III. The divine will as first cause of contingency
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natural things from their causes. A third division—namely, something contingent by reason of its secondary cause but necessary by reason of the First Cause—is impossible, as I explained and proved above [n. 13]. A fourth division—namely, something that is contingent but not by reason of the First Cause or by reason of its secondary cause—is also impossible.
Having found the cause of contingency, we can say that things other [than God] are moved contingently both on their own part and on the part of the First Cause, of which they are contingent effects. Hence, contingency in us, that is, in the will, derives both from our will itself and from God, whereas in some other things there is necessity from the thing itself but contingency on God's part. But in all effects there is unqualified contingency with respect to the First Cause, on which all causes, both necessary and contingent, depend. By contrast, the necessity found in things and in all effects is not unqualified necessity, but only necessity in a certain respect. For some effects—all natural effects—are necessary in relation to their proximate causes; and there is no necessity at all, but only contingency, in all effects or things willed by us, as such.
III. The divine will as first cause of contingency A. Scotus's view
Now that we have seen how the divine will is the first cause of contingency, and consequently how our own will is a secondary cause, we need to see how the divine will can be the first cause of contingency in all effects, given that both the divine will itself and its effect are invariable.
My view is this. If we take whatever is a matter of perfection in our will with respect to its acts and eliminate whatever is a matter of imperfection, and then attribute the perfections characteristic of the human will to the divine will, the answer to the question at hand is clear straightaway. For our will is indifferent, and related contingently, to diverse acts, and through those diverse acts it is also indifferent to diverse objects and to a plurality of effects. The first indifference is a matter of imperfection, but the second is a matter of perfection and should therefore be ascribed to God.
Therefore, indifference to [a plurality of] effects is not the first indifference, because there is another indifference [namely, indifference to diverse objects] that is prior to it with respect to what is willed or not willed. Nor is indifference with respect to diverse acts the first indifference, because such indifference in a will is a receptive power with respect to acts, and similarly for an act that concerns only one object. So let us remove these matters of imperfection from the divine will, which is not indifferent to [diverse] acts through which it has to do with diverse objects—for
THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF CONTINGENCY
in us this [capacity for diverse acts] is a matter of imperfection. Instead, the act of the divine will is one and simple and indifferent to diverse objects. Nonetheless, it has its first act necessarily; but through that act it is related contingently to other things.5
Thus, the divine will, as formally actually willing, is not indifferent to opposite acts; rather, it is indifferent [to diverse objects] through one act, because that act is unlimited and infinite. Hence, it is on account of its unlimitedness that it can indifferently will a or not will a by a single simple act, whereas I [can will a and can not will a] by multiple acts, because in us willing and willing-against with respect to the same object are diverse acts.
39 There is another respect in which our will is like the divine will. There are two ways in which something can be understood to be a power for opposites: either it is a power for opposites simultaneously, at the same instant of time, or it is a power for opposites successively, at different moments.
40 A power for opposites successively—that is, a power for being changed from one thing to another, as we see clearly in the case of transmutations—exists only in mutable things. Our will is the other kind of power for opposites: it is related indifferently to each of a pair of opposites at a single instant—taken separately, of course, not together, because that would imply a contradiction.6
41 Proof that our will is such a power for opposites: it is obvious that our will is a power for opposites in the first sense, that is, a power for opposites successively.
42 Proof that our will is also a power for opposites in the second way, that is, to each of a pair of opposites at a single instant, taken separately: in the very instant in which a cause causes, it causes either necessarily or contingently. Hence, just as a being or an effect (when the effect is a being) is either necessary or contingent, so too the cause, when it causes, causes either necessarily or contingently. Now our will, in the instant in which it elicits willing, or (in other words) causes, wills contingently; and in that very instant in which it is the cause of that willing, it could will the opposite.
Otherwise, it would be causing necessarily in that instant.
43 This is the way in which there is a power for opposites in the divine will. For God cannot will anything otherwise than in eternity or (in other words) in a single instant of eternity; and through that one willing, in that one instant, he is contingently the cause of a. By way of analogy, if my will existed for only one instant of time, it would contingently elicit an act of willing in that instant—and it could attain merit [by so willing]—not because it existed in some prior instant, but because it freely and contingently elicits such an act of willing. So too in the case of the divine will, in 5 Alternatively, conjecturing obiectum for actum: "Nonetheless, it is related necessarily to its first object, but it is related contingently to other things through its first object."
6 That is, at the same time I have both the power to will a and the power not to will a; I do not have the power both to will a and not to will a at the same time.
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that instant of eternity in which it produces a, a can not exist; otherwise it would follow that when the divine will is the cause of a, a would exist necessarily.
But what is this power? I say that the power does not precede its act in terms of duration, for if it did, it would be mutable. Rather, the power is naturally prior to its contingent act. Therefore, naturally—not durationally—prior to its act, the will is compatible with the opposite of that act.
B. Objections to Scotus's view
Against this I raise the objection that "everything that is, when it is, necessarily is."7
Therefore, if, in that instant of eternity, God wills something, he wills it necessarily, because his willing exists when he wills. Therefore, etc.
Also, if in that instant he wills a and in that very same instant he can not will a, it follows that in one and the same instant—simultaneously, in other words—he can will two opposites, which is impossible.
Also, this power by which God can will exists either along with its act or prior to its act. If the power exists along with its act, then it is in God necessarily; therefore, in the very instant in which he can simultaneously will a and will-against a, according to you, he wills that opposites exist simultaneously, which is impossible. If, on the other hand, the power exists prior to its act, then it is possible for the act to follow the power in terms of duration; and consequently such a power cannot will something else—in other words, the opposite of what it in fact wills—in the very moment in which it precedes the act, contrary to what you claim.
Also, granted that the false alternative is impossible in that very same instant,8 it must be determinately true that that alternative maintained to be false in the time in which it is impossible is not in fact false in that instant. For the following should be taken as a rule: if it were false in that instant, then it is not possible, and therefore it should be denied; for it can become true only through some motion or change [and therefore is not possibly true in that instant].
C. Scotus's response to the objections
To the first objection [n. 45] I say that the proposition "everything that is, when it is, necessarily is" can be either categorical (or temporal) or hypothetical. If it is categorical, then the expression "when it is" does not qualify the whole statement but only "is." In that case, the sense of the proposition "everything that is, when it is, necessarily is" is "every being, when it is, is necessary or exists necessarily." If, on the other hand, it is hypothetical, then the expression "when it is" is a qualification that modifies the whole statement or predication, and the sense is this: "For every being,
7 Aristotle, De interpretatione c. 9 (19a22–4).
8 That is, granted that it is not possible for not-a to exist in the very instant in which God wills a.
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necessarily, when it exists, it exists."9 So if from this proposition you draw an inference applicable to the present issue, you are committing the fallacy of inferring an unqualified statement from a qualified one.
50 So the Philosopher did not intend this proposition to be understood as meaning
"everything that exists exists necessarily in the moment in which it exists." The qualification "when it exists" is a determination that takes away.10 For that reason, from the fact that a predicate is predicated of a subject with a determination that takes away, one cannot infer that the predicate is predicated of that subject without that determination, or in an unqualified sense; for it is not licit to infer an unqualified predication from a qualified one.11 Thus, this does not follow: "Necessarily, if a human being runs, an animal runs; therefore, necessarily, an animal runs."
51 As for the second objection [n. 46], to the claim that if the power is conjoined with the act, it can will opposites simultaneously, I say that when two items are in relation to some third item, it never follows that they both have that relation to it simultaneously unless they are compatible with each other in relation to that item. Otherwise, one could evidently infer [the possibility of] items taken jointly from [the possibility of] items taken separately.
52 For example, from "This body can be in this place, and likewise another body can be in that same place" it does not follow that "therefore, two bodies can be in the same place at the same time," for it is not possible for the two bodies to have that relation to the third item12 at the same time. Another example: when each of a number of items taken separately is within the scope of a power, it does not follow that they are within the scope of that power when taken together. For example, from "I can carry one stone at t and I can carry that other stone at t," it does not follow that "therefore, I can carry the two stones simultaneously."
53 Likewise in the present case: the inference from "I can will a at t and I can will-against a at t" to "therefore, I can will a and will-against a simultaneously" is not valid. For my power to will a is such that if I should so will, I cannot not will a; yet I can will
9 Translating word for word, this would be "Every being exists necessarily when it exists." But in English that formulation remains—at best—ambiguous between de re and de dicto modality; indeed, it is more naturally read as expressing a de re modality ("For all x, when x exists, x exists necessarily"), rather than the de dicto modality that Scotus intends to express ("For all x, necessarily, when x exists, x exists").
A "literal" translation would therefore be a mistranslation. Accordingly, I have translated this and subsequent modal expressions according to our contemporary conventions regarding the syntax of modal expressions, not according to Scotus's syntax.
10 For a discussion of determinations that "take away" (distrahere), see Walter Burley, Treatise on the Purity of the Art of Logic, The Shorter Treatise, Rule 9, 111, trans. Paul Vincent Spade (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2000), 25.
11 More literally, "from 'in a qualified sense' (secundum quid) it is not licit to infer 'in an unqualified sense' (simpliciter)."
12 That is, the relation of being present in to that place.