II. Replies to the preliminary arguments
ORDINATIO III, D. , Q. UN.
inclination just as one conforming to its natural inclination, and not to elicit an act just as to elicit it.11
II. Replies to the preliminary arguments
As for the first preliminary argument [n. 2], I concede the major premise, that every will is in control of its own act. As for the claim in the minor premise that a will following the movement of another power is subordinate in its act, not in control of it, I say (as I said elsewhere in the first question of Book III [d. 1 nn. 17, 80–1]) that the Word has no causality over an act of the created will in Christ other than what the whole Trinity has; and therefore the created will in the Word is not deprived of control over its own acts on account of its union with the Word more than if it were not united to the Word.
But to respond further to the argument on the basis of the two views discussed in Book II:12
If the will is the immediate and total cause of its own act, in such a way that its act does not follow the movement of the Trinity causing the will's act along with the will, but instead the Trinity only establishes the will in its first being and leaves it to move itself in its act, so that the Trinity acts in the will's activity only insofar as the Trinity acts to bring about the will's being, as one view has it,13 then the minor premise—that the will in its activity follows the movement of another power—is false. For although it does follow the movement of another power in being, with respect to its first actuality, it does not follow it with respect to its activity (immediately, I mean).
By contrast, if one were to hold14 that the will immediately causes its own activity and nonetheless God also causes it immediately along with the will, just as he immediately causes the being of the will, then because (as I have said [n. 16]) the Word has no special activity distinct from the whole Trinity—though the activity of the created will [in Christ] is ascribed to the Word rather than the whole Trinity on account of the union that brings about the exchange of predicates (communicatio idiomatum)—I say that the created will in Christ elicits its act as freely, and is as much in control of its act, as my will is, since God acts in the will's activity only if the will acts freely and determines itself to act, in which case God acts along with it. And yet the first freedom and control is not in the created will, but in God's will, which has no other cause cooperating with it in its act; but there is as much freedom in the act of a created will as there can be in a creature.
11 Reading with Q. The reading in the edition continues thus after 'the advantageous': "and it is as free in eliciting an act conforming [to its natural inclination] as in eliciting an act opposed to it, since it is in the will's power to elicit an act conforming [to its natural inclination] or not to elicit it (a supernatural will [can elicit] only an act conforming [to its natural (?) inclination])."
12 Scotus expounds the first view in Ordinatio II dd. 34–7 nn. 97–107 and the second in nn. 119–23.
13 Ibid., n. 113.
14 According to the second view, ibid., nn. 124–8, 142–54.
WERE THERE TWO WILLS IN CHRIST?
18 As for the claim in the second argument that free will and natural will are two wills
[n. 3], I say that natural will, as such and as natural, is not the will as a power; 'natural will' just implies the inclination of the power to receiving its own perfection, not to acting as such. And thus it is imperfect unless it has the perfection to which that tendency inclines that power. Hence, the natural power does not tend; the natural power is the tendency by which the will, which is absolute, tends—passively—toward receiving that perfection. But there is another tendency in that same power as freely and actively tending by eliciting an act. Thus, there is one power and a twofold tendency, active and passive. On that basis I say to the form of the argument that natural will, as far as what the term formally implies is concerned, is not the power or the will, but an inclination of the will and the tendency by which the will tends toward passively receiving perfection.
Ordinatio III, d. 27, q. un.
"Is there a theological virtue that inclines one toward loving God above all else?"
Concerning distinction 27 I ask whether there is a theological virtue that inclines one toward loving God above all else.
For the negative:
If there were such a virtue, it would be a kind of friendship—as is evident from the act, since its act would be an act of loving. But according to the Philosopher in Ethics
VIII.7 [1157b25–7], there is no friendship toward God, since God is incommensurably greater than everyone else. And his being incommensurably greater makes friendship impossible, according to Aristotle, because friendship exists between parties who are in some way equal.
Also, no virtue moves its possessor toward an act that is impossible for him; and it is impossible for us to love God above all else.
This is proved in two ways:
First, from what is said in Ethics IX.9 [IX.4, 1166a1–2], "Things that are worthy of love for another's sake are measured by those that are worthy of love for one's own sake." Now what is measured does not exceed its measure in measures taken with perfection. Therefore, friendship toward oneself is greater than friendship toward another.
Second, friendship is founded on oneness, and it is impossible for anything to be as much one with a lover as is the lover himself.
Also, a third argument on the main point: someone without virtue can love God above all else; therefore, no theological virtue is needed for this purpose.
Proof of the antecedent:
First, if someone can love God above all else through a habit, he can do so without a habit, because a habit is not what makes it unqualifiedly the case that someone can do something. If it were, it would be a power.