I. Reply to the question
IS EVERY LIE A SIN?
falsehood in deeds misrepresents what is in someone's mind more than falsehood in words. Now a lie or dissimulation in deeds is not always reckoned sinful, as is clear in David's deed in 1 Samuel [21:10–15]; he pretended to be mad before King Achish, though he was not. And Jehu in 2 Kings [10:18–28] pretended to worship Baal, when in fact he purposed to destroy the worshipers of Baal. And he is not reproached for this dissimulation; on the contrary, he is praised [2 Kings 10:30], because of his evident zeal for God against Baal.
7 In favor of the affirmative view is Augustine, frequently, in his book On Lying, and additional citations of Augustine are given in the text of the Sentences.
8 Furthermore, here is a proof that every lie is a mortal sin: it is contrary to the commandment and law of nature, "Do not do to another what you do not want done to yourself."2 For no one wants to be deceived by his neighbor when the neighbor ought to express to him what he is thinking. Therefore, no one should act otherwise toward another.
9 Furthermore, whatever is contrary to some necessary virtue or its act3 is a mortal sin.
And a lie fits this description, since a lie is contrary to truthfulness, which is a virtue contained under justice; for the truthful person shares with his neighbor what ought to be shared: the thought of his heart as it is. A liar, by contrast, does not share what he ought to share in speaking, but instead takes it away; for one speaks in order to express one's thought, whereas the liar does not express it, but states the opposite.
10 Furthermore, to lie is to misuse words. For as Plato says in the Timaeus [216b], words were instituted and imposed in order to be readily available indicators of one's will; but liars do not use words as indicators of their will, but of the opposite.
Therefore, etc.4
11 Furthermore, the authoritative passages from Augustine in the aforementioned books, cited in the text of the Sentences,5 evidently say this.
I. Reply to the question A. Lying is a sin 12 The view everyone holds on this question is that lying is a sin.6
2 Matthew 7:12, Tobit 4:16.
3 Reading contra aliquam virtutem necessariam vel eius actum (Q) for the edition's contra aliquam virtutem vel contra actum alicuius necessariae virtutis.
4 Richard Middleton, Sent. III d. 38 princ. 1 a. 1 in corp.
5 Peter Lombard, Sent. III d. 38 c. 2 n. 1, c. 5 n. 3.
6 Bonaventure, Sent. III d. 38 a. un. q. 2 in corp.; William of Auxerre, Summa III tr. 45 c. 2; Thomas
Aquinas, ST II-II q. 110 a. 3 in corp.; Peter of Tarentaise, Sent. III d. 38 q. un. a. 4 in corp.; Richard
Middleton, Sent. III d. 38 q. 2 in corp.; Henry of Ghent, Quodl. III q. 25 in corp.; and others.
ORDINATIO III, D. , Q. UN.
A persuasive argument for this conclusion is found in Augustine's reasoning in Against Lying:7 "It is foolish to believe someone who is permitted to lie." Now one ought to believe many people; otherwise, human social intercourse regarding the thoughts and affections of the mind will be destroyed. So those whom one ought to believe are not permitted to lie.
But different people offer different reasons for why this is so:
Some8 say that lying is necessarily a sin because it necessarily turns one away from God, who is truth, and a lie is contrary to truth.
But against this is the fact that a lie is not opposed immediately to the first Truth, but rather to the truth of some particular thing about which the liar is speaking.
So just as badness opposed to some particular created good does not necessarily turn someone away from the first uncreated Good, neither does falsity opposed to any truth unconnected with the first Truth [necessarily] turn someone away from the first Truth.9
Another approach10 is to say that an act is called good or bad in the genus of morals in virtue of its object, and the genus is taken from what is in potentiality, so the genus itself is in potentiality with respect to difference. Now the first difference by which an act is constituted in the genus of morals, so that it can be further determined by circumstances as by differences, is the object. For beyond the goodness of nature that an act has in virtue of its quiddity, the first feature that determines it so that it is quasi-potentially and materially moral is the object. In reference to our present concerns, it is said that an act that is bad in virtue of its genus can never be good, because no additional circumstance can remove the badness that the act has per se in virtue of its object, since every other circumstance presupposes the object. And lying is an act that is bad in virtue of its genus, because it issues forth on matter that is unsuitable to the act. For suitable matter for an act of speaking ought to be what is true or what is believed to be true;11 in a lie there is the opposite matter.
Against this:
What one believes to be entirely false is no more inappropriate or illicit matter for speech than a human being who is innocent and useful to the commonwealth is illicit
7 Actually On Lying 8.11.
8 William of Auxerre, Summa III tr. 45 c. 3 ad 3.
9 Reading nec falsitas opposita cuicumque veritati impertinenti primae Veritati avertit a prima Veritate
(with Q, except that Q mistakenly has virtuti for veritati). There is no sense to be made of the edition's nec falsitas—opposita cuilibet veritati (in particulari, primae Veritati)—avertit a prima Veritate; but drop the heavy-handed punctuation and primae Veritati (which does not appear in A), and the resulting text does not differ appreciably in meaning from mine: "neither does falsity opposed to some particular truth turn someone away from the first Truth."
10 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II q. 18 a. 2 in corp., a. 3 in corp., II-II q. 110 a. 1 in corp.
11 Punctuating debet esse verum vel creditum esse verum; in mendacio est materia opposita instead of the edition's debet esse 'verum' vel 'creditum', esse verum in mendacio est materia opposita.
IS EVERY LIE A SIN?
matter for killing. But with these conditions on the part of the matter (that is, the human being) remaining intact, it can become licit to kill such a human being, for example, if God revoked the commandment "You shall not kill"12 (as was said in the previous question [d. 37 n. 13])—and not merely licit, but meritorious, for example, if God commanded someone to kill, as he commanded Abraham concerning Isaac.13
Therefore, by topical reasoning from the similar or from the lesser,14 it can become licit to make an utterance believed to be false if the commandment not to deceive one's neighbor (a commandment that evidently exists) is revoked, since the commandment not to deceive is no more binding than the commandment not to kill. For it is less bad to take true opinion away from one's neighbor, or to be the occasion of generating false opinion in him, than to take away his bodily life. Indeed, there is scarcely a comparison.
18 This is confirmed, because if lying necessarily has badness because it issues forth on such matter, then lying is not forbidden by a precept of the second table, because the prohibitions in the second table exclusively concern things that are bad for one's neighbors; but according to you lying is not bad just because it harms one's neighbor, for if it were (as I have argued) it would be less bad than killing, and thus it would be possible for lying, like killing, to lack the character of evil—more possible for lying, in fact.15 Therefore, lying would be contrary to a commandment of the first table— which does not seem probable, since it does not turn one away from God immediately, just as the opposite act does not have God as its object immediately when one is speaking of some indifferent truth.
19 Furthermore, if someone uttering the sentence "He is running" were deceived and believed that it was true, that act of speaking would issue forth on the same matter as it would if he were not deceived and believed it was false. Now if he is deceived and believes that what he says is true, he does not sin. Therefore, there is no badness in that act in virtue of the object on which it issues forth.
20 According to a third approach,16 lying by its very definition implies a bad intention, since it implies the intention to deceive. So although some acts that do not include a bad intention can sometimes be good in virtue of some good circumstance, an act that includes a bad intention can never be good, because it formally includes a bad will; and such is the case here.
21 This can be expounded as meaning that although a positive act and its badness are not something per se one either in reality or conceptually, a name can be imposed that does not signify only the act or only its deformity, but both together.
12 Exodus 20:13.
13 Genesis 22:2.
14 See Peter of Spain, Tractatus tr. 5 nn. 32–3.
15 Reading immo possibilius (Q) for the edition's vel possibilius.
16 Bonaventure, Sent. III d. 38 a. un. q. 1 in corp., q. 2 in corp.
ORDINATIO III, D. , Q. UN.
For example, the name 'adultery' was imposed to signify not only the natural act of intercourse but also its deformity, the fact that it is intercourse with someone who belongs to another. And the name 'theft' was imposed not merely to signify the taking of a thing, but to signify the appropriation of someone else's property against his will and the will of any superior owner. Such wholes as are implied by such names cannot, it seems, be good, though the underlying act (for example, the act of sexual intercourse or of taking such a thing) can exist without such deformity. So in the present case, although the utterance of such-and-such words, with such-and-such a meaning,17 can exist without sin, the utterance of those words with knowledge that the opposite is true, and consequently with the intention to deceive, cannot exist without sin, because it includes the underlying act along with the circumstances that necessarily deform the act.18 The assumption is evident, since Christ uttered the words "I do not know him" and "I will be a liar like you,"19 but not by way of assertion; and a Greek could utter any Latin words whatsoever, however false, without sin.
B. What sort of sin a lie is
1. THE THREE SPECIES OF LIES
Second, we need to see what kind of sin a lie is. And although there are a number of different ways to distinguish lies, for our present purposes a three-fold distinction will suffice: the destructive lie, the serviceable lie, and the humorous lie.
A destructive lie is one that is intrinsically harmful, or actually does harm, to the person to whom or about whom I lie. And if it harms him with respect to the Christian religion, for example, as to faith or morals, then20 it is a mortal sin; but if it harms him by taking away his bodily life or marital fidelity or his offspring or other people connected with him in some way, or other temporal goods, then the lie is more or less serious in proportion to the harm done by taking away that good. And without exception every such lie told deliberately is a mortal sin,21 for it is prohibited without qualification by the commandment, "You shall not speak false testimony against your neighbor" [Exodus 20:16]. For testimony is not limited to what is given in court; it is whenever someone firmly and deliberately asserts something that he
17 quorumcumque significatorum, omitting (with BYQ) vel nonsignificatorum, which follows in the edition.
18 The edition, following A alone, adds "accompany or" (concomitantibus vel) before "deform" (deformantibus). But the circumstances in question do not necessarily accompany the underlying act—Scotus has just argued for that, and the point is obvious in any case—and the disjunction makes the whole phrase even more mysterious.
19 John 8:55: "If I say, 'I do not know him [sc. the Father],' I will be a liar like you."
20 Reading tunc for the edition's etc. (AS).
21 Reading Et universaliter omne tale mendacium ex deliberatione dictum est peccatum mortale for the edition's Et universaliter omne tale mendacium, quo ex deliberatione asseritur quod ignoratur vel cuius novit oppositum, est peccatum mortale (A, more or less).
IS EVERY LIE A SIN?
does not know to be true, or that is the opposite of what he knows to be true.
Therefore, anyone who, with the intention of deceiving someone to whom he speaks,22 says the opposite of what he knows to be true, and by speaking thus harms the person to whom he speaks or the one about whom he speaks, speaks false testimony against his neighbor. As for whether lack of deliberation excuses, that will be dealt with in the following question, on perjury.
24 A serviceable lie is one that is useful to someone and harms no one.
25 A humorous lie is telling stories that all the listeners know are not true and that are not told as true: for the listeners are not deceived and the speaker does not intend to deceive, nor is what he says intrinsically deceptive, since it is not the sort of thing that the listeners are apt to believe, but rather they recognize that it is said without any expectation that anyone will take it to be true. Similarly, it is a humorous lie when someone intends to deceive in a humorous way, such that the person is genuinely deceived but not seriously harmed in any way and those who know that he is deceived also find the humor in it. And finally, there can be a humorous lie of the sort Augustine ascribes to Joseph,23 who genuinely willed to deceive his brothers when he said "You are spies," etc. [n. 4], and yet he, who knew the truth, was able to find humor in their deception and in the fear that their false belief inspired; and the others who were in the know—and eventually the brothers themselves, when they realized that he had not been speaking seriously—were able to find the humor in it.
2. THE VIEWS OF OTHERS
26 The consensus view24 is that the latter two—serviceable and humorous lies—are not mortal sins in imperfect men,25 since neither is contrary to charity or contrary to anything that is of itself necessarily required for the status of those persons.
27 But some say26 that both are mortal sins in perfect men, because they undermine their authority and credibility and thereby cheapen their status; they also harm those who hear them because of the scandal.
28 An argument is given against this27: no circumstance brings it about that what is venial in one person is mortal in another, unless one person is necessarily obligated to something to which the other is not. Now a perfect person has not obligated himself
22 Following BQ in omitting vel de quo loquitur ("or the one about whom he speaks"), which makes sense when it appears later in the sentence but is clearly out of place here.
23 Augustine, Contra mendacium 10.24.
24 Augustine, Enarrat. in Psalmos ps. 5 n. 7; William of Auxerre, Summa III tr. 45 c. 2; Richard Fishacre,
Sent. III d. 38 q. 4 in corp., q. 9 in corp.; Alexander of Hales, ST II-II n. 402 in corp., III n. 390 in corp.;
Bonaventure, Sent. III d. 38 a. un. q. 4 in corp.; Thomas Aquinas, Sent. III d. 38 q. un. a. 4 ad 4, ST II-II q.
110 a. 4 ad 5; Richard Middleton, Sent. III d. 38 q. 3 in corp., q. 4 ad 3–4 in opp.; and others.
25 viris, oddly, not hominibus (as again in the next sentence).
26 Alexander of Hales, ST II-II n. 403 in corp.; Bonaventure, Sent. III d. 38 a. un. q. 4 in corp.
27 Thomas Aquinas, ST II-II q. 110 a. 4 ad 5.
ORDINATIO III, D. , Q. UN.
to uphold truth in his words by any vow or oath, any more than any other Christian has; therefore, because the person has no special obligation, the circumstance of the person does not convert a venial sin into a mortal sin.
3. SCOTUS'S VIEW
Here we can make a distinction: some perfect persons (such as prelates) are in a state of exercising perfection, others (such as religious) are in a state of acquiring perfection.28 a. Persons in the state of exercising perfection
Regarding those who are in a state of exercising perfection, it can be conceded that in carrying out the acts that pertain to them in virtue of such a state of perfection (such as teaching, judging, and preaching) both serviceable and humorous lies would be a mortal sin for them, because the authority and usefulness of the doctrine that they preach would be destroyed. As Augustine says in his three letters to Jerome, "If any lies, however humorous, were allowed into the holy Scriptures, nothing solid would remain in them."29 For example, if a prelate were to mix in a humorous lie in his preaching, nothing solid would remain in that teaching: for anyone could doubt anything he said, just as one could doubt anyone else, or on whatever grounds one would not assent to that humorous lie, one could on those grounds withhold assent from anything else he said. And in this way the doctors of the Church would lose all authority in their teaching, and its usefulness for their listeners would be destroyed. Much the same considerations hold for solemn judgment or solemn teaching. Here I'm thinking of a situation in which no one recognizes that the lie is separate from the act of judging or teaching—it is, after all, possible for someone sitting in judgment to mix in some jest that everyone can tell, from his way of speaking, is not part of his judgment.
But in fact it seems that a single humorous or serviceable lie would not undermine the authority of a judge or teacher, but only telling such lies repeatedly or making a habit of telling them. But then according to the juridical principle that "two acts establish a habit,"30 it follows that the second act is a mortal sin and the first one isn't, even though (evidently) the second act is exactly like the first in terms of all its circumstances.
Whatever might be the case for one or more such lies in teaching and judging, in other acts, at any rate, such lies would not be mortal sins for them except by reason of scandal.
28 Cf. Henry of Ghent, Quodl. II q. 14 in corp., VII q. 30 in corp.
29 Cf. Augustine, Epist. 28 ad Hieronymum 3.3–4, Epist. 40 ad Hieronymum 3.3, Epist. 82 ad Hieronymum 2.21.
30 Decretales Gregorii IX cum glossis I tit. 6 c. 34, gloss.
IS EVERY LIE A SIN?
b. Persons in the state of acquiring perfection
But we clearly have to say something different about someone who has the status of acquiring, rather than exercising, perfection, because such a person does not appear to be more obligated to acts of perfection than anyone else, except for those acts that he has vowed to undertake. For he has not undertaken the duty of pastoral care, and so neither has he undertaken to perform any act of pastoral care; so if such a person does not carry out a work of perfection such as teaching, preaching, or something else of that sort, he evidently is not sinning mortally in telling a serviceable or humorous lie any more than another
Christian would be, except perhaps on account of scandal, because the imperfect could be more scandalized by a lie told by such a person than by a lie told by just anyone.
34 But one cannot judge the quality of acts on the basis of scandal that does or does not result from them.31 For according to the Gospel law scandalizing the weak is to be avoided in all cases, as we read in Matthew [18:7]: "Woe to the one by whom the scandal comes." But there is no requirement to avoid things not intended as scandalous that nonetheless scandalized the Pharisees,32 as we learn from the Savior's words in Matthew [15:12–14]. When the disciples said that "the Pharisees were scandalized when they heard what you said," Christ replied, "Let them be; they are blind, and guides of the blind." So both acts that are indifferent in themselves, such as eating meat (about which the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 8:13, "If my brother will be scandalized, I will never eat meat again"), and acts that have some sort of venial badness but are apt to occasion or cause scandal to weak people who are present, should be avoided on account of scandal; but we cannot on this basis judge the quality that characterizes the act33 by its very nature.
35 So as far as the nature of a humorous or serviceable lie in cases of the second sort34 is concerned, it does not seem that such a person is obligated by his profession to avoid such a lie for any other reason, or with any greater strictness in the commandment, than any other Christian. Nonetheless, if right reason should dictate that a single act or repeated acts on his part would scandalize his hearers, when a similar act on someone else's part would not be scandalous, he is bound by charity toward his neighbor35 to avoid the scandal, in much the way that a pastor is sometimes bound
31 "does or does not result from them": reading consequente vel non consequente (Q) for the edition's concomitante vel non concomitante, "does or does not accompany them."
32 More literally: scandals not given to but received by the Pharisees.
33 Reading factum (all but AS) for the edition's peccatum ("sin"). Since Scotus is arguing that the act may well not be a sin, scandal or no, the edition is obviously wrong.
34 "in cases of the second sort" = in factis secundo modo dictis. The edition instructs us to understand this phrase as referring to acts where there is no accompanying scandal, but it seems more plausible to read it as referring to the potentially but not intrinsically scandalous acts described in the previous paragraph, performed by those in the state of acquiring (rather than exercising) perfection.
35 "charity toward his neighbor": reading caritate proximi with most MSS against the edition's caritate vel salute proximi.