II. Replies to the preliminary arguments
ORDINATIO IV, D. , QQ. –
II. Replies to the preliminary arguments
To the first preliminary argument [n. 3] I say that in God's case there is no equality in an unqualified sense except to himself, and so neither is there justice in God in an unqualified sense except to himself as if to another. But a certain sort of equality can be attributed to God: the sort of equality that there can be between a Master who is vastly greater than his servant and his much lesser servant.
To the second [n. 4] I say that the virtues are not in God in terms of whatever imperfection they involve, but rather with any aspect of imperfection removed. This is clear in the example given here, that of temperance. For temperance requires that the tempered nature have the capacity for some immoderate pleasure, and that is an aspect of imperfection. And for that very reason we could more properly ascribe justice to God than we could ascribe temperance, since justice does not require any excess of passion or any such imperfection inthe way that temperance does. Still, itis a matter of controversy whether justice as it is in God is a virtue according to this definition [cf. n. 24]: "it is formally distinct from the will and, as it were, the rule of the will, or at least it is the will itself under theaspectofthe first,self-determining rule." Ifitisnot, the argumentismore easily answered, because in that case justice is not in God as a moral virtue.
To the third argument [n. 5] I saythat God does not oweanything inanunqualified sense except to love his own goodness. But he owes something to creatures in virtue of his goodness, namely, that he communicate to them what their nature demands; this demand is identified as something just in them, as a secondary object of God's justice.
But in truth nothing outside God is determinately just except ina certainrespect: namely, with the qualification "as far as it concerns a creature." Only what is referred to the first justice, in that it is actually willed by the divine will, is just in an unqualified sense
Question 2: "Is there mercy in God?"
Thus we come to the second question. Arguments for the negative:
According to Damascene, Book II, c. 13,21 "mercy is compassion for another's misfortune."22 There is no compassion in God because there is no passion. Therefore, etc.
Also, one who is merciful is inclined to do away with unhappiness and have compassion for it; but God is not inclined in this way to do away with unhappiness, for although he could do away with all unhappiness, he does not do away with it all.23
On the contrary: In Psalm 102:8, "[The Lord is] patient and very merciful."
21 Damascene, De fide orth. c. 28 (II.14): "Mercy is sorrow for the misfortunes of others."
22 Throughout this question 'misfortune' translates malum, 'bad,' used substantivally.
23 Neither the edition nor the MSS have the 'not' in the final clause, but the sense clearly requires it.