II. The first cause of contingency
THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF CONTINGENCY
II. The first cause of contingency 31 Taking it as given, therefore, that there is contingency in things, we turn to an investigation of the second topic: what is the primary basis of contingency? My view is that the primary basis of contingency is in the divine will, or in its act, in relation to things other than itself.
32 Proof: If the divine will acted of necessity in causing things other than itself, (1) there would be nothing contingent in the universe; also, (2) there would be no secondary cause in the universe; and (3) third, there would be nothing bad in things—all of which are absurd.
33 I prove (1) as follows: if something that moves insofar as it is moved, is moved necessarily, it moves necessarily. The First Cause moves necessarily (so you say), and no secondary cause moves except insofar as it is moved. Therefore, every secondary cause moves and causes necessarily.
34 (2) follows, because the First Cause moves and causes naturally prior to a secondary cause, so if it causes necessarily and perfectly in that prior instant, it follows that it cannot not produce the effect, and thus a secondary cause cannot cause anything in the subsequent instant unless one and the same thing is caused twice, which is unintelligible.
35 (3) also follows, because there is nothing bad in things except because of a lack of some due perfection that can be possessed either by the whole universe or by a particular being. So if God caused necessarily, then given that he is a supremely perfect agent and the First Agent, he would cause in each thing as much perfection as he could cause, and thus nothing would lack any perfection it could possibly have.
So since these conclusions are all false, it is clear that the divine will is related contingently to everything other than itself to which it is related immediately, and that the primary basis of contingency is found in the divine will. For if there were some other cause of contingency prior to the divine will, it would be the divine intellect; but the divine intellect can't be the primary basis of contingency, since the intellect and its act, as preceding the will and its act, is purely natural, and a contingent effect does not have its ultimate source in a purely natural cause
(nor does the converse hold). Therefore, the divine will is the primary basis of contingency.
36 But there are two ways in which something can be said to be contingent by reason of its cause. For example, an act of my will has a twofold cause of its contingency: one on the part of the divine will as First Cause, and another on the part of my will as secondary cause. Other things are contingent only by reason of the First Cause, and necessary insofar as they are from their secondary and proximate cause. Things that can be impeded by the divine will are like this: for example, the coming-about of