II. Replies to the preliminary arguments
ORDINATIO III, D. , Q. UN.
it includes the requirement that one will certain goods for one's neighbor, or at any rate that one not will for one's neighbor the opposites of those goods—for example, that one ought not will that his bodily life, conjugal fidelity, temporal goods, and so forth, be taken away from him unjustly.
So it's true that those who love their neighbor have fulfilled the law, in the sense that the law as elucidated ought to be obeyed, but not in the sense that love of neighbor is derived from the first principles of the natural law.
And, similarly, all the law—as far as the second table goes—and the prophets do hang on the precept "You shall love your neighbor as yourself," if we understand that precept not as it follows from the first practical principle of the natural law, but as the Lawgiver intends for that precept to be upheld, as he has elucidated it in the precepts of the second table.
II. Replies to the preliminary arguments
In reply to the preliminary arguments:
The first [nn. 2–4] supports my view, since it proves that a precept of the second table does not belong to the natural law in the strict sense.
To the second argument [n. 5] I say that even if the conclusion "God exists" could be derived by natural reason from principles known per se, those unsophisticated people, unaccustomed to disciplined thinking in speculative matters, could not have known it unless it was revealed in the law. That's why the Apostle says in Hebrews 11:6, "Those who approach God must believe"—meaning, if they do not or cannot have any other knowledge of God. And in that same way, even supposing that it's possible [in principle] to reach the conclusion that some coveting is contrary to the natural law, corrupt human beings would not have known that such coveting is contrary to the natural law; for that reason it was necessary for that fact to be set forth explicitly in a revealed law. Alternatively, coveting is prohibited by precepts of the second table, and I have granted that those precepts are not known per se.
To the other argument [n. 6], I say that these precepts have been observed, and ought to be observed, in every state. Certainly in heaven there will be the utmost observance of these precepts, both affirmative and negative, with the one possible exception of "Honor your parents"—not that the will to honor one's parents will be absent in heaven, but that there will be no need to put that will into action, at least as far as honoring them is expressed by supporting them in what they need, since in heaven no one will need any help. And in the state of innocence these precepts were binding for everyone, since they were written inwardly on each person's heart—or perhaps through some teaching given outwardly by God these precepts were passed down from one generation to the next, even though they weren't written in any book (nor did they need to be, since they could easily be held in memory, and the people of
THE DECALOGUE AND THE NATURAL LAW
those days were longer-lived and had better natural capacities than the people of more recent times, when the people's weakness made it necessary for the law to be revealed and written down).
43 But as for the example given in connection with the first argument, about the children of Israel despoiling the Egyptians [n. 4], one could say that in that instance
God did not give a dispensation contrary to the law or to the precept "You shall not steal," since the children of Israel did not take away anyone else's property in an unqualified sense, for two reasons. First, God was the superior owner, and he had the power to transfer ownership to them, even if the inferior owners were unwilling.
(This explains why Christ did not sin when he permitted the demons to enter into the pigs, which immediately rushed into the sea:19 he did not act unjustly in depriving the swineherd of his pigs.) Second, the children of Israel had earned such great possessions as payment for serving the Egyptians. Even though the Egyptians, being unjust, were unwilling to give them what they had earned, they could be compelled to do so by a higher judge. And since the children of Israel received their rightful possessions by the order of a higher judge, they received them licitly and justly.
44 As for the argument from the Decretum for the affirmative [n. 7], this passage should be understood as referring to the natural law in the broad sense, and thus as including the precepts of the second table.
19 Matthew 8:31–2, Mark 5:12–13, Luke 8:32–3.
Ordinatio III, d. 38, q. un.
"Is every lie a sin?"
Concerning distinction 38 I ask whether every lie is a sin.
For the negative:
Genesis 22:5: "The boy and I will hasten as far as that place, and after we have worshiped, we will return to you." But he intended to kill the boy, because he had been commanded to do so; therefore, he intended that the boy would not be with him when he returned; so he said the opposite of what he had in his mind; therefore, he lied. And it is not plausible that he sinned when he was carrying out his obedience to God, the very obedience for which God commended him.
Moreover, this is proved by many other examples:
In Genesis 27:32 Jacob says that he is Esau, the firstborn, which he knew was false.
Also, in Genesis 42:16 and 44:5, 15, Joseph said to his brothers, "By the health of Pharaoh, you are spies," and yet he knew that the opposite was true. Also, when he was frightening them because of the cup found in Benjamin's sack, he said that he used that cup for divination, when in fact he was a not a diviner; for divination was forbidden to those who served the law of God.1
Moreover, Rahab lied about the spies (in Joshua [2:2–21]), as did Judith [Judith
10:11–13, 11:4–17]. Rachel, sitting on the camel's saddle in which she had hidden her father's household gods, lied when she said that the way of women was upon her [Genesis 31:19, 31–5]. The midwives also lied when they said that the Hebrew women had the art of midwifery [Exodus 1:15–21]. And it does not seem that they sinned in this, nor is it said that they sinned; for "God dealt well with them and built up their houses" [Exodus 1:20–1], and God does not repay good for evil.
Therefore, etc.
Moreover, dissimulation in words is not a greater sin than dissimulation in deeds; for as deeds are more evident signs than words, if there is falsehood in either, falsehood in deeds seems more deserving of reproach than falsehood in words, because
1 Cf. Leviticus 19:26.