I. Reply to the question
MUST A WILL ENJOY AN END APPREHENDED BY THE INTELLECT?
no power for willing what is for the end for the sake of the end. For a power that has an act concerning both extremes must be one, as the Philosopher argues in De anima
III [426b15–29] concerning the common sense's cognition.1
81 Note that this argument does not disprove all necessity of immutability,2 but only natural necessity. So let there be a more general argument proving the negative. In that case, some answer the first question3 in the affirmative,4 with Henry saying that the will is drawn to the end freely5 and others saying that it is drawn naturally;6 but they agree that it is drawn necessarily. So the arguments made here against the view discussed in the first section [nn. 91–133] apply equally to all of them, whereas this argument [n. 80] is directed in particular against the claim that the will is drawn to the end naturally, as is Augustine's argument in the Enchridion, found in Book II, d. 25 (look it up here in distinction 10).7
I. Reply to the question 82 This question can be understood as asking about (1) an end apprehended obscurely and universally, as we conceive happiness in the abstract; (2) an end apprehended obscurely and in particular, as we conceive happiness in the Triune God; (3) an end seen clearly in someone who has a supernaturally elevated will, as in someone who has a will perfected by a supernatural habit; or (4) an end seen clearly in someone who does not have a supernatural habit in the will, supposing that God by his absolute power should show himself to the intellect without giving any supernatural habit to the will.
A. The views of others 83 As for these four articles, it is said8 regarding the first article that the will necessarily enjoys the ultimate end when it is apprehended obscurely and universally. There are three arguments for this:
The first is based on the claim in Physics II [200a15–16] that "as a principle is in speculative matters, so is the end in matters of action." Now the intellect necessarily
1 Cf. Ordinatio I d. 10 q. un. n. 44.
2 Cf. Ordinatio I d. 10 q. un. nn. 23–4.
3 Namely, whether the will necessarily enjoys an end apprehended obscurely and universally: see n. 83.
4 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II q. 10 a. 2 in corp.; Henry of Ghent, Quodl. III q. 17 ad arg. princ.; Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. VI q. 7 in corp.
5 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. X q. 9 ad 1; XII q. 5 in corp. and ad arg. 2; cf. also Quodl. III q. 17 ad arg. princ.;
Summa a. 47 q. 5 in corp.; Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. VIII q. 16 in corp.
6 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II q. 10 a. 1 in corp.; Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. VI q. 8 in corp.; VIII q. 2 in corp.
7 Peter Lombard, Sent. II d. 25 c. 3–4; Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 10 q. un. n. 45; see also the present question, n. 150.
8 Thomas Aquinas, ST I q. 82 a. 1 in corp., I-II q. 10 a. 2 in corp.; Henry of Ghent, Quodl. III q. 17 ad arg. princ., XIII q. 9 in corp.; Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. VI q. 7 in corp.
ORDINATIO I, D. , PART , Q. (OMITTING NN. –)
assents to first principles in speculative matters. Therefore, the will necessarily assents to the ultimate end in matters of action.
Second, the same conclusion is proved by the fact that the will necessarily wills that on account of which it wills whatever it wills. Now it is on account of the ultimate end that the will wills whatever it wills.9 Therefore, etc. Proof of the minor premise: the will does not will anything other [than the ultimate good] except insofar as it is a good, and every other good is evidently a participation in the ultimate end, which is the supreme good—as is evidently proved from what Augustine says in On the Trinity VIII.3.4: "Take away this good and that good," etc., "and see, if you can, the good itself, the good of every good."
Third, the same conclusion is proved as follows: the will cannot fail to will something unless there is in it some deficiency of good or some aspect of evil; in the ultimate end apprehended universally there is no deficiency of good or aspect of evil; therefore, etc.
As for the second article, it is said10 that when an end is apprehended obscurely and in particular, the will can fail to enjoy it. This can be proved by the fact that someone can enjoy something that he knows is incompossible with such an end, as is clear in the case of someone who sins mortally.
As for the third article, it is said11 that the will necessarily enjoys the end when it is seen clearly. The reasoning is that given in the third argument concerning the first article [n. 85]: there is no aspect of evil, and also no deficiency of good, found in it.
And this is the case if one sees that end by way of practical vision, whatever might be true of speculative vision. And some12 make the additional point that there is such necessity in this connection [between vision and enjoyment] that God himself cannot, even by his absolute power, separate the practical vision of himself from enjoyment.
As for the fourth article, it is said13 that it is impossible for a will not elevated by charity to enjoy the end even when it is seen. For activity presupposes being, and therefore supernatural activity presupposes supernatural being. But a will that has not been elevated by charity does not have supernatural being, and therefore it cannot have a supernatural act.
9 Inthisand theprevious sentence, "on account of" translatesparticipatione(which explains "participation" two sentences later). It is impossible to render the two sentences using 'participation' while both respecting the logical form of Scotus's statements and producing intelligible English; but a paraphrase into a more modern logical idiom is possible: " . . . if, for all x such that the will wills x, the will wills x because x participates in y, the will necessarily wills y; for all x such that the will wills x, the will wills xbecause x participates in theultimate end; therefore, the will necessarily wills the ultimate end."
10 Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 22 q. 2 in corp.
11 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. XII q. 5 in corp.; Thomas Aquinas, ST I q. 82 a. 2 in corp.
12 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. XII q. 5 ad 1; Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. VI q. 9 in corp.
13 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. VI q. 9 in corp.; Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 49 q. 6 in corp.
MUST A WILL ENJOY AN END APPREHENDED BY THE INTELLECT?
89 Also, if a will not elevated by charity could enjoy the end, it could be happy. The consequent is false, since otherwise charity would not be necessary for the will's happiness. The inference is proved as follows: enjoying the end seen in particular evidently either is happiness or formally includes happiness.
90 Another way14 to argue for this conclusion is like this: if vision is posited, enjoyment is necessarily posited as well; and if vision is not posited, enjoyment is taken away.
Therefore, vision is the total cause of enjoyment; therefore, it is unqualifiedly nobler
[than enjoyment]. Proof of the first inference: otherwise all knowledge that is a per se cause of enjoyment is taken away, and without that, the will will not be able to do anything in itself. Proof of the second inference: a total equivocal cause is more perfect [that what it causes].
B. Refutation of their view 91 I argue against the first article. First, Augustine in Reconsiderations I.9.3 and 22.4 says that "nothing is so much in the power of the will as the will itself," and this claim has to be understood as referring to an elicited act.
92 Two conclusions follow from this: first, that an act of will is more in the will's power than any other act is; and second, that an act of will is in the will's power not merely mediately, but immediately.
From the first conclusion it follows further that an act of intellect concerning the end is in the will's power; therefore, so too is an act of the will.
From the second conclusion it follows further that if an act of the will is in the will's power mediately, through an act of some other power, it is a fortiori in the will's power immediately. Now it is in the will's power to will or not to will the end through the mediation of an act of intellect; therefore, it is in the will's power immediately [to will or not to will the end]. The minor premise is evident, since it is in the will's power to avert the intellect from thinking about the end; and when it has done so, the will will not will the end, since the will cannot have an act concerning something unknown.15
93 This argument against the first view [nn. 91–2] is confirmed, and this could be a second argument. That which, if not impeded, is necessitated to act, of necessity removes, if it can, that which prevents it from acting. If the will, when not impeded, is necessitated in virtue of its nature to will the ultimate end, it necessarily removes, if it can, everything that prevents that volition. Now not thinking about the end prevents this volition, and the will can remove this by making the intellect think continuously about the end.
Therefore, of necessity the will makes the intellect think continuously about the end. The major premise of this argument is evident, since that which is of itself
14 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. VI q. 9 in corp.
15 I omit the sentence that follows in the critical edition; it is omitted by most MSS.
ORDINATIO I, D. , PART , Q. (OMITTING NN. –)
necessitated to act is never prevented from acting except by some hindrance that overcomes its active power. This is clear in the case of something heavy: for such a thing is prevented from descending by some hindrance that overcomes its inclination, and by parity of reasoning it removes, if it can, the thing that is preventing its descent; once that is removed, the heavy body, no longer impeded, descends. For its removing the thing that hinders its effect is as necessary as its bringing about the effect that the other thing hinders.
One might object to this argument by saying that the will is not said to enjoy the end in an unqualifiedly necessary way, but rather by conditional necessity—that is, if the end is presented to it—and the major premise is said to be true of what acts in an unqualifiedly necessary way. I reply that this does not undermine the argument. For things that can be impeded do not act in an unqualifiedly necessary way, but only by conditional necessity—that is, if they are not impeded. And yet the major premise is true of things that can be impeded. That's why the major premise does not say
"Whatever acts necessarily, necessarily removes, if it can, what prevents it from acting," but rather, "Whatever acts necessarily unless it is impeded," etc. Thus the major premise is explicitly stated in terms of conditional necessity.
Alternatively, someone might object that the major premise is true of things that are equally necessitated both to what is ultimately (principaliter) intended and to those things that are necessary for what is ultimately intended. Merely natural agents are like that:16 in the whole sweep of their action, all the way to what is ultimately intended (ultimum intentum), they act purely out of natural necessity. The will, by contrast, is not related in the same way to the end as it is to any other being. In the end there is every goodness, and so the will is related to it necessarily; whereas in any other being there is a deficiency of good, and so the will is related to it contingently.
Against this objection I say that it is impossible for one extreme to be related to another by a certain sort of necessity and yet for some intermediate that is necessarily required between those extremes not to be related by the same sort of necessity. If that were possible, something necessary would depend necessarily on something non-necessary. Therefore, by whatever sort of necessity the will tends toward the end, it tends by that same sort of necessity toward the presentation of the end, for without that presentation it is impossible for the will to tend toward the end.
Third, one might object to the minor premise by saying that not-thinking about the end does not properly prevent the will from enjoyment. By way of response one could reframe the argument as follows. Whatever rests necessarily in something present to it, necessarily holds on to that present thing if it has the thing and can hold on to it.
The will (so you say) necessarily rests in the end when the end is made present to it.
Therefore, once the end has been made present to the will, the will necessarily holds
16 Reading cuiusmodi with a majority of the MSS for the edition's cuius.
MUST A WILL ENJOY AN END APPREHENDED BY THE INTELLECT?
on to it, so that the end is always present to the will. The major premise is proved inductively: if a heavy body necessarily rests in the center, it necessarily makes itself present to the center, and the center to itself, if it can, and it necessarily holds on to that presence so far as it has the power to do so. This is evident in the sensory appetite: if it necessarily rests in a pleasant thing that is present to it, it necessarily keeps the sense trained on that sensory object, so far as it has the power to do so, so that the object is present to it so that the appetite can take pleasure in it. The major premise is also proved by argument: the fact that a necessarily rests in b when b is present to a is a consequence of the fact that b is perfectly suited to a. On account of this very suitability, it seems equally necessary that a should desire to be joined with b so far as this joining is in its power, and such joining is a matter of b's being present to a.
97 An alternative response to the major premise of the first argument is that it is true of what is impeded properly speaking, that is, what is prevented from acting because of something else that overcomes its active power; but that is not the case here. Instead, there is another agent whose action is a precondition for the action of the will, and for that reason the cessation of that action is said, in an extended sense of the word, to impede the will from willing. Now in a case like this, the major premise is false. For even if an agent that presupposes another's action for its own action can move that other agent to act and acts necessarily (with conditional or concomitant necessity) when that previous agent acts, it does not necessarily move that previous agent to act, since it does not act in an unqualifiedly necessary way, as what is said to be impeded properly speaking would unqualifiedly necessarily act so far as it has the power to do so; rather, it acts by conditional necessity only, that is, it acts necessarily given the previous action. Take the example of a power that acts contingently and yet, given an act that generates a habit, it acts by concomitant necessity.
98 On the contrary: there is no necessity in acting except through something intrinsic to the active principle; that previous action is not something intrinsic to the active principle; therefore, there is, even apart from that previous action,17 necessity in acting, and thus there is absolute necessity in acting. Given that, we can argue as before: if there is unqualified necessity for acting, then there is unqualified necessity for bringing about that without which a thing cannot act, provided that it is in the thing's power; and in the present case, it is [in the will's power to bring it about that the intellect thinks about the end]; therefore, etc.
Confirmation: this is not a case of one action's being necessary for another, because one action is not the active power with respect to the other. Therefore, it is on account of the power's inclination to action. Therefore, the power is also necessarily inclined to the required intermediates, because there is no necessary connection between 17 Reading circumscripta illa with Σ against the edition's circumscripto illo, which would have to mean
"even apart from that intrinsic principle."
ORDINATIO I, D. , PART , Q. (OMITTING NN. –)
extremes unless there is also a necessary connection of all the intermediates required for the connection between the extremes.
A response to these arguments [n. 98] as well as to the main argument [n. 93]: this is a case of conditional necessity, that is, necessity given that something else is presupposed. And I concede that this is through something intrinsic to the principal agent and that the necessity applies to the intermediates just as it does to the extremes: but all of that is conditional, that is, presupposing the presentation of the object.
On the contrary: an agent that can be impeded does not act in an unqualifiedly necessary way; it acts necessarily only on the condition that it is not being impeded.
Nevertheless, it necessarily removes an impediment if it can. Therefore, that is the case here. And the first response [n. 97], which says that the will is not impeded properly speaking, does not work.
. . .
Against the second article [n. 86]. It seems that the arguments for the first article destroy the second article, since the argument that there is no deficiency of good and no badness [n. 85] is evidently just as efficacious for supporting the same conclusion regarding the end apprehended in its particularity—if not more efficacious, since the whole character of the end universally is apprehended in the ultimate end understood in its particularity. Indeed, it is only in the ultimate end apprehended in its particularity that the perfection of the end taken universally, and thus the fact that it has no deficiency of good and no badness, can be shown.
Similarly, the second argument for the first article, the one concerning participation
[n. 84], is more conclusive regarding the end apprehended in particular, since, given that created goods are goods by participation, they are more truly goods through participation in the ultimate end in particular than through participation in the ultimate end taken universally. For they participate in the ultimate end taken universally only because they participate in the ultimate end in particular, since what participates has that in which it participates as the cause or measure on which it essentially depends, and a real being does not depend on anything other than a real being and thus depends only on something singular.
Against the third article [n. 87]. When an elicitive principle does not elicit necessarily, what has that principle does not act necessarily. Nor does an elicitive principle that is in the same condition elicit necessarily at one time what it previously elicited contingently; therefore, the agent that has that principle will also not act necessarily.
Now a will that previously contingently elicited an act of enjoyment, and has the same charity now that it had then, does not now elicit that act necessarily, since there has been no change on the will's part. This is evident from the case of Paul's rapture.18
18 2 Corinthians 12:2–4.
MUST A WILL ENJOY AN END APPREHENDED BY THE INTELLECT?
If before his rapture he had charity equal to that which he had when he was caught up in that rapture, there was no change on the part of his will or of the elicitive principle, so there was no more necessity of eliciting such an act then than there was before. At any rate, there could have been equal charity in him both during his rapture and before it.
137 Alternatively, an argument should be made along the following lines: there can be no necessity in acting except in virtue of something intrinsic to an active principle; but there is nothing new intrinsic to the active principle in enjoyment in virtue of the fact that the intellect now sees an object; therefore, there is also no new necessity in acting.
Proof of the major premise: otherwise necessity in acting would not be in virtue of the character of the active principle, and so it would be either in virtue of nothing or in virtue of something extrinsic. And if it were in virtue of something extrinsic, the active principle could act in virtue of that extrinsic thing, since if there is necessity in acting in virtue of something, there is action in virtue of that thing.
The minor premise is evident: if, as he says,19 vision has nothing of the character of an active principle with respect to enjoyment, neither does the intellect or anything in the intellect. And if, as another approach has it,20 vision does have something of the character of an active principle, it is nonetheless a secondary, not a primary, active principle. On that latter view, the major principle should be taken as qualified in this way: "there is no necessity in acting except in virtue of something intrinsic to a primary active principle." For a secondary principle does not impose necessity on a primary principle or determine it to act, but rather the converse: a primary agent uses a secondary agent in its own right and according to its own mode [of acting]; thus, if nothing in the primary principle excludes contingency, the whole action will be contingent. The minor premise is thus straightforward: there is nothing intrinsic to the primary active principle in virtue of vision.21 Therefore, etc.
138 Also, either the end moves to this act or the power moves. If the end is what moves, it is evident that there is no necessity, since that end does not move necessarily to any created act. If the will is what moves, I argue as follows: a difference in a patient's approach to an agent does not cause necessity, but only a more intense act, as is evident in the case of something hot with respect to heatable things that approach it more or less closely. Now a difference in the presence of a cognized object—say, whether the object is seen or not seen—is evidently nothing other than, in effect, a difference in how closely what should be an object of an act of will approaches the will. Therefore, that does not make a difference with respect to necessity or nonnecessity; rather, it only makes the act more or less intense.
19 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. IX q. 5 in corp., XIII q. 11 in corp.
20 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II q. 9 a. 1 in corp. and ad 1, 2; Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. VI q. 7 in corp.
21 Reading visionem with a handful of MSS, as the sense requires, for the edition's fruitionem.
ORDINATIO I, D. , PART , Q. (OMITTING NN. –)
Also, the claim in this article [n. 87] that it is altogether impossible for there to be an act of vision without enjoyment does not appear to be true, since any distinct absolute natures are such that the essentially prior can, without contradiction, exist without the posterior. These acts, vision and enjoyment, are two absolute natures.
Therefore, vision, which is naturally prior, can, without contradiction, exist apart from what is posterior to it, namely, enjoyment.
One writer replies22 that the major premise is true of absolute natures in cases in which neither depends on the other and they do not both depend on a third, whereas in the case at hand both depend on a third as on an object that causes and moves.
On the contrary: if they do not both depend on a third that causes necessarily, or if that third does not necessarily cause one even though it does cause the other, then the major premise will still be true, because the prior will, without contradiction, be able to exist apart from the posterior. And it is evident that these two [i.e., vision and enjoyment] do not depend on a third that unqualifiedly necessarily causes them, or on a third that necessarily causes the posterior if it causes the prior. For any absolute that can not-necessarily cause an effect immediately can also not-necessarily cause that effect through an intermediate cause, even through a caused intermediate cause; for that caused intermediate cause does not necessitate the [first] cause to cause an absolute effect of that cause. Therefore, if it does not cause the posterior absolute necessarily, it does not cause it necessarily even given the prior cause, if there is such a cause.
An argument against the fourth article [n. 88]: that in virtue of which someone can unqualifiedly act is a power; therefore, if the will cannot have an act regarding the end, when seen, by its own natural capabilities, but it can when it has charity, then charity is either unqualifiedly the power of willing regarding that object or a part of the power of willing. Both of those are false.
Also, if a willable object that approaches the will less sufficiently23 can sufficiently terminate an act of the will, a fortiori that same object can do so if it approaches the will more perfectly.24 Therefore, if some good apprehended obscurely can be willed by a will that has not been elevated by a supernatural habit, a fortiori that same object seen clearly can be willed in some act by such a will. I therefore concede the conclusions of these arguments.
22 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. XII q. 5 ad 1.
23 Reading minus sufficienter approximatum voluntati with the majority of MSS against the edition's minus sufficienter approximatum vel praesentatum voluntati (D).
24 Reading si idem sit perfectius approximatum voluntati with the majority of MSS against the edition's si idem sit perfectius approximatum vel praesentatum voluntati (vel praesentatum appears only in two MSS, and as a correction in another hand).
MUST A WILL ENJOY AN END APPREHENDED BY THE INTELLECT?
C. Scotus's view 143 As for the first article [n. 82], I say that just as the will does not necessarily enjoy things that are for the end, so also it does not necessarily enjoy the end apprehended obscurely and universally.
144 As for the second article, I concede, along with the first view [n. 86], that the will does not necessarily enjoy the end seen obscurely and in particular; and there is no argument, nor should there be, against that conclusion, except for the fact that the arguments offered in the first article are equally conclusive against the second if they are sound [nn. 134–5]. I, however, do not regard them as unqualifiedly conclusive.
Still, how will someone who relies on those arguments in the first article defeat them in the second? And indeed their argument in the second article [n. 86] evidently contradicts the first article [n. 83].
145 As for the third article, I say that a will elevated [by charity] does not necessarily enjoy an end seen in this way, so far as it depends on the will itself.
146 As for the fourth article, I say that a will not elevated supernaturally [by charity] can enjoy that end.
D. Replies to the arguments of others 147 Replies to the arguments for the view:
To the first argument [n. 83] I say that that comparison would support many false conclusions, since it would support the conclusion that just as we assent necessarily to conclusions on account of principles, so also we assent necessarily to things that are for the end on account of the end, which is false. So I say that the comparison holds in two respects: (1) with respect to the order of things in both domains to each other and (2) with respect to the order of things in both domains to the powers that ordinately tend toward them. I understand the comparison in this way: the order among goods is like the order among truths, and the orderly way in which goods are to be willed is like the orderly way in which truths are to be cognized. But the comparison does not hold with respect to the order of necessity in each domain as related to the relevant powers, taken absolutely. For it need not be the case that the will preserves the same sort of order in its acts as willable things are apt to have by their very nature. Nor is assent the same sort of thing in both domains, since there is necessity in the intellect because of the evidentness of an object that necessarily causes assent in the intellect, whereas there is no goodness of an object that necessarily causes the assent of the will; rather, the will freely assents to any good, and thus assents to a greater good as freely as it assents to a lesser good.
148 To the second argument, about participation [n. 84], I say that the major premise is false, since there is nothing that the will wills necessarily, and so it need not be the case that it necessarily wills that on the basis of which it wills all other things,
ORDINATIO I, D. , PART , Q. (OMITTING NN. –)
assuming that there is such a thing. The minor premise—that the will wills whatever it wills in virtue of or on account of the ultimate end—is also false. For there are two ways of understanding the claim that the will wills something in virtue of or on account of something: either because that something is the efficient cause of the thing willed or virtually contains it, or because that something is the first object, and other things are willed because it is willed. If the claim is understood in the first way, then the minor premise taken together with the major premise is not relevant to the question at hand, since the efficient cause in virtue of which something is willed need not itself be willed, just as the efficient cause of what is seen need not itself be seen; for it need not be the case that I first see God with my bodily eye if I see color, which is a certain participation in God as efficient cause. If the claim is understood in the second way, as being about participation in the ultimate end as first willed object, then the minor premise is false; for it is not the case that whatever I will, I will it in virtue of willing God. For if that were the case, every act of will would be actual use, an act of referring the willed object to the first willed object.
One reply to the third argument25 [n. 85] is that although there is no deficiency of good and no badness in the ultimate end apprehended universally, and therefore perhaps the will could not will-against it, because the object of an act of willingagainst is what is bad or deficient, the will can nonetheless not will that perfect good, since it is in the will's power not only to will this way or that way but also to will or not to will, since the will has freedom with respect to acting or not acting. For if the will can, by commanding, move other powers to act—and not only to act this way or that but, determinately, to act or not act—it is evidently no less free with respect to the determination of its own act. And this can evidently be shown by appeal to Augustine in Reconsiderations I.8.3 and 22.4, where he claims that "nothing is so much in the power of the will as the will itself," which can be understood to be true only with regard to an elicited act.
It could, however, be said that the will itself commands or prevents the action of an inferior power through some elicited willing, but it cannot in the same way suspend all willing, since if it did, it would simultaneously be both not willing anything and willing something. But whatever might be the case with regard to the suspension of all willing, the will can at any rate suspend every act concerning a given object through some elicited willing. And in this way I now will-against eliciting any act concerning this object, however distinctly it is presented to me. And this willingagainst is an elicited act, a sort of reflexive act concerning the willing of that object: not an actual or past willing of that object, but a possible willing of that object. Even if that object is not presented in itself, it is presented in its cause, namely, in a presented object that is apt to be a principle of an act in some genus of principle.
25 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. VI q. 1 in corp.
MUST A WILL ENJOY AN END APPREHENDED BY THE INTELLECT?
151 Alternatively, one could say in reply to this third argument [nn. 85, 149] that it has not been proved that the will cannot will-against that good in which there is no aspect of evil or deficiency of goodness, just as it has not been proved that it cannot will that in which no aspect of goodness is found prior to that thing's terminating an act of willing (taking 'prior' as either "prior in fact" or "prior in apprehension"). Perhaps
I will discuss this elsewhere.26
152 To the authoritative passage from Augustine, On the Trinity XIII.3.6, arguing that all will to be happy, so all necessarily will the ultimate end in which happiness consists,
I say that he does not understand this in terms of actual volition. For he claims that the actor of whom he is speaking would have said something true of what all the spectators willed if he said to them all, "You all will to be happy." Now not all the spectators at that performance had at that time an actual desire for happiness, since they did not all have an actual cognition of happiness. Therefore, he is speaking of the habitual or aptitudinal volition by which the will is disposed in such a way that it is inclined straightaway to will happiness if happiness is actually presented to it by the intellect.
153 Likewise, the authority is not relevant to the question at hand. For granting that it is certain that all will happiness, this is not by an act of friendship in which they will well-being for the beatific good, but rather by an act of desire in which they will that good for themselves as a sufficient good. For it is not certain that inordinate wills have ordinate delight in the first good in itself; rather, all wills, ordinate or inordinate, have a will-of-desire for the good for themselves.27 Now an act of desire cannot be an act of enjoyment, since everyone who desires something, desires it for one whom he loves with friendship-love. Thus, an act of desire is not an act of enjoyment; only an act of friendship is an act of enjoyment. So even if Augustine is speaking of an act of willing happiness, he is not speaking of an act of friendship but of an act of desire; thus he is not speaking of enjoyment, and so this passage is not relevant to the question at hand.
154 To the argument for their fourth article, in which they argue that activity presupposes being [n. 88], I say that that act would not be supernatural, but natural, since the will can naturally elicit some act regarding an object no matter how it is presented by the intellect. And since that act does not exceed the scope of the power, neither does the object as it terminates an act of that power.
155 To the next claim, namely that in that case such a will could be happy [n. 89], I say no.
For as Augustine says in On the Trinity XIII.5.8, "One who is happy has everything he wills, and wills nothing bad." This definition should be understood as meaning
26 Cf. Ordinatio II d. 6 q. 2 n. 63, d. 43 q. un.
27 Reading habent voluntatem concupiscendi sibi bonum with the majority of MSS against the edition's habent concupiscentiam volendi seu voluntatem concupiscendi sibi bonum (ADV).