Question 2: "Is a science called practical per se because it is ordered to praxis as its end?"
ORDINATIO PROLOGUE, PART , QQ. AND (OMITTING NN. –)
Also, this science was discovered once all the needs of life had been provided for, for the sake of avoiding ignorance, as is obvious from the fact that concern for such needs detracts from inquiry into this teaching. It follows that this science is speculative. For this is how Aristotle argues in Metaphysics I [982b19–25] that metaphysics is speculative.5
On the contrary:
Romans 13:10: "Love is the end of the law."
Also, Matthew 22:40: "On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets."
Also, Augustine, In Praise of Charity: "One who preserves charity in his behavior upholds all that is hidden, and all that is evident, in the divine words."6
Now these authorities prove that this science is not strictly for the sake of speculation. And a speculative science aims at nothing beyond speculation, according to Avicenna in Metaphysics I a. (Look up his commentary in that passage.)7
Question 2: "Is a science called practical per se because it is ordered to praxis as its end?"
The second question is whether a science is called practical per se because it is ordered to praxis as its end.
I argue that it is:
In De anima III [433a14–15] the Philosopher says, "The intellect becomes practical by extension, and it differs from the speculative because of its end."8
Also, Metaphysics I [982a14–16]: "A practical science is less noble than a speculative science because it is for the sake of use." This argument would not hold unless use were per se the end of this habit.
Also, Metaphysics II [993b20–1]: "The end of a speculative science is truth, whereas the end of a practical science is action."9
On the contrary:
In Metaphysics VI [1025b18–28] the Philosopher distinguishes practical sciences from speculative sciences on the basis of their objects, as is evident; for there he distinguishes practical science, both active and productive, from speculative science on the basis of its object and not on the basis of its end.
5 Cf. Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 1 q. 1 arg. 4 in opp.; a. 7 q. 10 in corp.
6 Augustine, Sermon 350, De caritate II n. 2.
7 Avicenna, Metaph. I c. 1. Cf. Richard Middleton, Sent. prol. q. 4 in corp.
8 Cf. Henry of Ghent, Quodl. VIII q. 1 in corp., Summa a. 36 q. 4 in corp.
9 Cf. Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. X q. 11 in corp.; Henry of Ghent, Quodl. VIII q. 1 in corp., Summa a. 8 q. 3 arg. 1; Richard Middleton, Sent. prol. q. 4 arg. 1 in opp.