II. Reply to the preliminary argument for the negative
ORDINATIO III, D. , Q. UN., NN. –, –, –
number of beatitudes is different from the number of gifts, that is because different species of the same seven virtues appear in the two lists and appear in different ways, not because they are different habits that are not species of these seven virtues.
And if one places such great weight on the fact that Scripture offers an eightfold list in one place and a sevenfold list in another that one absolutely has to distinguish them, why then should one not also affirm that the habits the Apostle mentions in 1
Corinthians 12:7–10—where he offers a ninefold list—are distinct habits? Why, then, don't we distinguish those habits from the ones listed in 2 Peter 1:5–7, beginning at "Add to your faith virtue"? Scripture frequently uses different words to express the same reality; in one place it leaves certain things out, and in another it explicitly states what was left out elsewhere.
II. Reply to the preliminary argument for the negative
In reply to the argument for the negative [n. 5], therefore, it is evident that even if the number is not the same, this is not because the lists include different habits, but because they include different numbers of intermediate species or of the most specific species contained under them, or because they leave out some of them. The things enumerated in the two lists are also the same, as I have explained.
Ordinatio III, d. 36, q. un.
"Are the moral virtues connected?"
1 Concerning distinction 36 I ask whether the moral virtues are connected.
2 Arguments for the negative:
Someone can be naturally inclined to acts of one virtue and not those of another because of his physical constitution:1 for example, someone might be constituted in such a way that he easily grows angry, but is not naturally inclined to acts of concupiscence. Accordingly, such a person can more easily devote his energy to [refraining from] the former acts rather than the latter; indeed, he can devote his energy exclusively to [refraining from] the acts to which he is inclined and not at all to [refraining from] the acts to which he is not inclined, and thus he will have a virtue that concerns the former acts but not one that concerns the acts to which he is not inclined.2
3 Second, however someone might be inclined, he can have occasion to devote his energy to the acts of one virtue and not those of another virtue. For example, a religious can have occasion to restrain passions but not to confront or endure the terrors of war; thus he will develop temperance without courage.
4 Third, suppose someone's reason is in error. Then his will can choose contrary to reason's judgment and yet choose rightly. Therefore, from many such choices a moral habit can be generated in his will, and yet prudence will not be generated in his intellect, because the intellect is not dictating rightly. And thus there can be moral virtue without prudence.
5 Fourth, conversely, suppose someone's intellect dictates rightly. Then his will can fail to choose what reason dictates, and instead choose the opposite. And in this way, as a 1 "because of his physical constitution" = secundum complexionem (PSZB). The edition follows A in reading secundum connexionem vel complexionem, which is mysterious. Q omits the phrase altogether; given the use of complexionatus ("constituted") in the next phrase, the omission is surely justified.
2 Q reads, "Accordingly, such a person can more easily devote his energy to [combating] the acts to which he is inclined than the acts to which he is not inclined, and thus he will have a virtue regarding the former but not the latter."