III. Reply to the preliminary arguments
IS GOD ALONE IMMUTABLE?
than God is formally necessary. For everything else is mutable as a subject, except on account of negative imperfection, as is the case with an ultimate accident, which on account of its imperfection (if, say, it is a relation) is not mutable as a subject because it can't be the subject of anything; this is because it is imperfect negatively, that is, not capable of any perfection. But nothing other than God is immutable because of its perfection. For if there were any such thing, it would surely be the First Intelligence.
But the First Intelligence can change from one intellection to another. Proof: it can have an intellection of any intelligible, since even our intellect can have an intellection of any intelligible. But it cannot have a single intellection of all intelligibles, because if it did, it would be infinite, as I argued in distinction 2, question 1 [nn. 101,
125–9]. Nor is there a simultaneous infinity of all intelligibles, for if there were, an intellect that possessed all of them at once in actuality and distinctly would evidently be infinite. Therefore, the First Intelligence can have an intellection of one intelligible after another intelligible and after an intellection of another intelligible.17 Therefore, it is mutable.
III. Reply to the preliminary arguments 294 Reply to the arguments offered for the philosophers' view:
As for the argument that the First Cause changes if it is not related necessarily to the cause proximate to it [n. 223], I reply that a new effect can be brought about by an already-existing will without any change on the part of that will. For example, in virtue of my persistent (continuata) will to do such-and-such, I shall do it at the time at which I will to do it. And in the same way God willed in eternity that something other than himself should exist at such-and-such a time, and then he created that thing at the time at which he willed it to exist.
295 You might object, taking your cue from what Averroes says in Physics VIII com. 15, that in that case God will, at the very least, be awaiting the right time if he does not immediately bring about the existence of the effect when he wills its existence. Moreover, according to Averroes in that same passage, this introduces indeterminacy—contingency with respect to either of two possible outcomes—and what is indeterminate in this way cannot of itself issue forth into an act. Therefore, if in God there is this sort of contingency with respect to causing, he evidently cannot determine himself to causing.
297 I reply to the first [n. 295]: One who exists and wills in time either wills with an efficacious volition, without reference to a time for which he wills it, or else he wills that it exist at some definite time. If he wills in the first way, he would immediately bring about what he wills if his will is perfectly powerful. If he wills in the second way,
17 Σ alone reads (equivalently but far more elegantly), "Therefore, the First Intelligence, after an intellection of one intelligible, can understand another."
ORDINATIO I, D. , PART , Q. UN., NN. –, –, –
then even granting that his will were unqualifiedly powerful, he would nonetheless not straightaway bring about what he wills; rather, he would bring it about at the time at which he wills that it should exist. Therefore, he would await that time, since he is a being in time. But when we apply this analysis to God, we must remove the imperfections. His will, after all, is not powerless; nor does it have its being in time so as to have to await the time at which it will produce what it wills. So if God wills something such that he does not will it to exist necessarily when he wills, but instead wills that it exist at some determinate time, he of course does not await that time, since the activity of his will is not in time.
As for the second claim, about the indeterminacy of a cause that causes contingently
[n. 296], I have explained elsewhere18 about the two different kinds of indeterminacy: indeterminacy of a passive power and indeterminacy of an unlimited active power.
God's being undetermined with respect to causing exemplifies the second kind of indeterminacy, not the first. And this is not indeterminacy with respect to a plurality of disparate effects, to each of which it is determined naturally, in the way that the sun is related to the plurality of effects that it can bring about. No, God is undetermined with respect to contradictories, and it is in virtue of his freedom that he can be determined to either of those contradictories. Our own will is undetermined in this same way, as a consequence of its own power,19 with the indeterminacy of an active power to either of a pair of contradictories; and it can be determined by itself to this or that.
Suppose you ask why the divine will is determined to this contradictory rather than that. I reply: "It is characteristic of the improperly educated to seek causes and a demonstration for everything"—so says Aristotle in Metaphysics IV [1006a5–8]—
"for there is no demonstration of a principle of demonstration." That the will wills this is immediate, such that there is no intermediate cause between the will and what it wills, in the same way that heat heats is immediate (though the latter case is a matter of what is natural, whereas the former is a matter of freedom). Consequently, there is no cause of why the will wills this other than the fact that will is will, just as there is no cause of why heat heats other than the fact that heat is heat.
For there is no prior cause.
You might ask how there can be immediacy in such a case, given that there is contingency with respect to both [of the pair of contradictories]. I explained elsewhere, in the question on the subject of theology,20 that among contingents there is something first, which is immediate and yet contingent, since one does not terminate the explanatory regress with something necessary (for something contingent does not follow from something necessary). And so in the present context one must
18 Cf. Ordinatio I d. 3 n. 545 and d. 7 nn. 20–1.
19 "as a consequence of its own power" translates virtualiter.
20 Ordinatio prol. n. 169.
IS GOD ALONE IMMUTABLE?
terminate the explanatory regress with "God's will wills this," which is contingent and yet immediate, since there is no other cause conceptually prior to the will that explains why the will is of this and not of that. This makes it clear how we should think about Avicenna's claim that God's action is in him through his essence and is not in him accidentally:21 it is true that his willing is his essence, yet it goes forth contingently to this object or22 that, as will be explained later in the material on future contingents.23
301 Given these considerations, it is clear how to reply to the argument at the beginning
[n. 223]: God's necessity is compatible with the mutability of that to which he is related immediately. For that which is immediately from something immutable is mutable without any change on the part of what is immutable, since the relation of that immutable thing to what is proximate to it is contingent, and therefore the extreme of that relation is contingent and mutable even though the foundation is immutable.
21 Avicenna, Metaph. IX c. 4.
22 Reading vel for the edition's et (AV).
23 Scotus did not revise his discussion of future contingents for the Ordinatio; I have supplied the corresponding material from the Reportatio.
Ordinatio I, d. 17, part 1, qq. 1–2, nn. 55–67, 92–100 "Is a moral habit, as a virtue, in some way an active principle with respect to moral goodness in an act?"
We still need to go on to inquire about the accidental goodness of an act—moral goodness is a kind of accidental goodness—and about moral habits. Is a moral habit, as a virtue, in some way an active principle with respect to moral goodness in an act?
Arguments for the affirmative:
According to the Philosopher in Ethics II [1106a15–17], a virtue is "what perfects the one who possesses it and makes his act good." Now it does not make his act good qua passive principle, since a virtue is not a basis for receiving something; therefore, it makes his act good qua active principle.
Furthermore, a virtue is "a disposition of what is complete to what is best," as we read in Physics VII [246b23]. Now it is not a passive disposition, since (as was just argued) it is not a basis (ratio) for receiving anything; therefore, it is a disposition qua active principle. The argument is confirmed: "as good is to good, so is best to best."1 And since the best characteristic (ratio) is that of an active principle, it follows that it is as an active principle that a virtue perfects a power, and thus it perfects a power with respect to acting.
Furthermore, a virtue moderates passions. Now it does not moderate passions qua passive principle, since the object, being a natural cause, causes an act to the utmost of its power, and therefore to the fullest extent that it can, if it is not impeded by anything acting counter to it. Therefore, in impeding the object from acting to the full extent of its power in this way, it is qua active principle that a habit moderates a passion by restraining it.
1 Cf. Aristotle, Topics III.4, 117b33–6.