fruits the same habits?"
Concerning distinction 34 I ask whether the virtues, gifts, beatitudes, and fruits are the same habits.
For the affirmative:
See what Gregory says in commenting on this passage from Job [1:2]: "Seven sons and three daughters were born to him."1
Furthermore, if they were distinct from each other, no habit of one sort would be identical with a habit of another sort. The consequent is false, because courage is a gift and courage is a virtue.
Someone might object2 that the two courages differ in their essential nature. But on the contrary: they have acts of the same essential nature.
For the negative:
The number of gifts is not the same as the number of beatitudes. And clearly the things enumerated are not concordant, because something is a beatitude that is not a gift, something is a gift that is not a virtue, and so on.3
I. Scotus's view A. In this life there is no need for any habits other than the theological and cardinal virtues
In response to this question it can be said (though without asserting it) that the only habits that are needed in this life are the intellectual, moral, and theological virtues.
1 Gregory, Moralia in Iob I c. 27 n. 38: "Indeed, seven sons are born to us because—through the conception of good thought—the seven virtues of the Holy Spirit arise in us." Cf. ibid. XXXV c. 16 n. 42.
2 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II q. 68 a. 1 ad 1.
3 For reasons of space I omit nn. 6–23, in which Scotus discusses the views of Henry of Ghent,
Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas.
ARE THE VIRTUES, GIFTS, ETC., THE SAME HABITS?
1. PROOF OF THE VIEW
25 This is shown in the following way:
Natural reason shows the necessity of an intellectual habit that perfects the intellect in the speculative domain, and a habit that perfects the intellect in the domain of action. Thus we can establish a speculative and a practical intellectual habit.
26 In a very similar way natural reason shows the necessity of a habit that perfects the appetite with respect to things that are desirable for one's own sake and another that perfects the appetite with respect to things that are desirable for another's sake. Thus we establish the first distinction within appetitive virtue: a virtue that orders the appetitive power in acts that concern oneself and another that orders it in acts that concern another.4
27 Perhaps natural reason shows that human beings are not sufficiently perfected by these habits, along the lines of the argument in the first question of Book I, which tried to show the necessity of some cognition other than acquired cognition.5 But whether that's the case or not, natural reason certainly doesn't establish specifically which intellectual habit and which appetitive habit are necessary in addition to these.
But on the basis of the persuasive arguments put forward in that question,6 it is reasonable to hold that the cognitive habit and the appetitive habit that the Catholic
Church teaches are necessary are in fact the ones that are necessary. And by faith we hold that three theological virtues, which immediately perfect the soul with respect to the Uncreated Object, are necessary.7
28 On the basis of these observations I argue as follows: the only habits we should posit in wayfarers are those by which they can be perfected, with regard to any object, as much as it is possible for them to be perfected in this life. The seven general virtues fit this description, leaving aside any consideration of the acquired speculative sciences.
Therefore, besides the acquired speculative sciences, no habit should be posited in wayfarers that is unqualifiedly distinct from the seven virtues.
29 Proof of the minor premise: there is no object with regard to which wayfarers can be perfected other than God and creatures. With regard to God, wayfarers are sufficiently perfected by the three theological virtues; and they are perfected in a supremely perfect way, as far it is possible for them to be perfected, if those three habits are supremely perfect according to their kind.8 With regard to creatures:
4 An expansive translation of the reading in Q: Et ita habetur prima distinctio virtutis appetitivae ordinantis talem potentiam in actibus ad se et ad alterum. The edition has Scotus speaking of virtue as ordering the habits (ordinantis istos habitus ad se et ad alterum). The virtues, of course, do not order the habits; the virtues are the habits.
5 Ordinatio prol. nn. 62–65.
6 Ibid. nn. 13–18, 40–1.
7 Lectura III d. 23 n. 48.
8 Reading et hoc perfectissime, quantum perfici potest, si illi tres habitus sunt perfectissimi in suo genere with Q. The edition has in summo (perfectissime, quantum potest, si illi tres habitus sunt perfectissimi).
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leaving aside any consideration of speculative matters, the intellect is supremely perfectly perfected by prudence, if it is supremely perfect prudence; for supremely perfect prudence is supremely perfect knowledge concerning everything in the domain of possible action, under every condition.9 Similarly, appetite is supremely perfectly perfected by the three moral virtues, if they are supremely perfect; for they perfect the appetite both with respect to others and things desirable for others, and with respect to oneself and things desirable for oneself, whether primarily and directly or secondarily, on account of those primary things. And my understanding of these four cardinal virtues is that none of them is numerically one habit in a given person—a universal, all-inclusive temperance or justice, one that concerns everything [within the domain of the relevant virtue]—but rather someone possesses particular species of justice for the particular matters [that fall within that domain].
Therefore, a human being who is perfected by the three theological virtues and the speculative and practical virtues, and the moral virtues ordered both to self and to others, is as fully perfected as a wayfarer can be. So there does not appear to be any necessity to posit other habits besides the theological, intellectual, and moral virtues.
Through the three theological virtues a wayfarer is sufficiently perfected toward
God immediately. For by faith a wayfarer is sufficiently perfected with respect to God as he is to be understood in this life, since the cognition of faith is the only sort of cognition one can have of him in this life, as was explained earlier in Book III.10 With respect to God as worthy of love in himself, a wayfarer is sufficiently perfected by charity; and with respect to God as worthy of love for my own sake, as beneficial for me, hope perfects the wayfarer. (This is clear from the questions on hope and charity, above.11) Now there are no ordinate acts that a wayfarer can perform with respect to God besides understanding him, loving him in himself, and desiring him for myself as my good. Therefore, etc.
Similarly, with respect to every good other than God as object, a wayfarer is sufficiently perfected when he is perfected by intellectual habits and appetitive habits that concern those goods. Now all these intellectual habits that sufficiently perfect the intellect are intellectual virtues, for the intellectual virtues sufficiently perfect the wayfarer, as far as is possible, for engaging in both speculation and practical reasoning. And the appetitive habits are appetitive virtues, and these appetitive virtues
9 Reading ipsa enim est de omni agibili et quantum ad omnem condicionem agibilis perfectissima notitia with Q for the edition's tunc enim est de omni agibili quantum ad omnem condicionem agibilis et perfectissime notam.
10 That is, faith is the only cognition of God as the wayfarer needs to understand God, that is, as the trustworthy revealer of what is taught in Scripture and by the Church. (For the kind of faith Scotus has in mind here, see Lectura III d. 23.) Scotus does of course affirm the possibility of natural knowledge of God: demonstrative knowledge that there exists one and only one being who is first in efficient causality, first in final causality, and first in dignity, who is infinite in being and characterized by intellect and will.
11 On hope, see III d. 26 nn. 89–96; on charity, see III d. 27 nn. 29–32.
ARE THE VIRTUES, GIFTS, ETC., THE SAME HABITS?
sufficiently perfect the wayfarer for loving everything that is worthy of love, whether in order to oneself or in order to another.12
2. HOW THE INTELLECTUAL, IRASCIBLE, AND CONCUPISCIBLE HABITS
ARE CONNECTED WITH THE SEVEN VIRTUES
31 It is important to note, further, that just as habit is a kind of intermediate genus in the category of quality,13 so too it has many intermediate genera under it before one comes to the most specific species. For whether (as seems probable) habit is first divided into intellectual and appetitive, and intellectual is further divided into acquired and infused, and appetitive is likewise divided into acquired and infused— or, alternatively, habit is first divided into acquired and infused and each of those is in turn divided into intellectual and appetitive—at any rate acquired intellectual is further divided into speculative and practical, and acquired appetitive is further divided into in order to oneself and in order to another. Acquired speculative is divided into real and of reason, because such a habit concerns real being or being of reason.
What concerns real being is divided according to the division made in Metaphysics
VI [1026a18–19]: physics, mathematics, divine science. And each of those perhaps admits of many further divisions before one reaches the most specific species.
Acquired practical is divided into concerning what can be done and concerning what can be made. Concerning what can be done has several divisions before one reaches the most specific species (example: a practical habit concerning this particular kind of thing that can be done). Finally, the habit of building and suchlike, which are also practical habits concerning what can be done, are subject to many further divisions, as will become clear in the question on the connection of the virtues
[d. 36 nn. 96–7]. For no matter whether we are talking about practical knowledge or practical prudence, there is not a unitary habit that concerns everything that can be done, as I shall discuss in that question [nn. 98–9].
32 In this whole division of intellectual habit, only one infused virtue, faith, is counted among the virtues, and one intermediate genus, called "prudence," is an intermediate genus containing many [kinds of] acquired practical habits. And if we count rather general species [of intellectual habit] alongside each other, we can have three: namely, faith, speculative science, and prudence.14 But because speculative science does not perfect human beings for acting morally, it is not counted alongside the other virtues: for it is less necessary than prudence is for human beings to live rightly in human
12 The edition consigns the two paragraphs that precede this note to the apparatus, on the grounds that this text is "canceled by virtue of the added 'extra' text of Duns Scotus." That added 'extra' text is nn. 28–9, marked in Codex A as an addition. But these two "canceled" paragraphs are not redundant following nn.
28–9; I have accordingly translated them and included them in the main text.
13 See Aristotle, Praed. c. 15, 15b17–33; Scotus, In Praed. qq. 30–6 n. 40.
14 Reading Et sic connumerando species etiam satis communes possunt haberi tres with Q for the edition's Quod si etiam connumerando species—etiam satis communes—possent haberi tres.
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terms, and less necessary than faith is for human beings to live rightly in the commonwealth of the Church.
Two acquired and two infused habits can be identified as the first species under infused appetitive habit and acquired appetitive habit. Under infused are hope and charity; under acquired is a virtue that disposes the appetite to itself and [a virtue that disposes the appetite] to another. The second of these is called by the general name
"justice." The virtue that concerns oneself, by contrast, has no general name; that is perhaps the reason that it has no place in the list of cardinal virtues, and instead other virtues directly beneath it are on the list.15
Among things desirable for oneself, some—namely those that are apt to be appealing straightaway—are desirable in their own right; and others—those that are apt to be unappealing—are undesirable directly. Others are neither directly desirable nor directly undesirable, but are desirable or undesirable indirectly, for the sake of the things that are directly desirable or undesirable. The general virtue that disposes the appetite toward the primary [objects of desire and aversion] is called "temperance"; the one concerned with the secondary objects is called "courage." For the primary objects of desire [and aversion] properly belong to the concupiscible and the secondary objects to the irascible.
In order to make this distinction a bit clearer, it is important to note that the concupiscible concerns what is apt in its own right to be appealing or unappealing, in such a way that nothing is required but the apprehension of that object in order for an act of pleasure or displeasure (tristandi), or of pursuit or avoidance, to be suited to follow, to the extent that such an act depends on the object.16
The irascible does not have such things as its objects. For the act of the irascible is to be angry (irasci); and to be angry, according to the Philosopher in Rhetoric II [1378a31–3], is "to desire revenge in accordance with an apparent end, on account of an apparent slight." So the object of the irascible is revenge. Or, more correctly, if its object17 is the revenge-worthy, or what could be called the anger-worthy, or (to use more normal vocabulary) the offensive, what is called "offensive" is not what is not straightaway unappealing to the concupiscible, but what poses an obstacle to something that is directly appealing. For example, if food is directly suitable to the gustatory appetite of a bird and is desired accordingly, something that gets in the way of such food or takes it away is offensive to the animal that desires the food. This offensive thing is the object of the irascible, and the irascible has a certain willingagainst with respect to the offensive thing—not indeed the kind of willing-against that characterizes the concupiscible, which is aversion in the proper sense, but a 15 A free translation of the edition's sed descenditur sub illa, quia descenditur ad alias proximas sub illa.
16 The edition, following A against all the other MSS, adds 'necessarily' after 'follow.'
17 All the MSS have 'act,' but 'object' is what makes sense.
ARE THE VIRTUES, GIFTS, ETC., THE SAME HABITS?
willing-against that consists in rejecting or fighting off. For the irascible fights off the offensive thing willingly: it does not merely desire that what is imposing the obstacle be removed, it desires to remove it and, further, to punish it. (On this, see III d. 26
[nn. 38–9], above.) 37 Yet because its act is to will to take vengeance, or to will-against, and the object willed-against is still present,18 being angry always involves sorrow—not merely concupiscible sorrow but also irascible sorrow. And this is so only when the irascible has an imperfect act: that is, when it desires vengeance but does not achieve it.19 By contrast, when it actually achieves revenge, its act is perfect and is assimilated to fruition on the part of the concupiscible; at that point the irascible's anger is without sorrow. Indeed, it is accompanied by great pleasure of its own: as Aristotle says in Rhetoric [II.2, 1378b5–7], "A man's anger is like honey."
38 Therefore, just as the concupiscible needs to be ordered toward things that are apt to be desired directly, so that it will not desire them inordinately but in accordance with the moderation of right reason, so too the irascible needs to be moderated by a habit, so that it will not immoderately will to fight off what needs to be fought off and not to fight off what should not be fought off.20 The habit by which it is disposed to fight off what needs to be fought off has no name, although it could be called "pugnacity" (bellicositas) or something like that, whereas the habit by which it is disposed not to fight off what should not be fought off, but rather to bear up under it, is called "patience." And because it is more difficult not to fight off something offensive than to fight it off, patience is nobler than courage, as the poet says: "Patience is a noble kind of victory, for one who endures patiently is a victor."21 So the irascible does not have as its object the "difficult or prizeworthy" (which the concupiscible has as its object). Rather, it has as its object what is offensive. Thus, its adequate act is willing vengeance or willing-against what is offensive: an imperfect willing-against (which is assimilated to desire on the part of the concupiscible) as long as one is angry and the offensive thing has not yet been fought off or endured, a perfect willing-against (which is assimilated to enjoyment
18 Or, to read with Q, "And yet because its act is to will to take vengeance, and the object willed-against, not yet punished, is still present."
19 Reading et hoc nonnisi tunc quando irascibilis habet actum imperfectum, quando scilicet desiderat vindicare sed non vindicat (Q). The edition has et hoc nonnisi in illo tempore vel instanti quando irascibile habet actum perfectum: non quasi nolle desideratum, quale habet dum non vindicat. To the extent that one can even make sense of the edition's reading, it seems clearly at odds with Scotus's argument. The idea has to be that the irascible's act is imperfect (not perfect, as the edition has it) until vengeance is achieved; and it is while vengeance is desired but not yet realized that anger is accompanied by sorrow.
20 Reading ne immoderate velit propellere propellenda et non propellere non-propellenda with NQ. The edition has ne immoderate velit offendens propellere propellenda et immoderate ulcisci, sed moderate velit propellere propellenda et non propellere non-propellenda.
21 Anonymous, 13th c. G. Dinkova-Bruum, in Sacris erudiri 43 (2004): 327.
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in the concupiscible) when it fights off in a moderate way the thing willed-against or bears it in a moderate way.22
You might say that what has the role of willing one opposite has the role of willingagainst the other opposite; the concupiscible has the role of willing one opposite; therefore, etc. I reply that when the irascible has an act of its own, there are always two things that are willed-against, one by the concupiscible and the other by the irascible. This is evident in the example given above [n. 36]: what is willed-against by the concupiscible is the lack of food. This willing-against produces sadness in the concupiscible; by that sadness it flees (as it were) from what is willed-against and does not repel it. For there is something else willed-against, namely, what takes away the food. And that is willed-against by the irascible not in an act of flight but in an act of repelling or fighting off; and so long as it does not actually fight it off, there is sadness proper to the irascible.
Now it is clear that the two sorrows of the irascible and the concupiscible are not the same sorrow. For if fighting off what is offensive is presented as impossible, there is greater sadness in the concupiscible, and yet there will not be anger, properly speaking. For according to the Philosopher in Rhetoric II [1380a31–3], no one who is extremely afraid grows angry; and yet the more afraid someone is, the greater is the sorrow of his concupiscible part in fleeing from what he fears. And although the irascible is sometimes sorrowful over being unable to take revenge, namely when it lacks the power to do so, the concupiscible is sorrowful over something else, namely lacking the desired object.
Also, concupiscible sorrow and irascible sorrow are accompanied by different immutations of the organ in the sensory part (look this up23): concupiscible sorrow is accompanied by constriction (just as the opposed pleasure is accompanied by dilation), whereas irascible sorrow is accompanied by heating, which is the boiling of blood around the heart. And from this it follows that the concupiscible and the irascible in the sensory part have diverse organs, since one and the same thing cannot be moved with contrary motions at the same time.
Now in the rational part the concupiscible and irascible can have a distinction in their objects similar to the distinction in the sensory part:
For something is non-derivatively pleasant to the will, namely the good: either what is suitable to the will in the will's own right or, also, what is suitable to the will according to the sensory appetite—for the will is apt to share the pleasure of the sensory appetite with which it is conjoined in the same supposit.
22 The edition continues with a text (nn. 39–44) that appears here in P, after the words "has a certain willing-against with respect to the offensive thing" (n. 36) in ASZB, and not at all in NYQ. The text is disorderly and sometimes unintelligible, so I have omitted it.
23 See Aristotle, De motu animalium 7, 701b1–32; Scotus, Lectura III d. 33 n. 85.
ARE THE VIRTUES, GIFTS, ETC., THE SAME HABITS?
The will can also have an object that offends it, both in accordance with right reason and in opposition to right reason, and the will can have to do with such an object qua actually offensive by willing-against it, qua offensive, in an act that fights it off and takes charge of it.
But there is not as great a distinction between the concupiscible and the irascible in the will as there is in the sensory appetite, because the will has no organ. And it's not correct to say that one of them is more a potency (vis) and the other a power
(potentia), or vice versa. Rather, [we distinguish the concupiscible and the irascible in the will] in the same way that we distinguish a higher part and a lower part in reason: on the basis of diverse objects. The power is unqualifiedly one and the same.
49 I really don't know what 'potency' is supposed to mean; it's a superfluous word. For the basis for acting with respect to those distinct objects, higher and lower, is unqualifiedly the same, as I explained in Book II, distinction 24 [n. 29].
50 In the same way, it can be said that one and the same power, and one and the same potency, is the basis for activity with respect to both the non-derivative and the derivative objects of pleasure or sorrow. For a power is that through which something that has power has power and that by which something that has power is strong.
In the case of spiritual things, having power and being strong are identical. And there will be no distinction in the will except on the basis of the objects to which it tends.
Analogously, with reference to the intellect we could distinguish between principles and conclusions, insofar as the intellect tends to conclusions on the basis of principles; but no one would say that there is a distinction of powers or of potencies in the intellect corresponding to this distinction between principles and conclusions.
51 Taking these claims about the irascible and concupiscible as given, I return to the virtues. I say that the proper habit of the concupiscible is called "temperance" and the proper habit of the irascible that perfects it in general is called "courage"—and that is so whether we are speaking of acquired habits or infused habits. But both infused habits perfect the concupiscible, because God, who is the object of those habits, cannot be willed-against. Now even though both of these species—that is, both courage and temperance—can be subdivided, they are left undivided in the enumeration of the cardinal virtues.
3. THESE SEVEN VIRTUES UNQUALIFIEDLY PERFECT A WAYFARER
52 Accordingly, therefore, in the enumeration of all the virtues there are three theological and four cardinal virtues. We draw the list of the theological virtues from the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 13:1224 and the list of the moral virtues from Wisdom 8:7: for wisdom "teaches sobriety and justice and prudence and strength, than which there is nothing more useful in life."
24 "Now faith, hope, and charity abide, these three."
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These seven virtues unqualifiedly perfect a wayfarer; thus, a wayfarer is perfect according to the degree of these virtues in their species. For as these virtues are more or less intense,25 a wayfarer is more or less perfect; and if they are as intense as they can possibly be in this life, a human being is unqualifiedly perfect to the extent that one can be in this life. (For the present I am paying no attention to the perfection that someone has through the acquired speculative virtues, which I set aside earlier
[n. 28].) Indeed, through these seven virtues—understanding this to be true of them and of their necessary species, which I will talk about later [n. 81]—if they are as perfect as possible in themselves, a human being is as perfect as possible with regard to God in himself and with regard to all things other than God, both as intelligible by practical reason and as desirable for himself or for another, and this as ordered to himself, as the appetitive virtues can order him in their own right, and as ordered to the ultimate end, to which the acquired virtues can order him when they are conjoined with charity.
B. How the moral virtues, beatitudes, gifts, and fruits can be classified under the aforementioned seven virtues
1. THE THREE MORAL VIRTUES
Further, in order to see whether the virtues, beatitudes, gifts, and fruits are the same habits, it is important to note that the three acquired moral virtues—justice, courage, and temperance—are intermediate genera.
For there are evidently two primarily desirable objects: honor and pleasure (taken strictly). Indeed, everything that is primarily good—that is, suitable—is either honorable or pleasant. For something useful cannot be what primarily moves one to desire, since something useful is desired only as ordered to something else. And the authoritative passage in 1 John 2:16, "All that is in the world," etc., shows the same thing: for lust of the eyes, which concerns riches, cannot be first, speaking of riches as a useful and not as a pleasant good. (If we speak of riches as beautiful, that is, as a pleasant good, then they can be desired primarily, just like any other beautiful visible thing.) And so, as I have said, the primary objects desirable by a rational nature are honor and pleasure (taken strictly). Therefore, there are two primary species of temperance that moderate [the will] with regard to what is desirable to it: the one that moderates it with regard to honors is called "humility," and the one that moderates it with regard to pleasures retains the name of the genus—and there are as many species of this temperance that moderates these pleasures as there can be distinct pleasures to which the will is inclined (for example, there is one pleasure with regard to objects of taste and another with regard to objects of touch). And this is true not only of pleasures of the senses (the will shares in those pleasures because it is conjoined with the senses) but also of the pleasures that belong to the will as will,
25 The edition, following A alone, adds "not in themselves but in their capacity."
ARE THE VIRTUES, GIFTS, ETC., THE SAME HABITS?
in the way that an angel's will can desire a pleasant good even though it is not associated with a sensory appetite.
56 The proof that these temperances are distinct is that there can be supreme pleasure in one and no pleasure in another. For someone can be unqualifiedly temperate with respect to sex, willing-against having sex with anyone other than his wife26 or unqualifiedly willing-against having sex, and intemperate with respect to objects of taste, willing to eat things that ought not to be eaten or willing-against eating things that ought to be eaten. Also, someone can be temperate with respect to objects of sense and intemperate with respect to objects of speculation. For example, suppose his will takes supreme pleasure in the fact that his intellect is supremely occupied with speculating about intelligible things, speculative knowledge of which is, in and of itself, not as useful as other speculative knowledge is; this pleasure is immoderate in and of itself and ought to be moderated, because it is disordered in and of itself.
57 The species of courage do not require as much explication for our present purposes, since the only species that will be dealt with explicitly is courage in itself or patience, which, as I said earlier [n. 38], is the noblest kind of courage because it does not fight off things that are worthy of being fought off; thus undergoing (pati) is a kind of permitting. And whatever we would say about permission—that it is a positive act of willing or willing-against, or perhaps a willing to impose no hindrance—is also what we would say about the sort of act that undergoing something frightening is in the will.
58 Justice, however, needs to be subdivided for the sake of what follows.
In this connection it is important to note that the first way in which one can be rightly disposed in order to another is with respect to sharing oneself with that other to the greatest extent one can or with respect to sharing something else with that other.27
59 The virtue inclining to the first is friendship, by which one gives oneself to one's neighbor to the extent that one can give oneself and to the extent that one's neighbor can possess one. And this is the most perfect moral virtue, because the whole of justice is more perfect than those [virtues] that concern oneself, and friendship is the most perfect form of justice.28
60 If, by contrast, one shares something else with one's neighbor, one will share either extrinsic goods or intrinsic goods that pertain to the sustaining of human life. We speak of "commutative justice" with respect to the extrinsic goods that human beings need to share, and this is frequently called "justice" inasmuch as it involves sharing
26 For this reading of nolens uti nisi sua, see Williams, "Franciscans," 170 n. 5.
27 Reading aliquid aliud (Q) for the edition's aliquid alterum vel sua (A).
28 Reading perfectissima iustitia (PBNQ), as the argument requires, for the edition's perfectissime iustitia.
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something that makes [the exchanging parties] equal.29 But if one shares with one's neighbor something necessary for common life, this will be either authority, which belongs to the ruler—this species of justice has no name, but it could be called
"rulership" or "just dominion"—or just subordination, which is called "obedience."
2. THE BEATITUDES
These things having been understood, I say that the beatitudes, which the Savior puts forward in Matthew 5:3–10, are the same habits as the virtues, although sometimes more specific species are enumerated among the beatitudes than are found in the list of seven virtues given above [n. 28].
In fact the Savior lists two species of temperance among the beatitudes. The first is humility, which moderates one with respect to the first object of delight, which is honor; he speaks of this when he says, "Blessed are the poor in spirit." Augustine comments, "The 'poor in spirit' are rightly understood as those who are upright and fear God, that is, whose spirit is not puffed up."30 He speaks of the other species of temperance, which moderates pleasures in general, when he says, "Blessed are the pure in heart"; for purity of heart is the will's freedom (immunitas) from all disordered delight, both in its own right and in terms of the sensory appetites to which it is conjoined.
He speaks of courage in its most perfect species: "Blessed are those who suffer persecution for righteousness' sake."
He speaks of three species of justice:
First, he speaks of the species that consists in sharing oneself through friendship when he says "Blessed are the meek." For although friendship is more than benevolence (as the Philosopher says in Ethics VIII [1155b33–4], [friendship is benevolence that is] reciprocated and mutually recognized) and benevolence is more than meekness, because the meek are those who do not give offense or persist in what is bad, still, by means of this, which is as it were the least significant aspect of friendship, he speaks of the species of justice by which someone shares himself with his neighbor.
He speaks of a second species—the one that is subdivided into just dominion and obedience—when he says, "Blessed are the peacemakers," since peace is indeed preserved by a ruler's ruling rightly and a subject's obeying rightly.
He speaks of a third species of justice, which has to do with external goods, when he says, "Blessed are the merciful." For there is no way anyone can be more perfectly disposed with respect to sharing external goods with one's neighbor than someone who is merciful, since a merciful person shares such goods with no expectation of return and without needing to have been previously benefited by the one with whom
29 These two sentences read with Q.
30 Augustine, De sermone Domini in monte I.1.3.
ARE THE VIRTUES, GIFTS, ETC., THE SAME HABITS?
he shares them. Now a generous person may well share certain things with a friend, but there can be a kind of generosity that is inferior to mercy, and thus generosity is a more imperfect species of justice than mercy is. So the Lord speaks of this justice, which concerns temporal things, in terms of its most specific species, in keeping with Luke 8,31 "When you give a feast."
67 And thus we have the three moral virtues spoken of either in themselves or in their species.
68 He also speaks of two theological virtues. The first is charity, which he speaks of when he says, "Blessed are those who hunger and thirst after justice." There is, to be sure, no hungering without some unhappiness, but the habit by which it is elicited is charity; for in its most proper sense charity in this life is the habit by which we hunger after justice and love God, who is truly Justice, in himself. The second is hope, which he speaks of when he says, "Blessed are those who mourn"; for mourning is the habit of desiring that.32
69 And in this way the eight beatitudes speak of two infused appetitive virtues and three moral virtues: courage in itself, temperance in two species, and justice in three species. The two intellectual virtues—one acquired, prudence; the other infused, faith—are not mentioned either in themselves or in their species, but they are sufficiently well-understood through the appetitive virtues, since the will is not disposed in the best possible way apart from a corresponding virtue in the intellect.
3. THE GIFTS
70 As for the gifts,33 I say that the four cardinal virtues are enumerated among them.
"The spirit of counsel" names prudence: for prudence is properly a deliberative (consiliativus) habit, since it is properly the habit of making practical syllogisms correctly, and to make a practical syllogism is to deliberate (consulere); accordingly, the habit by which someone is deliberative is the habit of prudence. "Courage" is listed by its own name among the gifts. "Fear" is a species of temperance: for fear is exactly the same habit as humility, though by a different name, as is evident from what Augustine says in commenting on Matthew 5:3, "Happy are the poor in spirit";34 and that is why Scripture frequently commends fear, as in "The beginning of wisdom [is the fear of the Lord],"35 which is simply to say that humility is the principle of the virtues, with something in the intellect corresponding to it. And in the present context, "happy" should be understood to mean either happy in hope36 or happy in terms of merit, as it often means elsewhere in Scripture: for example,
31 Actually Luke 14:13–14.
32 The edition suggests filling out this rather elliptical expression thus: "mourning is the habit of desiring to mourn for the sake of the consolation for which one hopes."
33 See Isaiah 11:2–3.
34 Augustine, De sermone Domini in monte I.4.11.
35 Psalm 110:10; Proverbs 1:7, 9:10.
36 Reading spe (SZ) for the edition's specie (AB).
ORDINATIO III, D. , Q. UN., NN. –, –, –
"Happy is the one who considers the poor and needy" [Psalm 40:2], "Happy is the one who undergoes testing" [James 1:12], and other similar verses. These verses do not mean that someone is happy in the sense that he possesses happiness, but rather that through that act he merits happiness.37 Now piety is listed among the gifts: this is what the Savior calls "mercy," and thus it is a species of justice [n. 66]
So four cardinal virtues are listed among the gifts.38 Prudence is listed as "counsel" and courage by its own name. The two others appear, not under the notion of the intermediate species that appear in the sevenfold list, but in particular species of those seven: temperance in "fear" and justice in "piety."39
Two infused virtues are listed among them as well. Charity appears as "the spirit of wisdom." For invariably when wisdom is commended in Scripture (as in "Happy is the man who will abide in wisdom" [Ecclesiasticus 14:22] and other such passages),
"wisdom" means charity; for wisdom (sapientia) is the habit by which what is savory (sapidum) in itself is savory to the one who possesses that habit: in other words, it is the habit by which that good in itself is pleasing to me and I will it for myself.40 Infused faith is expressed by the two gifts of "understanding" and "knowledge": those two do not indicate two habits (as "wisdom" indicates charity and "fear" humility) but rather one and the same habit as perfect and imperfect. And both can be given from above, the first indeed without the second, though not vice versa. We can take "understanding" as meaning imperfect faith, which is cognition
(notitia) of the first articles and "knowledge" as explicit cognition of the articles, much as in what can be known naturally we speak of "understanding" of a principle and "knowledge" of an explicit conclusion. Faith is not named among the gifts, but it can be understood as included in charity: for the wisdom by which God is savory to me in himself is also the wisdom by which he is savory as a good for me; for one who savors something both approves the savor of the thing in itself and desires it for himself.
4. THE FRUITS
As for the fruits,41 I say that some of them are virtues of the same essential nature as those that appear in the sevenfold list and some are species of the virtues that appear
37 PNYQ omit "with something in the intellect corresponding to it . . . he merits happiness."
38 The edition adds et duae infusae, quae nominantur propriis nominibus. But besides the fact that these words manifestly interrupt the flow of the exposition, the two infused virtues are not in fact listed by their own names, as will shortly become clear. I therefore follow NYQ in omitting them.
39 pietate (instead of the edition's caritate) is clearly the word required here, since Scotus has just said that pietas is a species of justice. (According to the apparatus, only P has pietate, though this is in fact incorrect; Q also has pietate, though it lacks iustitia.)
40 Or, following the edition (which reads with A alone), "and I also will it in itself for myself."
41 The list of the fruit of the Spirit in Galatians 5:22–3 in the Vulgate is twelvefold—caritas, gaudium, pax, patientia, benignitas, bonitas, longanimitas, mansuetudo, fides, modestia, continentia, castitas—rather than ninefold as we find in the best Greek text and in modern English translations.
ARE THE VIRTUES, GIFTS, ETC., THE SAME HABITS?
in that same list; some are neither virtues nor species of virtues, but pleasures consequent upon the acts [of those virtues].
74 For example, "charity" is spoken of there by its own name, as is "faith," whereas hope appears as "longsuffering" (longanimitas), which is why we read [Hebrews 6:15] that the patriarchs were longsuffering in hope, as though looking boldly far ahead
(in longum animose).
75 The moral virtues appear there as well. Courage appears as "patience."
76 Justice appears, in its species called mercy, as "goodness," as someone is commonly called good because he shares himself with his neighbor. Another species of justice, namely friendship, is spoken of there as "kindness" (benignitas), which is, as it were, benevolence and good ardor (bona igneitas). The second species of justice, which has to do with rulership or subordination, appears as "gentleness"—or perhaps that refers specifically to obedience, since a gentle person is one who carries out everything without complaining.
77 Temperance is spoken of in two of its species, "continence" and "chastity," if you like to distinguish between "chastity" as having to do with sexual pleasure and "continence" as having to do with other pleasures. Alternatively, one could affirm a single species having to do with all pleasures that is spoken of as both "continence" and "chastity," as the Philosopher in Ethics VII [1150a9–15] affirms that chastity is a certain level within every virtue.42
78 Prudence is spoken of as "modesty": for a modest person is one who upholds the requisite and right way of acting, and it is the task of prudence to find, settle beforehand, and determine the requisite way of acting.
79 Thus we have the three theological virtues in themselves. We have courage as "patience," justice in its three species, temperance in one species or in two species, and prudence in one species, and so we have all the [cardinal] virtues, both intellectual and moral.
80 The other things that appear on this list are pleasures that accompany or follow from an act: "joy," properly speaking, is a pleasure in the will, and "peace" is the security of having an object in that same power without a struggle.
C. Conclusion 81 In this way, then, it is evident how, if we uphold the view that the seven virtues, either in themselves or in their species, sufficiently perfect a human being in this life, no habits will be necessary other than these seven and their species; and no other such habits are listed among the beatitudes or the fruits or the gifts. And although the 42 Cf. Richard Middleton, Sent. III d. 33 princ. 5 q. 4 in corp.