III. Replies to the preliminary arguments for the second view
WAS DIVORCE LICIT UNDER THE MOSAIC LAW?
[d. 31 n. 22], [there is also a dispensation] regarding a marriage that has been made but not consummated; such a marriage is dissolved upon [one partner's] entrance into religion, and yet it was marriage without qualification and not merely a temporary arrangement. But in the latter sort of case the Lawgiver made a dispensation for the sake of attaining a greater good, whereas in the former sort of case it was for the sake of avoiding a greater evil.
98 As for the third argument [n. 71], the cases are not similar, because the basis for a dispensation is not similar. For there is not so much reason for fear29 if a woman hates her husband as there is if a man hates his wife, since her very sex restrains a woman from exacting revenge outwardly more than it restrains a man.30
III. Replies to the preliminary arguments for the second view 99 Someone who wants to uphold the first view can easily reply to the arguments for the affirmative.
One could say that the authoritative passages from Deuteronomy and Malachi [nn. 65–6] permit a lesser evil, though still a mortal sin, lest an even more serious mortal sin be committed.
100 To the second argument [n. 67] one could say that that rule is true strictly of dissoluble things, and this obligation is not such a thing. One could also reply to the minor premise by saying that this obligation arises from the wills of the contracting parties as instrumental cause but from divine approval as principal cause, and this rule should not be understood as applying to instrumental causes. That is why Christ31 in Matthew
19:6 drew his conclusion about the indissolubility of marriage from its principal cause:
"What God has joined together[, let no human being separate]."
29 Reading non tantum enim timeretur (Q); alternatively "For there is not reason to fear as great an evil"
(non enim tantum malum timetur) (PZN). The edition reads "For it is not as bad" (non enim tantum malum est).
30 The edition, following A alone, continues: just as there was also a concession for one man to have more than one wife for the sake of procreation, whereas there was no such concession for a woman, since it would be contrary to the good of procreation for one woman to have more than one husband. And thus in neither of these cases are men and women relevantly similar.
31 Reading Christus (Q) for the edition's Deus.