II. Scotus's view
CAN A CREATED WILL SIN EX MALITIA?
4 There is another way to argue against this view. Hatred for God is apprehended by some created intellective power that is not in error and consequently does not present hatred for God as good, but only as evil. If the will can will this, my point is made, because there is no goodness in this act prior to the act of willing itself. (For if it is assigned some goodness on account of the act of willing, this is not in the object as it precedes the act, but rather in the object as it follows the act of willing.) If the will cannot will this thing, which is presented as evil, except under some aspect of good and not-evil, then either the will unqualifiedly cannot will this or else a blinding of reason must be naturally prior [to this willing]—which seems untenable and is contrary to the argument in Ethics VII [1147a24–33] about acting contrary to universal and particular reason.
II. Scotus's view 5 If one answers this question in the affirmative, it is easy to distinguish a sin against the Holy Spirit from other sins. For because the will is conjoined to a sensory appetite, it is apt to take pleasure in what is pleasurable to the sensory appetite; and thus, someone sinning efficaciously from an inclination of the sensory appetite toward what is pleasurable to it sins from passion. This is called a "sin from weakness or lack of power" and is by appropriation a sin against the Father, to whom power is appropriated. The will also acts on the basis of intellectual cognition, and so when it fails to will rightly because reason is in error, the sin on the will's part that results from reason's error is called a "sin from ignorance" and is by appropriation a sin against the Son, to whom wisdom is appropriated. The third kind of sin would be a sin of the will as such, in virtue of its own freedom rather than in virtue of its sharing the pleasure of the sensory appetite or in virtue of an error on the part of reason. This would be a sin ex malitia and so by appropriation a sin against the Holy Spirit, to whom goodness is appropriated.
6 Nonetheless, even if one does not hold that a created will can will evil qua evil, one could still identify a sin ex malitia: when the will sins in virtue of its own freedom, without any passion in the sensory appetite or error in reason. For in such a case the notion of sin is most fully exemplified, since there is nothing other than the will enticing the will to evil. Such a sin would be ex malitia because the evil in that sin would be as perfect and complete as evil can be in a sin, because the will chooses for itself to will evil in virtue of its sheer freedom and without any motive or explanation3 external to itself, though it would not be ex malitia in the sense that the sinning will would tend toward evil qua evil.
3 "motive or explanation": occasio.