II. Replies to the preliminary arguments
THE OBJECT OF ENJOYMENT
character of an end. Therefore, something's being an end is not in fact the proper basis for its being an object of enjoyment in the case of ordinate enjoyment; rather, something's being an end is a concomitant of its being an enjoyable object. In inordinate enjoyment of an apparent end something's being an end is a concomitant of its being an enjoyable object (though perhaps it is prior in apprehension to the enjoyment that is to be elicited, as a feature of the object that attracts the will). But in the enjoyment of a selected end the object's being an end is a consequence of the act, since that indicates either a mode of the act or a mode of the object that, qua end selected by an act [of will], terminates that act, since the will confers on that object the character of end by willing it for its own sake.
II. Replies to the preliminary arguments 18 To the first preliminary argument [n. 1] I say that 'enjoy' is being used in that passage with a particular extension, to mean love of what is intrinsically worthy as opposed to love of what is useful and of what is pleasant. Or else the passage speaks of "intrinsically worthy things"9 in the plural not because there is a plurality of such beings but because of the plurality of perfections in God that can be enjoyed.
19 To the second argument [n. 2] I say that there is necessarily some finite relation to an unqualifiedly infinite terminus or object, since what is toward an end qua end is finite, even given that it is directly proximate to the end, together with everything that suffices for immediately attaining the ultimate end; and yet the relation of end toward which it is immediately related is not founded in anything but what is infinite. And this frequently occurs in relations of proportions or proportionalities, not of likenesses, since in the former relations the first extremes are maximally unlike. Thus
I say in the present context that between the power and the object there is a relation not of likeness but of proportion, and so it's perfectly possible for a capacity to be finite in nature, as the nature [in which the capacity exists]10 is finite, and yet for it to be toward an unqualifiedly infinite terminus and object as its correlative.
One might object that an adequate object satisfies [the respective capacity]. I reply: it is adequate not in reality but qua object; such adequacy is according to proportion and correspondence.
20 On this same basis I say to the next argument [n. 3] that nothing is greater qua object than the object that is proportionate to the soul; and yet something is greater in the sense of being attainable in a greater or better way than it can be attained by the soul.
But that sort of being-greater is not in the object, but rather in the act. I will make this clearer through an example: suppose there is (a) a white thing visible in degree 10;
9 The passage quoted in n. 1 of course speaks of 'invisible things' (invisibilia) rather than of 'intrinsically worthy things' (honesta) in the plural, but only two manuscripts read invisibilia here.
10 The bracketed addition is found in Σ.
ORDINATIO I, D. , PART , Q.
(b) a power of sight with the capacity for that11 whiteness, or that white thing, to degree 1; and (c) another, more perfect, power of sight [with the capacity for whiteness] to degree 10. That second power of sight will have a perfect capacity for that white thing in every degree of its visibility, since it will see that white object to the full extent that the object's visibility allows; and yet if there is a third power of sight, more perfect and more acute than the second, it will see that white thing more perfectly still. Hence, the "exceeding" is not on the part of the visible thing or of the object in itself or of the object's degrees [of visibility], since there is unqualifiedly one thing maintaining exactly the same features throughout; rather, it is on the part of the seeing powers and of the acts of seeing.
To the fourth argument [n. 4] I say that no form satisfies the full extent of matter's appetite, since matter has as many appetites to forms as there are forms that can be received by that matter; so no one form can satisfy all of its appetites. Instead, one form—the most perfect form—satisfies it most perfectly; but that one form does not satisfy all of matter's appetites unless all the other forms are included in that one form. Regarding the present question I say that one object can in a certain way include all objects, and so that object by itself brings the power to rest to the full extent that it can be brought to rest. But internal rest is not exactly like external rest.
For whatever is receptive comes to rest by receiving something finite into itself, whereas what comes to rest in something external, as a terminus, need not come to rest in something finite, because it can be ordered to something more perfect than it can receive formally into itself—since something finite receives only a finite form, but it can still have an infinite object.
As for the argument that any given form brings matter to rest, because otherwise its rest under a given form would be violent [n. 4], I say that rest is never violent unless the resting thing is determinately inclined to the opposite, as in the example of the heavy body [that is determinately inclined] to go downward and its rest on a table.12 But prime matter is not determinately inclined to any form in that way, and so it is at rest under any form; because of its indeterminate inclination to any given form, its rest is not violent, but natural.
To the fifth argument [n. 5] I say that the intellect's assent to a given truth depends on the degree of evidentness that that truth is, of itself, apt to bring about in the intellect, and so it is not in the intellect's power to assent to a truth more or less firmly; its assent can only be proportionate to the truth that moves it. By contrast, it is in the will's power to assent more intensely to a good or not to assent at all, even to a good seen more imperfectly, and so one cannot validly infer something about the will's relation to what is good from something about the intellect's relation to what is true.
11 Reading illam or istam with the overwhelming majority of MSS. I don't know how to make sense of the edition's aliam (A), "another." The text of this example varies unusually widely in the MSS; the translation is somewhat free and admittedly aims more at making the example intelligible than at fidelity to any particular MS.
12 "on a table" = super trabem, which could equally be "up a tree" or "on a roof."
Ordinatio I, d. 1, part 2, q. 1, nn. 65–73 "Is enjoyment an act elicited by the will or a passion received by the will?"
65 In this question the first topic to be examined is the concepts themselves; the second is the significate of the name.
66 Concerning the first topic I say that just as in the intellect there are two acts of assenting to a complex—one in which we assent to something true for its own sake, a principle, and another in which we assent to a true complex not for its own sake but on account of some other truth, a conclusion—so too in the will there are two acts of assenting to something good—one in which we assent to some good for its own sake, and another in which we assent to some good on account of some other thing to which that good is referred, in the same way that we assent to a conclusion on account of a principle, since a conclusion has its truth from a principle. This comparison can be taken from the Philosopher in Ethics VI [1139a21–2], where he says that "in the mind there is affirmation and negation, but what corresponds to this in appetite is pursuit and avoidance." And thus, further, just as in the mind there is a twofold affirmation, for its own sake and on account of something else, so too in appetite there is a twofold pursuit or adherence, for its own sake and on account of something else.
67 But there is a twofold disanalogy between mind and appetite. First, the intellect's two assents are distinguished by the nature of the objects. For the two assents are different because the evidentness of the two kinds of truths is different, and so they have distinct objects corresponding to them and causing them. In appetite, by contrast, the two assents are differentiated not by a distinction on the part of their objects but by distinct acts of a free power that accepts its object in one way or the other. For, as I said earlier [n. 16], it is in the will's power to act this way or that by referring the object or not. And thus there are not distinct proper objects corresponding to these acts; rather, the will can have any given willable object as an object of either sort of act.
ORDINATIO I, D. , PART , Q. , NN. –
The second disanology is that these two assents on the part of the intellect sufficiently divide the intellect's assent in general, and there is no assent intermediate between them, since there is no intermediate evidentness on the part of an object that would ground some truth other than the truth of a principle and the truth of a conclusion. By contrast, there is on the part of the will an intermediate assent other than these two assents, since a good apprehended absolutely, neither as good for its own sake nor as good on account of something else, can be presented to the will. Now the will can have an act concerning something presented to it in this way, and not necessarily an inordinate act. Therefore, it can have an act of willing that thing absolutely, without referring it to anything else and without enjoying it for its own sake. And furthermore, it can command the intellect to inquire as to what sort of good it is and how it ought to be willed, and then it can assent to that object accordingly. And the entire basis of this disanalogy is the freedom of the will and the natural necessity on the part of the intellect.
Further, on the basis of these considerations: an act of assent to a good for its own sake is a perfect act; and according to Ethics X [1174b14–23], pleasure follows from a perfect act. Therefore, some pleasure follows from an act of willing a good for its own sake.
So concerning the present topic we have distinguished four things: (1) an imperfect act of willing a good on account of something else, which is called use; (2) a perfect act of willing a good for its own sake, which is called enjoyment; (3) an act [of willing] that is neither (1) nor (2); and (4) the pleasure that follows from an act.
An answer to the second main question, namely, for which of these the name 'enjoyment' is appropriate, can be gathered from the authorities that speak of this word 'enjoyment.' It is clear that (3), the act that is neither, is not an act of enjoyment, nor is (1), the act of use. The dispute is only about (2) a perfect act and (4) the consequent pleasure.
I reply: some authorities evidently say that enjoyment is only (2) this perfect act; some say that it is only (4) pleasure. Others say that it includes both, and in that case
'enjoyment' does not signify a being that is per se one, but instead something that is one by way of an aggregation of two beings, or a being per accidens. And there is nothing amiss in one name's signifying many things, since according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics VII [1030a6–10, 1030b4–10] 'the Iliad' can signify the whole
Trojan War.
The authority of Augustine in 83 Diverse Questions q. 30 evidently supports the view that enjoyment is only the act. He says, "all perversity, which is called 'vice,' is to use things that ought to be enjoyed and to enjoy things that ought to be used." Perversity is formally in an elicited act of the will, not in pleasure, since a pleasure is bad only because the act is bad. Also, pleasure is in the power of the one who experiences the pleasure only because the act is in his power, whereas sin as such is formally in the
IS ENJOYMENT AN ACT OR A PASSION OF THE WILL?
power of the one sinning. Augustine also appears to say this explicitly in On Christian
Teaching I.4.4: "To enjoy is to cleave to something with love for its own sake." This cleaving is evidently through a power that moves the one who cleaves, just as in bodies (from which this name 'cleave' was transferred to this context) cleaving is by the power of the thing that cleaves.
71 By contrast, the authority of Augustine in On the Trinity I.8.18 appears to say that enjoyment is just pleasure. He says, "To enjoy the Trinity is complete joy": and if we are not to twist the authority so that it indicates causality or some other meaning that the words themselves do not suggest, joy is formally pleasure. This holds likewise for what Augustine says in the question [83 Diverse Questions q. 30] quoted earlier
[n. 70]: "We enjoy a thing in which we take pleasure." If this formula expresses identity or is a quasi-definition, then taking pleasure is essentially enjoyment.
72 But one can argue from the definition of 'enjoy' in On the Trinity X.10.13—"We enjoy things known, in which the will comes to rest with pleasure for their own sake"—that 'enjoyment' signifies both the act and the pleasure together. "We enjoy things known" pertains to the act, since a known object is presupposed by an act of will. But then come the words "in which the will comes to rest with pleasure for their own sake"; if pleasure were accidental to enjoyment, it should not be included in the definition of enjoyment.
Similarly, if one holds that both the act and the consequent pleasure belong essentially to happiness,1 then all the authorities that say that enjoyment is the supreme reward or our happiness say that enjoyment includes both the act and pleasure. The authority of On Christian Teaching I.22.35, "the supreme reward is that we enjoy God," speaks in favor of this minor premise.
73 But we should not fight over the significate of the word. As Augustine says in Reconsiderations I.15.4, "when there is agreement about the thing, we should not indulge in controversy over words." There is agreement that the will has a threefold act, and a fourth item, the consequent passion. It is also evident that the name
'enjoyment' is in no way appropriate for two of the acts [(1) and (3)]. Some evidently use the name for one or the other of the other two [(2) and (4)] and for both together, in which case 'enjoyment' is equivocal. Or, if it is univocal, one should interpret certain authorities as speaking causally or concomitantly.
1 As Scotus holds in Reportatio IV d. 49 q. 7.
Ordinatio I, d. 1, part 2, q. 2
(omitting nn. 100–33) "Does the will necessarily enjoy an end when it is apprehended by the intellect?"
The second question concerns the manner in which the act of enjoyment is elicited, namely, whether the will necessarily enjoys an end when it is apprehended by the intellect.
Arguments for the affirmative:
Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7: "Delight is the conjunction of what is suitable with that for which it is suitable." An end is necessarily suitable to the will. Therefore, in virtue of the conjunction of an end with the will there is delight, and therefore enjoyment.
Also, an end moves metaphorically, just as an efficient cause moves properly speaking. Now when an efficient cause is in proximity to its patient and is not impeded, it necessarily moves properly speaking. Therefore, when an end is in proximity (that is, present) to the will and is not impeded, it necessarily moves metaphorically.
Also, anything that is movable presupposes something immovable. Therefore, the various and movable acts of the will presuppose some immovable act. There is no such act except regarding an end. Therefore, that act is necessarily immovable.
For the negative:
Natural necessity is not compatible with freedom. Proof: nature and will are active principles that have opposite modes of principiating; therefore, nature's mode of principiating is incompatible with the will's mode of principiating. Now the will wills an end freely; therefore, it cannot will an end by natural necessity or, consequently, necessarily in any way.
The premise that the will wills an end freely is proved as follows: it is one and the same power that wills an end and what is for the end; therefore, it has one and the same mode of acting, since diverse modes of acting indicate diverse powers. Now the will acts freely regarding things that are for the end; therefore, etc. And it is evident that there is one and the same power for both, since otherwise there would be