I. Reply to the second question
ORDINATIO II, DD. –, Q.
I. Reply to the second question A. Sin is formally a privation of good
Although the Master treats these questions as belonging to different distinctions, their answers are connected, and because of that connection they can be dealt with together in this way. And the first of them that needs to be answered is the second question, because the answer to that question plays a role in the others.
Now one could just stipulate what is meant by the word 'sin' without proving it, since before any question about something, one must first know what is meant by the word. Nonetheless, that sin is formally a privation of good is shown by the authorities cited for the affirmative [n. 14], as well as by an argument like this: an inferior agent is bound in acting to conform itself to a superior agent, since if it is in the inferior agent's power either to be conformed or not to be conformed to the superior agent, then not being conformed to the superior agent is a sin. For something is called a "sin" (whether we are speaking of sin against divine law or against human law) because the one sinning was able to conform to the law of a superior agent but did not conform.4 Therefore, this act that is in the power of the one who does not conform, and is therefore voluntary, is not formally sin; for if that act were in conformity with the superior rule, it would not be sin. So it is precisely the privation of such conformity that constitutes the sin in that act.
B. Of what good sin is formally the privation
From this we can infer, further, of what good sin is formally the privation.
1. THE VIEWS OF OTHERS
One view5 is that sin is the privation of the good of the one in whom the sin is present, because it harms him, as was argued [n. 13] on the basis of what Augustine says in City of God XII.6; another view6 is that sin is the privation of a supernatural good, namely grace; and a third view7 is that sin is a corruption of the acquired habits to which virtually evil acts are opposed, just as habits generated from formally evil acts are formally opposed to virtuous habits.
4 Reading discordavit with Q. The edition, along with nearly all the other manuscripts, has discordare.
On that reading, the sentence would conclude as follows: "because the one sinning was able to conform and not to conform to the law of a superior agent." Q obviously gives a better sense.
5 Alexander of Hales, ST II-II n. 15 in corp., n. 19 in corp., n. 21 in corp., n. 10 arg. 1 in opp.; William of Auxerre, Summa II tr. 11 c. 2 q. 2 a. 1 in corp., c. 3 q. 4 ad 6.
6 Thomas Aquinas, Sent. II d. 35 q. 1 a. 1 ad 3.
7 Bonaventure, Sent II. d. 35 a. 1 q. 1 in corp., ad 1 in opp., q. 2 in corp.
IS SIN PER SE A CORRUPTION OF GOOD?
2. REFUTATION OF THESE VIEWS
36 Four arguments against the first of these views:
First, since the good in which sin is present is finite, it could be totally destroyed by the subtraction of some finite good if it is subtracted often enough.
37 Now someone might say8 that parts of the same proportion are subtracted, so this can continue indefinitely. On the contrary: the second bad thing can be equal to the first in badness, or even worse; therefore, it corrupts a quantitatively equal or even greater part of the thing; so by continuing with equal or greater sins, it follows that in the end the nature will be totally destroyed.
38 Second, because an intellectual nature can be created only by God and consequently is unqualifiedly incorruptible with respect to any creature, so that no creature can destroy it, it follows that one who sins cannot through his act destroy anything of his own nature, since as far as incorruptibility is concerned, anything of his nature is of the same character as his nature as a whole, for something incorruptible is not composed of corruptibles.
39 Furthermore, what is formally incompatible with an effect does not destroy a nonnecessary cause of that effect. 'Sin' indicates formally a deformity or obliquity that is incompatible with rectitude in an act. Therefore, it does not destroy a non-necessary cause of this rectitude. (The will is not a necessary cause of rectitude, both because it does not cause its act necessarily, but only contingently, and because if it does cause an act, it does not necessarily cause it to be right.) Proof of the major premise of this argument: a contingent cause of something can exist and not cause; therefore, the cause need not be destroyed because of the non-existence of its effect. This is evident through the opposite, by analogy: something bringing about an alteration by inducing something repugnant to a quality corrupts the substantial form precisely because such a quality is a necessary concomitant of that substantial form. Therefore, what strictly corrupts a contingent concomitant cannot corrupt that of which it is a contingent concomitant.
40 Furthermore, [if sin were formally a privation of the good thing in which it is present,] sins would not differ in species, since they are privations of one good, and privations are distinguished in species only on the basis of the positive features of which they are privations.
41 Some of the same arguments prove that sin is not formally the privation or corruption of grace (though the first argument [n. 36] does not prove this), since grace is completely destroyed by the first mortal sin. But there is an additional consideration
8 It is not known who proposed this argument, which is considered by William of Auxerre (Summa II tr.
13 c. 4 q. 1 in corp.), Thomas Aquinas (De malo q. 2 a. 12 in corp.), and others.
ORDINATIO II, DD. –, Q.
that applies to this case in particular, namely that a subsequent sin would not be a sin, since it would not corrupt anything that sin is apt to corrupt, since there is no grace present to be corrupted.
The second argument [n. 38] applies here, because God alone creates grace and God alone conserves it; and when it is destroyed, it is annihilated—for if something's production is creation, its destruction is annihilation. The third argument [n. 39] also applies here, because grace is a contingent cause of rectitude in an act. And the fourth argument [n. 40] applies likewise, because all mortal sins would have the same formal character as privations.
Some of the same arguments [nn. 36, 39] also prove that sin is not formally the privation of justice or acquired virtue, since although it does not always remain incorruptible as a nature does and is not corrupted by a single mortal sin as grace is, nonetheless, mortal sin is not per se a privation of it, since it can coexist with mortal sin.
You might say that mortal sin cannot coexist with justice. On the contrary: justice can exist more intensely in one person who is sinning mortally than in another who is not sinning—say, if one person has justice in degree 9 and another has it in degree 10, and the one who has it in degree 10 sins mortally. Stipulate that the tenth degree is corrupted in him: then he still has justice equal to the one who did not sin mortally; therefore, if the other had sinned mortally by committing a similar sin, that sin would not have been incompatible with his justice in degree 9, and therefore it would not have corrupted it!
The third argument [n. 39] applies here, since any such habit is only a contingent cause of an act of sin.
3. SCOTUS'S ANSWER
I therefore concede, in keeping with the answer already set forth [n. 33], that sin is a corruption of rectitude in second act: not of natural rectitude or of any habitual rectitude, but of actual moral rectitude. But I do not mean the corruption that is a change from being to non-being, for sin can remain after justice goes from being to non-being, and it can also be present without any such change from being to non-being; rather, I mean corruption formally, in the way in which a privation is said to be formally a corruption of the corresponding positive feature.
For it is in this way that sin is defined formally as the corruption of rectitude in second act, because it is opposed to that rectitude as a privation is opposed to the corresponding positive feature: not indeed to rectitude that is present (for then two opposites would be present in the same thing at the same time) or to rectitude that was previously present in the act (since an act does not persist in such a way that it can undergo alteration from one opposite to the other), but to the rectitude that ought to be present.
IS SIN PER SE A CORRUPTION OF GOOD?
47 For a free will ought to elicit every act in conformity with a higher rule, that is, in accordance with divine command; and so when it acts in a way that does not conform with that rule, it lacks the actual justice that it ought to have—that is, the justice that ought to be present and is not. And this lack, insofar as it characterizes a deficient act of will (as will be explained in another answer [n. 125]), is formally actual sin.
48 This is evident from authorities:
The first is that of Augustine in On the Two Souls 11.15: "Sin is the will to retain or to pursue what justice forbids and from which the will is free to abstain." Put more concisely: sin is willing what is forbidden. Thus, the will itself is the material cause of sin (and the whole is imputed to the will just insofar as it is in the will's power), and what is forbidden or prohibited is the formal cause; it indicates the act's lack of harmony with the higher rule.
49 Similarly, Ambrose says in his book On Paradise (and this is cited in the text), "Sin is a transgression of heavenly commands," etc.9
50 What Augustine says in City of God XII.8 also agrees with this: "The will would not become evil if it were not willing to become evil, and therefore its voluntary defections receive just punishment. For it defects, not to evil things, but in a way that is evil in that it is contrary to the order of natures, from the one who supremely exists to that which exists in a lesser degree; and thereby" etc. (Look up the passage.)
He is in effect saying that what is formally sin is not this positive act of willing a creature, but rather the lack of the order that ought to be in the act, by which the creature ought to be loved for the sake of the supreme good. The will defects from this order by resting in a created good, and this defect is formally sin.
51 Reason agrees with these authorities, since every sin is formally injustice, and a particular sort of sin is a particular sort of injustice and consequently a privation of a particular sort of justice. Therefore, actual sin is formally actual injustice, and so a privation of actual justice, that is, of the justice that ought to be present in the act.
4. FOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT SIN AND THEIR ANSWERS
52 This answer [nn. 46–51] provides a clear basis for answering further questions about sin: first, whether turning away from God or turning toward a creature is more central to something's being a sin; second, how mortal sins could be distinguished in species if the formal notion of sin consists in turning away from God; and third, how one sin can be more serious than another if every sin is a turning away from the same good (for a pure privation evidently does not admit of more and less, according to Anselm, On the Virginal Conception, c. 24).10
9 Ambrose, De paradiso c. 8 n. 39; Peter Lombard, Sent. II d. 35 c. 1 n. 2.
10 A fourth question is raised and answered in n. 63.
ORDINATIO II, DD. –, Q.
a. The first question
To the first question I say that turning away from the ultimate end can be understood in two ways: formally and virtually.
One turns away formally either contrarily or negatively, such that the will either wills-against that end or does not will it when it ought to. Such willing-against is hating, whereas not willing is leaving the commandment "You shall love the Lord your God,"11 etc., unfulfilled.
One turns away virtually when something is necessary for attaining the ultimate end and the will, by turning away from that, is thereby virtually turned away from the end
(in much the same way that an intellect by denying a conclusion is virtually turned away from a principle).
Turning away formally, in and of itself, has the same character whether it is done contrarily or negatively. And it is not included formally in every sin: for hatred of God is a particular sin, and leaving the commandment "You shall love the Lord your
God," etc., unfulfilled is another particular sin.
Turning away virtually is common to every mortal sin, because in every such sin the will is related inordinately to something that is necessary for the end. From where does this necessity come? From the divine will commanding that it be observed "if you wish to enter into life,"12 not from any other practical syllogism. For in this context it does not behoove one to examine the moral teaching of the philosophers, but rather the commandments of God in Scripture.
This sort of turning away from God is the essential defining feature of every sin. For just as the formal feature of rectitude is an end's proper power13 in an act concerning something for the end, so also the lack of such rectitude is properly14 the lack of the power from the end, since proper formal turning away is from that which is necessary for15 the end. And thus turning away is nothing other than a lack of order on the part of the will regarding something ordered to the end by divine commandment, concerning which the will ought to be ordered. b. The second question
From this the answer to the second question becomes clear.
For since privations are distinguished in species on the basis of the distinction in species of their corresponding positive features, in the way in which distinction applies to privations and numbers, there are as many different species of lacks as there are different species of rectitudes that acts ought to have. And thus these sins are not distinguished on the basis of the objects toward which the sinner turns
11 Deuteronomy 6:5, Matthew 22:37.
12 Matthew 19:17–19.
13 Reading propria virtus (Q) for the edition's propria.
14 Reading proprie (Q) for the edition's propria.
15 Reading necessarium (Q) for the edition's proprium.
IS SIN PER SE A CORRUPTION OF GOOD?
(for those objects are only materially bad); rather, their formal character is distinguished by reference to rectitudes of different species that ought to exist in the acts.
60 And thus many sins of the same species can be present in a single act; these sins are privations of numerically many actual rectitudes16 that ought to be present in diverse successive acts. c. The third question
The answer to the third question is also clear: a sin that is opposed to a better rectitude is more serious according to its genus; and a rectitude that is closer to the end is better, other things being equal. This is clear from the analogy with principles and conclusions: an error that redounds more to the discredit of a principle, or that involves denying a conclusion that is truer and more proximate to a principle, is greater and falser.
62 But if we are talking about sins within the same genus of mortal sin, the greater the desire with which the will sins, the more serious the sin is, since the more effort one puts in, the more perfect is the act that one causes. And one is bound to give a proportionate rectitude to an act, if it is capable of rectitude—or if it is not capable of rectitude, to restrain oneself from that act more than from another act that is less repugnant to rectitude—and thus, by failing to do so, one sins more. An example of this is if an intellect that is in error concerning one conclusion has a more necessary object than another intellect that is in error concerning some other conclusion: the former error is worse precisely to the extent that the true act opposed to it ought to be more perfect. d. The fourth question
On this basis it is also readily apparent that if sins could be continued infinitely, nothing absurd would follow.17 For good would be corrupted infinitely, not in terms of the corruption that is transmutation, but formally, in terms of the corruption that is privation; and it would be a corruption, not of a good that was present, but of a good that should have been present. And if a will is conserved infinitely, it ought to have infinitely many goods or infinitely many upright acts, and so a will can be deprived of infinitely many such goods without the will itself, or anything pertaining to first act in the will, being diminished.
64 Someone might object to this approach and argue in favor of the other two approaches [n. 35], which hold that either nature or grace is corrupted. An argument18 in favor of the claim that sin corrupts nature is made on the basis of Luke
10:30, "they beat him." The Gloss says, "sin wounds in natural endowments," which 16 Reading rectitudines (Q) for the edition's aptitudines, "aptitudes."
17 Scotus here responds to a question not raised at n. 52 but asked explicitly in Lectura II dd. 34–7 n. 60:
"How can sins be multiplied to infinity without the nature being destroyed?"
18 Peter Lombard, Sent. II d. 25 c. 7 n. 1, d. 35 c. 4 n. 2.