II. Replies to the preliminary arguments
WAS PLURAL MARRIAGE EVER LICIT?
her own right in exchanging and in receiving what is exchanged6 with respect to the secondary end in order to receive something equivalent with respect to the primary end—which each of them ought to desire more—even if that means giving up something in the exchange that it is disadvantageous to give up. And sometimes this is necessary in a given case, namely, when one is bound to give up such a thing.
And it is licit to carry this out, and one ought to do so when it is ordered by a superior. This is evident because Sarah in Genesis 16:1–4 more or less forced
Abraham to go in to Hagar, her handmaid, so that he might have by her the son that he could not have by Sarah.
20 You might object that in modern times this would be illicit plural marriage.7 I reply that even if it is illicit because the Lawgiver has not given such dispensation for the present time—indeed, Christ has restored the natural law, "They will be two in one flesh," in Matthew 19:5–6—nonetheless, if we are speaking of justice on the part of the contracting parties and on the part of the contract itself, the reason it is not licit now is that the primary end is not now urgent, since many believers engage in procreation, and their children are directed to the worship of God and are brought up religiously. And for that reason the faith is multiplied without any such contract.
So, given that there is no longer any need to detract from the secondary end because of the urgency of the primary end, the marriage contract ought to be carried out in such a way that justice is observed in terms of both ends; and this is done best when one husband has one wife.
21 Still, if because of war or disaster or plague a great many men died but many women remained alive, plural marriage could be licit now, having regard strictly to justice on the part of those making the exchange and the exchanges themselves, and indeed the women ought, for their part, to be willing to exchange more for less in terms of the secondary end but equal for equal in terms of the primary end; and in such a case a woman ought, according to right reason, to will that the good of offspring should come about through her husband's intercourse with another woman. And in such a case all that would be lacking would be the completion of justice, which derives from divine approval, which might perhaps be given and specially revealed to the church.
II. Replies to the preliminary arguments 22 Replies to the arguments:
To the first argument [n. 4] I say what I said in distinction 17 [n. 19]: there are two ways in which something is said to belong to the natural law. The first is that it is a 6 Reading in perceptione commutati (Q). The edition has percipiendo (A); ZN read recipiendo.
7 Reading esset bigamia illicita (ZNQ) for the edition's esset bigamia et illicitum (A).
ORDINATIO IV, D. , Q.
practical truth in an unqualified sense, known unqualifiedly by the light of natural reason. The highest level here is that of a practical principle known from its terms, and the next is that of a conclusion demonstrated from such principles. But a truth that is, as a rule, consonant with the natural law in the first sense belongs to the natural law in a secondary sense.
There is no dispensation from the first, and therefore an act opposed to such a truth is evidently always a mortal sin. There can be dispensation from the second in a case in which the opposite would seem to be generally consonant with the natural law.
Now monogamy belongs to the natural law, and plural marriage is contrary to the natural law, only in the second sense. Accordingly I concede the claims drawn from Genesis 2 and the Gloss on Genesis 4.
And yet it does not follow from this that the opposite cannot be licit in some case.
Indeed, in a certain case—when right reason dictates that the exchange should be made in another way, and when there is a divine commandment in force—it is necessary for justice as regards both the exchange and those making the exchange.8,9
Nevertheless, one can concede absolutely that Lamech sinned mortally, because he sinned against the natural law. And granting that it was against the natural law in the second sense, he sinned, I say, by having more than one wife when it was not a case in which right reason dictated that that law was to be revoked and the superior dispensed from the law, but in fact the opposite of both was true.
To the second argument [n. 5] I say that it was never just on the part of those making the exchange or on the part of the exchange itself10 for the parties to make the exchange in a way that is less efficacious for the primary end and more efficacious for the secondary end, since the more principal end ought to be willed more. Now polyandry would be more efficacious for the secondary end and far less efficacious for the primary end, since one woman cannot be impregnated by more than one man at the same time.
In reply to the argument for the affirmative [n. 6]: although we presume that certain holy patriarchs did not sin in contracting plural marriages, because both justifications
8 Reading et considerando iustitiam ex parte commutationis et commutantium (PZN) for the edition's et commutando iustitiam ex parte commutantium et commutationum (A).
9 The edition adds a paragraph found only in A:
I say that the authoritative passage "they will be two in one flesh" should be understood as follows: they will be one flesh by reason of the offspring that is generated from both parents; and thus having more than one wife is not contrary to the original institution of marriage.
Or it can be said, etc.
10 Reading numquam fuit iustitiae ex parte commutantium vel commutationis (Q) for the edition's numquam fuit—ex parte contractus—iustitia inter commutantes (A): "there was never justice on the part of the contract between those making the exchange." The difference is not perhaps great enough to warrant the adoption of a variant reading.
WAS PLURAL MARRIAGE EVER LICIT?
for doing so—the necessity on account of which such marriages were justly to be contracted, as well as the approval and command of the divine authority—obtained at that time, I don't find it untenable if some of them sinned mortally by contracting such marriages without one or both of those justifications, since I do not think that they were confirmed in goodness.
Ordinatio IV, d. 33, q. 3
"Was it licit under the Mosaic Law to divorce one's wife?"
Concerning divorce, I ask whether it was licit under the Mosaic Law for a man to divorce his wife.
Arguments for the affirmative:
Deuteronomy 24:1: "If a man takes a wife, and she does not find favor in his eyes on account of some indecency, he shall write her a bill of divorce and put it into her hands and dismiss her from his household."
Also, Malachi 2:16: "Since you hate" your wife, "dismiss" her, "says the Lord God of Israel."
Also, Decretals, "On the rules of law":1 "By whatsoever causes a thing comes into existence, by those same causes it is dissolved." Now marriage comes into being through mutual consent; therefore, it can be dissolved through mutual dissent.
Also, in distinction 34, Si quis uxorem:2 "If the wife of a married cleric commits adultery, he should dismiss her, having given her a bill of divorce." Therefore, divorcing one's wife is licit even under the Law of the Gospel.
Arguments for the negative:
Divorce is evidently contrary to the natural law that Adam promulgated in Genesis
2:24, "A man shall cleave to his wife," from which Christ draws the conclusion, "What therefore God has joined together, let not a human being separate."3
Also, the marriage contract is essentially an irrevocable relinquishment of power over one's body to another in exchange for power over the other's body; therefore, no temporary accommodation or relinquishment can be marriage. But if divorce were licit, there would be only a temporary relinquishment; for if the contract were in fact permanent, the divorced woman would remain a wife, and in that case she would be
1 Gregory IX, Decretales V tit. 41 'De regulis iuris' c. 1.
2 Gratian, Decretum pars 1 d. 34 c. 11.
3 Matthew 19:6.