I. Against the philosophers
IS GOD ALONE IMMUTABLE?
I. Against the philosophers A. Evaluation of an argument from Henry of Ghent 269 A second argument is offered3 against the philosophers.4 A power that has to do per se and essentially with a certain object does not have to do necessarily with things that do not have an essential order, but only an accidental order, to that first object, since one who wills an end does not, on account of this, necessarily will the being of anything else whose being is not necessary for attaining or retaining the end in itself.
Now the divine will has first to do with the divine goodness, to which creatures have only an accidental order, since they are not necessary for attaining the divine goodness, nor do they add to the divine goodness. Therefore, the divine will does not necessarily have to do with creatures.
270 Although this argument has a certain sort of evidentness in itself, it does seem to contradict some things said by the one who offers the argument, since he claims that the divine will, insofar as it has to do with things in their quidditative being,5 necessarily wills whatever it wills, and yet things in their quidditative being have no greater order to the divine goodness than do things in their existential being.
271 And there seems to be another objection6 to the argument. For just as the divine will has the divine essence as its first object, so too does the divine intellect. Therefore, the divine intellect would also have to do accidentally with anything other than the divine essence that it has as an object; and so it would evidently follow that God would not necessarily know anything intelligible other than himself, just as he does not necessarily will anything willable other than himself.
272 I concede the first objection, since it does not go against the truth but merely against the view of the one proposing the argument.
273 In ruling out the second objection, I confirm both the conclusion and the argument: for a will that is determined to an end is not determined to any of the things that are for the end except inasmuch as a practical syllogism concludes on the basis of the end that what is for the end is necessary: either that it must necessarily exist or be possessed in order for the end to be possessed or acquired, or that it must necessarily be loved in order for the end to be loved or possessed. We see that this holds for all
Henry's second argument against the philosophers, Scotus's second argument for the contingency of creatures, his answer to the question, and his response to the preliminary argument given for the philosophers' view that not only God is immutable.
3 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. V q. 4 in corp.
4 That is, against the view that "the first cause naturally and necessarily causes its first effect" (n. 263).
5 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. V q. 4 in corp.
6 Reading aliam instantiam with the overwhelming majority of the MSS against the edition's instantiam
(AV), since Scotus will go on to speak of the objection in n. 270 as the first instantia and of this objection as the second instantia.
ORDINATIO I, D. , PART , Q. UN., NN. –, –, –
wills that are of the end itself: they need not, on account of the end, be determined to anything that is for the end if such a thing is not shown by a practical syllogism to be necessary for the end in one of the ways I have explained. Therefore, since the divine intellect does not cognize anything other than itself to be necessary for the ultimate end in any of these ways, the fact that the divine will7 necessarily wills the end does not require that it necessarily wills anything other than the end.
As for the objection about the divine intellect, the cases are not similar. That the intellect necessarily has to do with some object does not mean that that object is something in real entity distinct from the first object, since being cognized by the divine intellect does not mean that the object has being in its own right, but merely being as presented to the intellect or being in the intellect by way of presence. That is not the case for being willed. Quite the opposite: something's being willed—we're talking about efficacious volition here—means that it then, or consequently, has being distinct from the will; for what is willed efficaciously by God exists at some point as an effect. So the divine intellect is not related to intelligibles other than itself in the same way that the divine will is related to other willables, since that intellect can necessarily understand other intelligibles—indeed, all intelligibles—without their having any being distinct from the divine being, insofar as they are present to the divine being; nor does it follow from God's understanding them that they are formally necessary in real being. The will, by contrast, could not will any other willables necessarily without other things being at some time necessary in some real being distinct from the divine being.
B. An argument from Scotus
Second,8 I argue as follows: something happens contingently among beings; therefore, the first cause causes contingently.
The philosophers concede the antecedent. I prove the inference as follows: if the first cause is related necessarily to the cause proximate to it—call that cause b—then b is moved necessarily by the first cause. But b moves the cause proximate to itself in the same way in which it is moved by the first cause. Therefore, in moving c, b causes necessarily, and so does c in moving d, and so on for all the subsequent causes.
Therefore, if the first cause causes necessarily, nothing will happen contingently. This argument has been treated thoroughly in distinction 2, question 1, "On God's infinity," in the argument proving that God is formally understanding,9 and so there is no need to spend any more time on it here.
7 Reading necessarium ad finem ultimum quomodocumque, voluntas sua with a number of MSS against the edition's necessarium ad finem ultimum, voluntas sua, quomodocumque.
8 What follows is the second argument Scotus gives on his own for the contingency of creatures, as distinguished from the arguments (one of which is given at nn. 269–74, above) that he draws from Henry but "strengthens" (n. 275).
9 Ordinatio I d. 2 nn. 79–88.
IS GOD ALONE IMMUTABLE?
283 Furthermore (and this comes to the same thing), something bad happens in the universe; therefore, God does not cause necessarily.
284 The philosophers grant the antecedent, and I prove the inference as follows. Something that acts necessarily, necessarily produces its effect in the patient (susceptivum) to whatever extent the effect can be produced in it. The effect of the First Agent is goodness and a perfection. Therefore, if the First Agent acts necessarily, it necessarily produces as much goodness in each patient as that patient is able to receive. But something that has as much goodness as it is capable of having has no badness.
Therefore, etc.
285 Even if one could escape this argument as it applies to what is bad in nature, as was discussed in distinction 2 of the question cited earlier,10 there is evidently no possible escape when it comes to something bad brought about contingently—something blameworthy, in other words. For if some such bad, that is, blameworthy, thing is brought about, and it follows from this that it is brought about contingently,11 then the First Cause does not cause necessarily, as this deduction shows.
286 Also, a cause that acts necessarily, acts to the fullest extent of its power; for just as it is not in such a thing's power to act or not act, neither is it in such a thing's power to act intensely or not intensely. Therefore, if the First Cause causes necessarily, it causes whatever it has the power to cause. But it has the power, of itself, to cause everything causable, as I shall prove [n. 288]. Therefore, it causes everything causable. Therefore, no secondary cause causes anything.
287 I prove this second inference. A prior cause's relation to what is caused is naturally prior to a posterior cause's relation, according to the first proposition in De causis.
So if the prior cause acts as a total cause in a prior moment, it causes the whole of what would have been caused by a secondary cause in a second moment, and thus in that second moment in which the secondary cause should have caused, no action is possible on the part of the secondary cause, because the whole effect is already understood to be caused by the first cause.
288 I prove what is assumed in the argument, namely, that the First Cause has the power to cause everything causable. The First Cause has the power of every secondary cause and the whole causal perfection that is in every secondary cause, as I argued in the question "On infinity" cited earlier, in the first way, drawn from efficient causality.12
Now there need not be any imperfection in an efficient cause, but only perfection, since causing efficiently is a matter of unqualified perfection. Therefore, the First
Cause, which has in itself whatever is a matter of perfection in all the causality of any
10 Ordinatio I d. 2 n. 149.
11 Because if it were necessary, it would not be blameworthy: see Lectura I d. 8 n. 258.
12 Ordinatio I d. 2 n. 120.