VII. Replies to the preliminary arguments of the second question
ORDINATIO PROLOGUE, PART , QQ. AND (OMITTING NN. –)
quantity of teaching than are in fact transmitted in this science; rather, the same things are frequently repeated in this science, so that hearers might be more efficaciously induced to do the things enjoined upon them in this science.
VII. Replies to the preliminary arguments of the second question
As for the preliminary arguments of the second question, to the authority of the Philosopher in De anima III [n. 223] I say that he is speaking there of the end as cognized; for an intellect reasoning for the sake of something reasons for the sake of an end as cognized and as it is the principle of demonstration.
To the second authoritative passage, from Metaphysics I [n. 224], I say that a practical science is not for the sake of use as its per se end; nonetheless, it does have some relation to use, such that its per se object is use or something virtually including use.
Now the Philosopher posited no such thing other than a being for the end, and any such object is less noble than a speculative object; and for that reason such ordering to praxis shows [by Aristotle's lights] that a practical science is less noble than a speculative science.
To the third argument, from Metaphysics II [n. 225], I say that speculative and practical sciences have diverse ends if we are speaking of per se ends within the genus of cognition, but those ends are not what primarily distinguish the two; the prior distinction is from their objects, as was said earlier [nn. 252–5, 259, 265–6].
As for the arguments for the opposite position, which argue against distinguishing
[speculative and practical sciences] based on their objects:
To the first [n. 249] I say that there cannot be both a speculative habit and a practical habit regarding one and the same object. But as for the proof of the opposing view from the Philosopher's words in De anima, "the intellect becomes practical by extension," I say that the Philosopher does not say that the speculative intellect becomes practical by extension. Rather, Aristotle44 identifies three levels of intellect, of which the first considers only speculative matters and the second considers matters within the scope of action but does not dictate pursuit or avoidance of anything; he says that "by extending itself further, it wills to pursue or avoid."
Thus, the extension in question is of an imperfectly practical intellect to perfectly practical consideration, for example, from apprehension of terrifying things to a complete dictate concerning them, commanding flight or pursuit. Yet even granted that the speculative intellect becomes practical, that's irrelevant to the question at hand, because speculative and practical are accidental differences for the intellect,
44 De anima III, 432b26–433a3.
THEOLOGY, PRAXIS, AND PRACTICAL SCIENCE
though they are essential differences for habits and acts, and therefore habits and acts are not extended.
360 To the other argument, about medicine [n. 250], a certain writer45 says that a universal habit is speculative, but when a particular habit is acquired from it, it becomes practical. Against this: if that were true, a practical conclusion would follow from speculative principles, which is untenable.
361 So we need to give a different response: when there are two opposed extremes, the further something gets from one of the opposites, the closer it comes to the other.
What has the characteristic of the practical in the most fully actualized way is consideration that is apt to be immediately formally in conformity with praxis to be elicited; so the further something gets from this, the closer it comes to the speculative. Therefore, a universal habit, which is not apt to be immediately in conformity with praxis, can be said to be in some way speculative by comparison with a habit that is immediately apt to be in conformity with praxis to be elicited.
This is how art can be regarded as a speculative habit by comparison with the habit of an expert, because it is a more universal habit and not as immediately directive, as is clear in Metaphysics I [981a14–24]: "the artisan will err frequently; the expert will not err." This is how medicine can be distinguished into speculative, which is about universal causes and cures, a cognition that is more remote from praxis to be elicited, and practical, which concerns particulars that are more proximate to praxis and more immediately in conformity with praxis to be elicited. Nonetheless, in truth that more universal cognition, which is called speculative by comparison, is unqualifiedly and most truly practical, since it virtually includes that particular cognition that is formally in conformity with praxis.
362 To the other argument, about goodness and badness [n. 251], I say that not every good act is primarily good from the circumstance of the end as end; indeed, there is some act that is good from the circumstance of the object, for example, where the end is the object, and in such an act the circumstance of the end as object is what primarily confers correctness on the act [cf. nn. 263–4]; for that act is unqualifiedly good in virtue of the object alone, as the act of loving God, without any other circumstances, is unqualifiedly good. It is therefore false that the first goodness of a moral act is taken from the end as end, as distinguished from the object. Indeed, it is false for a second reason, because although an act concerning what is for the end has the end as its first circumstance, there is nonetheless a prior goodness from the object in virtue of which the act is said to be good generically.46 There is a third response, directly to the point at issue [n. 251]: even if a circumstance formally characterizes praxis so that it is good, it does not formally characterize practical intellection; for the 45 Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 60 q. 1 ad 1 contra aliud.
46 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II q. 18 a. 2 in corp.
ORDINATIO PROLOGUE, PART , QQ. AND (OMITTING NN. –)
intellect does not dictate the act moderately or in an intermediate way, in such a way that the dictating is characterized by the circumstance "moderately"; rather, the intellect dictates according to the utmost of its power. But that dictating is correct in virtue of its principle, and the principle is taken from the first object.
Against this, someone could argue that the distinction does not derive from the objects. Proof: everything formally F is F through something intrinsic to itself. So if a habit is formally practical, it is practical through something intrinsic to itself; but this is not the object; therefore, etc. Example: the sun is not formally hot, although it is hot virtually.
Moreover, the object does not distinguish a habit except as an efficient cause; efficient causes do not cause effects to differ in species, because an effect in a single species can be caused by causes of diverse species, as heat in a single species is generated equivocally and univocally by fire and the sun.
To the first [n. 363] I say that being practical indicates something intrinsic to the knowledge in the way that an aptitudinal relation indicates something intrinsic to the foundation; the fact that some knowledge is apt to be referred [to praxis] is a consequence of the intrinsic nature of that knowledge, and the knowledge has that nature from its object as an extrinsic cause. I say then that a habit is practical through something intrinsic as a formal cause, but through the object, which is extrinsic, as efficient cause.
To the second [n. 364] I say that although an effect of a single nature can be caused by essentially ordered causes of which one is univocal and the other equivocal, as the example of heat shows, when proximate efficient causes that are of the same order with respect to the effect cause something insofar as they are distinct causes, above all if one is univocal with the effect—whether completely univocal or univocal in a diminished way—there cannot be an effect of a single nature from distinct causes of this sort. By 'completely univocal' I mean a case in which there is likeness in form and in the mode of being of the form; by 'univocal in a diminished way' I mean a case in which there is likeness in form but a different mode of being of the form, as a house in the external world has a different mode of being from a house in the mind of the maker (which is why the Philosopher in Metaphysics VII [1034a21–5] calls this generation univocal "in a certain way"). Therefore, because the object is a proximate cause of knowledge and a univocal cause, albeit in a diminished way, it follows that the formal distinction of objects necessarily implies a formal distinction between the knowledges they cause, because the objects cause those knowledges precisely insofar as they are distinct.
Ordinatio I, d. 1, part 1, q. 1
"Is the object of enjoyment per se the ultimate end?"
1 Concerning distinction 1, in which the Master discusses enjoyment and use,1 I first investigate the object of enjoyment itself. First, I ask whether the object of enjoyment per se is the ultimate end.
Arguments for the negative:
First, based on the authority of Augustine in 83 Diverse Questions, q. 30: "One ought to enjoy invisible goods." Now there are many invisible goods, so it is not only the ultimate end that is to be enjoyed.
2 Also, there is an argument based on reason: the capacity of the one enjoying is finite, because the subject's essence or nature is finite. Therefore, that capacity can be satisfied by something finite. And anything that satisfies the capacity of the one enjoying is to be enjoyed. Therefore, etc.
3 Also, there is something greater than the soul's capacity, as is God, who is sufficient for himself; and there is something less than its capacity, as is the body; therefore, there is something intermediate, something equal to its capacity. That something is less than God, so I have established the point at issue, that not only God or the ultimate end is to be enjoyed.
4 Also, any form at all satisfies the capacity of matter. Therefore, any object at all satisfies the capacity of a power. Proof ofthe inference: itis througha form received in the power that a power has to do with its object; and if one received form satisfies the power intrinsically, it follows that the object with which the power has to do through that form satisfiesthepowerextrinsically orasterminus.Proofoftheantecedent:ifsomeformdid not satisfy the capacity of matter, then the matter would be naturally inclined to some other form even with that first form remaining present in the matter, and consequently its rest under that form would be violent, for anything that prevents something from attaining that to which it has a natural inclination is violent with respect to that thing, as is clear from the case of a heavy body that is at rest outside the center.
1 Peter Lombard, Sent. I d. 1 c. 2, 3.