II. Replies to the preliminary arguments on both sides
ORDINATIO III, D. , Q. UN.
but as it goes forth to its objects in the way I have just explained. And yet this inequality is not on account of any goodness presupposed in any objects other than God that is some sort of reason for his willing one way rather than another. Rather, the reason is in the divine will alone: for it is because the divine will accepts certain things in such-andsuch a degree that those things are good in that degree, and not the other way around.
Alternatively, if one grants that there is some degree of essential goodness in them as they are presented by the divine intellect, such that according to reason they ought to please the divine will in a well-ordered way in proportion to their goodness, this, at any rate, is certain: their being pleasing as far as actual existence is concerned derives entirely from the divine will, without any determining reason on their part.
II. Replies to the preliminary arguments on both sides
To the first argument [n. 2], I say that a habit has an aspect of perfection, and in that respect it is posited in God; but as requiring imperfection, because it presupposes a potency that is perfectible through act, there is no habit in God. For the habit is strictly identical with the power and the act, since everything in God is formally infinite in itself.
To the second [n. 3], I say that if properly speaking inanimate things cannot be loved through charity because charity is a friendship and it is not possible to have friendship properly speaking toward inanimate things, still, I can through charity have a certain sort of willing with respect to them, the sort of willing that is appropriate toward them through charity. For through charity I will that a tree exist and that the tree be of use to me in some act insofar as such an act helps me love God in himself. And in this way it can be conceded that God loves all things through charity, not with the volition of friendship, but with the sort of volition that is appropriate toward them.
The third argument [n. 4] succeeds in establishing inequality with respect to the goods willed for the things loved, for God does not will such great goods for the nonpredestinate as he wills for the predestinate, and he does not will as great a good for those toward whom he is said to be wrathful, for so long as he is said to be wrathful toward them, as for those toward whom he is not said to be wrathful. And this inequality of love—that is, this inequality in the effect of his love—is to be conceded not only with respect to degrees of nature but also for individuals of the same species. And the reason for this inequality is not the nature in this or that thing, but solely the divine will.8
The argument for the affirmative, concerning God's understanding [n. 5], establishes equality only as the act belongs to the agent, not as it goes forth to its objects.
8 Cf. Ordinatio I d. 41 n. 53.
Ordinatio III, d. 33, q. un.
"Are the moral virtues in the will as in a subject?"
1 Concerning distinction 33, I ask whether the moral virtues are in the will as in a subject.
2 Arguments for the negative:
In Ethics I [1103a3–5] the Philosopher says that they are in the irrational part of the soul. Now the Commentator explains that they are in the irrational part as intermediate between the vegetative and the rational.1 It is not the will, but the sensory appetite, that fits this description.
3 Moreover, in Ethics III [1117b23–49] the Philosopher locates courage and temperance in the sensory appetite.
4 Moreover, see the commentary on Ethics VI, c. 7, "Prudence is," etc.2
5 Moreover, according to Politics I.3 [1254b4–9], "Reason rules the lower appetite with absolute authority, whereas it rules the higher appetite with political authority, that is to say, with the sort of authority exercised over free citizens, such that the appetite can be moved contrary to reason"; therefore, in order for the higher appetite to be moved pleasurably by right reason, certain virtues must be found in it.
6 Moreover, courage and temperance are said to be in the irascible and the concupiscible, respectively. There is no distinction between irascible and concupiscible in the will, but only in the sensory appetite, because the features of an object with which they have to do—namely, the arduous good and the pleasurable good—do not make3
1 Eustratius, In Eth. ad Nic. I.18–19.
2 Eustratius, In Eth. ad Nic. VI.6:
Aristotle sufficiently explains what prudence is and how it differs from art and from scientific knowledge. Moreover, he sets forth the particular differences or powers that exist in the soul and explains how prudence subsists in them. He divides the rational soul into two: the understanding part and the opining part. . . . Thus it is shown that prudence comes about in the opining part of the soul.
3 The edition, following AP, reads "do not always make." The 'always' makes the argument a gross nonsequitur; I follow all the other MSS in omitting it.