I. Reply to the question
ORDINATIO IV, D. , Q.
Also, in the Decretals, "On penances and remissions," Omnis utriusque sexus:8 "Let a priest take care lest he betray a sinner by word or sign or in any other way whatsoever." And it goes on, "If he shall presume to reveal a sin that has been disclosed to him, we decree that not only is he to be deposed from his priestly office, but he is to perform the most rigorous penance and be held fast in the strictest confinement."
I. Reply to the question
In this question, the first conclusion is that a priest is bound by the natural law to conceal a sin disclosed to him in confession. The second is that he is bound to it by positive divine law. The third is that he is bound to it by positive ecclesiastical law.
The fourth explains when and in what way (and so on for the other relevant circumstances) he is so bound. The fifth concerns other secrets or matters disclosed to someone in secret.
A. The first conclusion
1. A PROOF OFFERED BY OTHERS
One proof9 of the first conclusion goes as follows:
A person can truthfully affirm something when speaking in the person of someone else that the very same person would truthfully deny when speaking in his own person. Proof: an angel speaking to Moses in the person of God truthfully said, "I am the Lord your God" [Exodus 20:2]. Therefore, by analogy, a human being who is representing the person of God in the forum of confession can truthfully affirm something that he can truthfully deny when speaking in his own person outside that forum. Therefore, someone who, outside that forum, says that he has heard or knows such-and-such is lying, because he came to know those things only insofar as he was representing the person of God. Now the avoidance of lying—and particularly of harmful lies—belongs to the natural law. Therefore, etc.
2. REFUTATION OF THIS PROOF
One can argue against this proof:
First, it belongs to one and the same person, acting as the same person, both to have knowledge of a case and to give judgment in that case. This is obvious, since the very reason that this person, acting as this person, has knowledge of the case is so that he can judge correctly in the case. Now a priest does not give judgment by absolving the penitent in the person of God, but in his own person; therefore, he also hears and knows the confession in his own person. Proof of the minor premise: the priest does
8 Gregory IX, Decretales V tit. 38 c. 12.
9 Richard Middleton, Sent. IV d. 21 princ. 4 q. 1 in corp.
IS THE SEAL OF CONFESSION EXCEPTIONLESS?
not absolve as the ultimate source of absolution,10 but only as a minister, and absolving as a minister belongs to him only in his own person. For if he were speaking in the person of God in absolving a penitent, he could truthfully say, without the preceding prayer (which is "may the Lord absolve you"), "I as the ultimate source of absolution absolve and infuse you with grace," just as the angel truthfully said in the person of God, "I led you out of Egypt."11
68 Also, the priest does not hear or absolve in the forum of confession in the person of God more than he confects the Eucharist in the person of God, since the latter act is as noble as the former, and it is a sacramental act in which the divine power is active just as the former is—if anything, in fact, the priest seems to be acting in the person of God or in the person of Christ more in the Eucharist than in confession, since in the Eucharist he utters the words of Christ, "my body," and in the person of Christ, about whom he has already said, "In the night before," etc. Thus, he says the whole of "Take, [eat]," etc., and "This is [my body]," etc., as reciting the words of Christ. That is not how things are in giving absolution. Hence, he does not begin by saying,
"Christ, willing to absolve a sinner, said 'I absolve you.'" Rather, the 'I' in "I absolve you" stands for the person of the minister himself. From this it is evident that a priest does not confect the Eucharist any more or less in the person of Christ than he absolves or hears a confession. Rather, he confects the Eucharist in his own person, and what he knows as confecting the Eucharist, he knows in his own person; hence, he is not lying after mass if he says "I know that I have consecrated the Eucharist today." Therefore, the same is true in the case of confession.
69 Also, according to this approach, and indeed according to the truth of the matter (as I shall prove later [n. 97]), it is permissible to speak in general terms of sins disclosed in confession, and to speak of them in particular in ways that do not reveal the identity of the penitent.
70 This is also proved by the passage in the Decretals, "On penances and remissions,"
Officii,12 in which Innocent III responds to a cardinal-legate who wrote to him about a case he had heard in confession, asking for advice. The pope does not rebuke him for revealing those things in general terms, even in writing; instead he replies by explaining how one ought to advise such a penitent.
71 This is also evident from the common practice of confessors. After all, they sometimes say in ordinary conversation or in preaching, "Such-and-such a case happened" or "A certain person sinned in this or that way." So there is a standing assumption that a confessor can licitly speak outside of confession of a sin that has been confessed to him, though of course not in any way that would allow someone to connect it with the particular penitent and thus come to know who he is.
10 "as the ultimate source of absolution" translates principaliter.
11 Exodus 20:2.
12 Gregory IX, Decretales V tit. 38 c. 9.
ORDINATIO IV, D. , Q.
But if the argument given above [n. 66] were right, this would not be permissible, because the priest would be lying. Proof: if someone knows a particular truth only through a determinate singular instance, then if he does not know that instance, he doesn't know the particular truth. Now the priest knows that someone committed such a sin only because this person confessed this sin. Therefore, if he would be lying about this person and this sin because he does not know about them, he would likewise be lying about some person and such a sin.
So I concede these arguments [nn. 67–72]: revealing a sin disclosed in a confession is not against the natural law because the one revealing it would be lying. And thus I do not stand by that first argument [n. 66].
In response to that argument I say that speaking in the person of someone is not the same as speaking by that person's authority or as his minister. For generally someone who speaks in the person of another portrays that person without qualification, as is generally the case with those who pretend to be others for the sake of entertainment.
Suppose someone is portraying a person who stutters or who acts a certain way: in speaking as that person would speak, or acting as that person would act, he speaks or acts in the person of the one whom he is portraying. And for that reason, as soon as he falls short of acting as that person would act or speaking as he would speak, he is told "You are lying" or "You are falling short," although at that point he is acting or speaking in the way he usually does.13 This is how things are in the case of what angels say in the person of God.
But a priest does not hear a confession or give absolution in the person of God in this way. Rather, he is merely a minister of God in that act, and he acts as a minister, and therefore in his own person.
So I concede that if the priest heard and spoke in the person of God, he could truthfully say something that he could not say in his own person. For in the person of God he could say "I am God," "I created the world," and suchlike; but if he were to say such things in his own person, he would be lying. But the priest neither hears nor speaks in confession in the person of God, but rather in his own person, albeit by God's authority and as God's minister. A priest acts in the same way in the other sacraments: hence, it is as God's minister that he baptizes and consecrates; and yet as a human being, or (in other words) in his own person, he knows that he has baptized and can say, without lying, that he has baptized.
3. SCOTUS'S ARGUMENTS FOR THE FIRST CONCLUSION
So I hold the first conclusion, 13 Reading more suo proprio (PZQ) for the edition's in ore suo proprio.
IS THE SEAL OF CONFESSION EXCEPTIONLESS?
78 but I offer four other arguments. The first is drawn from the notion of charity, the second from the notion of faithfulness, the third from the notion of truth, and the fourth from the notion of unity or mutual usefulness.
79 The first goes like this: the natural law concerning brotherly charity is set forth in Matthew 7:12, "All things whatsoever that you want human beings to do to you, do the same to them; for this is the law and the prophets," and Luke 6:31, "As you want human beings to do to you, do also to them." The words "what you want human beings to do to you" in this proposition of the natural law concerning brotherly charity should be understood to mean what you ought to will according to right reason; and the same applies to the words of Matthew 22:39, "You shall love your neighbor as yourself." Now according to right reason everyone ought to love his own reputation, and therefore the concealment of a sin he has confessed; consequently, a confessor ought to love and will the same thing for the penitent. But revealing the penitent's sin would destroy his reputation. Therefore, etc.
80 Proofs of the minor premise:
On the basis of Scripture: Ecclesiasticus 41:15 says, "Take care of your good name," and it offers a rationale for this: "For this will endure for you longer than a thousand great and precious treasures." And it offers another proof, adding, "The days of a good life are numbered, but a good name will endure for ever." And Proverbs 22:1 says, "A good name is better than great riches."
81 This is also proved through reason. For according to right reason everyone ought to will for himself the sort of life that is fitting for a citizen. Such a life is destroyed if one's reputation is ruined, because one lives a life fitting for a citizen by being suited for the lawful acts that are appropriate to one's role in society; and someone who has lost his reputation has been deprived of his aptitude for such acts, since he has lost the status he had when his dignity was unimpaired, that is, his aptitude for the acts he would otherwise be worthy to perform.
82 The second part of the minor premise, namely that the revelation of a confessed sin destroys the penitent's reputation, is proved as follows. Whatever justification there is for revealing it to one person is equally a justification for revealing it to another person and thus to everyone. But it is obvious that revealing it to everyone would destroy his status of unimpaired dignity, which consists in his reputation among his fellow-citizens.
83 The second argument: by the natural law everyone is bound to preserve toward his neighbor the faithfulness that he would will, and ought to will, that his neighbor preserve toward him. Now someone who entrusts another with a very great secret would will, and ought to will, that it be kept secret. Therefore, the other person to whom he has entrusted that secret is bound to keep it. This argument is touched upon in Proverbs 11:13: "He who walks fraudulently reveals what is hidden, whereas he who is faithful conceals what his friend has entrusted to him."
ORDINATIO IV, D. , Q.
The third argument: by the natural law everyone is bound to keep a licit promise.
Now someone who is told a secret, especially one that is disclosed in confession, promises—even if not explicitly, then at least implicitly—to keep it secret. For the secret would not have been entrusted to him in the absence of such a promise (at least an implicit promise). Therefore, etc. This argument can be drawn from the verse,
"Let each of you speak truth with your neighbor."14
The fourth argument: a given community has a unity proportionate to the unity of a body15 because there is in that community an ordering of superior and inferior, and the superior is bound to have influence over the inferior, whereas the inferior is bound to uphold the superior, in keeping with the analogy of the mystical body of Christ that Paul puts forward in several passages.16 Now in civil society an inferior is less self-sufficient and less knowledgeable, and in the Church a sinner is lacking in knowledge, whereas the superior is a prelate who can both give counsel and offer reconciliation. Therefore, by the natural law no one is to keep an inferior from having recourse to a superior in necessary things or to prevent the influence of a superior over an inferior, since this is how members of the body can be of service to one another. Now revealing a secret would keep an inferior from having recourse to a superior for counsel concerning his soul, and consequently it would prevent the influence of a superior over the inferior, since no one would have such recourse if the matter about which he sought counsel or relief were not to be kept secret as a matter of rule. Therefore, by the same natural law by which everyone is bound to preserve the unity of the mystical body of Christ and to be of service to others as members of that body, one is bound also to keep that secret.
B. The second conclusion
Proof of the second conclusion, namely that a confessor is bound to secrecy by divine positive law:
First: every Christian is bound not to give anyone else a reason to depart from the law of Christ. Now the law of Christ requires making confession, as I showed in distinction 17 [nn. 48–57]. Therefore, everyone is bound by the law of Christ not to discourage anyone from making a confession. Now one who reveals a confession thereby offers such a reason, one that discourages others from confessing.
Therefore, etc.
Now you might say that even if this priest reveals it, some other priest will still keep the secret. But that means nothing, since this priest, as far as it is up to him, gives a reason to someone else to avoid individual confessors in the same way.
14 Zechariah 8:16, Ephesians 4:25.
15 The edition, following A alone, reads unitati corporis Christi mystici ("to the unity of the mystical body of Christ").
16 Romans 12:4–5; 1 Corinthians 6:15–20, 12:4–27; Colossians 1:18.
IS THE SEAL OF CONFESSION EXCEPTIONLESS?
88 Also, second: Christ determined that the judgment of penance should be the final judgment on earth regarding the wrongdoing that is confessed. This is clear from the statement in Matthew 16:19, "Whatever you loose on earth will be loosed also in heaven," that is, finally and ultimately confirmed, and in John 20:23, "If you forgive the sins of any, [they are forgiven]"—understand this as meaning "they are finally, in the divine judgment, confirmed as forgiven." Therefore, anyone who brings into another forum something that has been discussed in the forum of confession, and has been given its final adjudication there, sins against the law of Christ. Now someone who reveals a confession brings it about, so far as it is up to him, that it can be brought into another forum, namely, a public forum. Therefore, etc.
89 Third: someone who gives an occasion for sinning mortally in carrying out a commandment of Christ sins mortally, since, as far as it is up to him, he causes what ought to be carried out fittingly to be carried out unfittingly. Now someone who reveals a confession gives an occasion for Christ's command concerning confession to be carried out unfittingly, because dishonestly. For he gives an occasion for someone to praise himself in his confession and to revile another, whom he hates, so that he might be unworthily rewarded by the confessor and his enemy punished.
Therefore, etc.
C. The third conclusion 90 The third conclusion, namely, that such concealment is required by the positive law of the Church, is evident from the authorities cited for the contrary, among which the second [n. 64] is better and more reasonable. For it is not beneficial for anyone to become an outcast because of a crime, at least as long as his being detained among human beings, whether in company or in solitude, can be tolerated. For an outcast is left more to his own bad will, and thus he would sin more both against himself and against others, and would do more harm, than if he were kept under close supervision.
D. The fourth conclusion 91 As for the fourth conclusion, we must investigate who is bound, to whom he is bound, and when he is bound.
As for who is bound, I say that not only the confessor but also one to whom the confessor reveals it, even illicitly, is bound to conceal it. Proof: someone who transfers to another de facto what he cannot licitly transfer de iure does not give to that other any right of use or right to transfer to another; for because he has no right himself, he cannot transfer any right to another, since "no one gives what he does not have."17
Now a confessor who reveals a confession has no right to transfer this information to another; therefore, if he in fact transfers it, the other has no right to transfer it further.
17 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations II.5, 178b1–7.
ORDINATIO IV, D. , Q.
I say the same thing in the case of someone other than the confessor who hears a penitent's confession. If he hears it accidentally, he is not sinning, but he is still bound to silence. If, however, he hears it stealthily, he sins mortally, and in addition he is bound to silence.
These two conditions concerning who is bound are proved by the arguments given above for the first and second conclusion [nn. 78–85, 86–9].
Now what about the when? I say that one is bound always and for ever, since it is a negative precept. And from this it follows that one may not reveal it once the person is dead any more than when he is alive, since the arguments given for the first and second conclusion are equally conclusive regarding this as a negative precept whether the penitent is alive or dead.
As for to whom he is bound not to reveal a confession, according to one view18 the priest is bound not to reveal it to anyone except his superior.
But the arguments given above are just as conclusive regarding a superior as they are regarding an inferior, except in a case in which an inferior cannot absolve but is required to refer the confession to a superior who has the power to absolve. In such a case, the inferior is not himself the confessor. Instead, one should think of it like this: the penitent who tells the inferior priest his sin tells him only as an interpreter, and then this all takes place in a single act of confession in which the penitent is the one submitting to judgment and the superior—who is the only confessor in such a case— is the judge. The go-between—the priest who hears the confession and refers it to his superior—is merely an interpreter. Nonetheless, he is bound to silence toward everyone other than the one for whom he is interpreter.
You might say that this point offers a way to reply to the argument made earlier about the chapter Officii [n. 70], because in that case the inferior tells his superior about the sin confessed to him, and consequently that chapter does not prove that it is licit to speak to anyone outside the forum of confession about the sins he has heard about. But that is entirely wrong. That cardinal did not write to the pope in order for the pope to grant absolution; he wrote seeking counsel about what he should do himself. That's clear from the pope's response: he does not immediately absolve the woman for representing another child as her own,19 but instead he prescribes how a discreet priest ought to counsel her. And in such a case of doubt he could likewise seek counsel not only from a superior but from any other prudent person whom he knew to consult.
18 William of Auxerre, Summa IV tr. 10 c. 3 q. 2 in corp.
19 The story as contained in the Decretals is that the woman, fearing that her husband was going to stray, faked a pregnancy by drinking every day a potion that distended her stomach. At length she presented someone else's newborn child to her husband as the child to whom she had just given birth.
IS THE SEAL OF CONFESSION EXCEPTIONLESS?
97 Hence, what is said there in opposition to the first argument [n. 69] is generally true: as long as a penitent's sin is not connected with the penitent or told in such detail that the penitent's identity is revealed, the confessor can speak about it; and it is useful, even necessary, for him to do so, when he is not himself experienced enough to know what counsel to give. And in such circumstances he can usefully speak to some prudent person whom he knows to consult, and he ought to do so as a matter of urgent need.
98 But can the pope command that it be revealed to him?
I reply: a certain writer20 would say that the pope never has power over and above the natural law.
99 As for what he is bound to conceal, I say that he is bound to conceal not only the penitent's principal sin and the circumstances of the sin, since the circumstances cannot well be revealed without revealing the deed, but even any second person with whom the sin was committed.
100 This is evident from the arguments given for the first [nn. 79–85] and second conclusion [nn. 86–9], because the penitent wants also to save the reputation of the person with whom he sinned—that is, he ought to want that for the other just as he wants it for himself, and indeed more, because that person was his companion in wrongdoing. For he is bound even more to make restitution to his companion for the good that he lost through that wrongdoing,21 and to safeguard whatever good of his can be safeguarded notwithstanding the evil that they have done.
101 The requirements of faithfulness, truth, and unity or community [nn. 79–85] are also evident here as before.
102 Similarly, the three arguments given for the second conclusion [nn. 86–9] also apply here: failure to conceal [the information specified in n. 99] would discourage people from confession, brings into another forum what is aired in the forum of confession, and is an occasion for lying in the forum of confession, as I said earlier [n. 88].
E. The fifth conclusion 103 As for the fifth conclusion, one view22 is that one is bound by the natural law to keep every secret, on the basis of the arguments given for the first conclusion [nn. 79–85]: not merely when the person entrusting one with the secret23 states explicitly that he
20 Richard Middleton, Sent. IV d. 21 princ. 4 q. 2 ad 2.
21 "that wrongdoing": reading illud (Q) for the edition's illam, which would have to refer to "restitution," which makes no sense. A has illum, which could mean "him," meaning the penitent.
22 Richard Middleton, Sent. IV d. 21 princ. 5 q. 4 in corp.
23 "person entrusting one with the secret": reading committens (NQ) for the edition's ipse confitens, "the penitent himself." Since the point of this argument is that the obligation to keep secrets is not limited to the confessional, ipse confitens can't be right.