II. Reply to the preliminary argument
WAS THE EVIL ANGEL ABLE TO DESIRE EQUALITY WITH GOD?
20 To the fourth argument [n. 8] it could be said that the will could will its own nonexistence consequently. For anyone who sins mortally wills something with respect to which he does not will to be subordinate to God, and thereby he wills his own nonexistence consequently, since he cannot exist without being subordinate to God.
21 As to the form of the argument, it can be said that in a case in which the consequent is not intrinsically included in the understanding of the antecedent, one need not will the consequent even if one wills the antecedent. For example, someone can desire episcopacy without willing priesthood.11 The argument for this is that knowledge of the consequent does not follow from knowledge of the antecedent unless one knows that the consequent follows from the antecedent; and in the same way, willing the consequent does not follow from willing the antecedent unless one wills the following of the consequent from the antecedent. For if one either does not know that the consequent follows from the antecedent or does not will this, one need not will the consequent just because one wills the antecedent. Now in the case at issue here, the consequent is not intrinsically included in the understanding of the antecedent; and even if it were, the relationship [between the antecedent and the consequent] would not automatically be known or willed. And thus the angel is able not to will the consequent.
22 To the argument from Anselm in De similitudinibus 6012 I reply that one is not able to will to be Peter ordinately, for a will is not ordinate in willing something and willing-against what necessarily follows from it, whether what follows from it is intrinsic to it or not. But that need not be true of an inordinate will.
II. Reply to the preliminary argument 23 To the preliminary argument [n. 2] I say that an intellect understanding something that is not the supreme truth to be the supreme truth can err: for example, in understanding a rock to be the supreme truth. But it does not err in understanding the rock in itself by simple intellection, or in understanding by relational intellection something that appropriately characterizes the rock. In the same way, the will does not err in willing the first good by a simple complacent volition, or in willing the first good for something to which that good is suited. But that good is suited to God alone, and so by willing it for anything other than God, by a relational volition, it errs.
11 Cf. Ordinatio I d. 1 n. 47.
12 The argument (from Alexander of Canterbury's De S. Anselmi similitudinibus c. 64) is not given earlier. The passage reads as follows: "Even if you will to be equal in glory to St Peter, you will be; I say 'in glory' because you will not be able to will to be Peter in your own person. For if you were to will that, you would be willing that you be nothing, which you will not be able to will."
Ordinatio II, d. 6, q. 2
"Was the angel's first sin formally pride?"
Second, I ask whether the angel's first sin was formally pride.
Arguments for the affirmative:
Augustine, City of God XIV.13: "The beginning of an evil will: what could it be, other than pride?" And he proves this by referring to Scripture, Ecclesiasticus 10:13:
"The beginning of all sin is pride." Likewise, in the same chapter: "We are taught in the sacred writings that it is the vice of self-exaltation in the devil that is damned above all else."
Furthermore, in 1 John 2:16 we read that "All that is in the world is either the lust of the eyes or the lust of the flesh [or the pride of life]." Now they did not sin by the lust of the eyes or the lust of the flesh; therefore, they sinned by the pride of life.1
Furthermore, there is an argument that proceeds by process of elimination. They could not have sinned initially through some willing-against; consequently, they could not have sinned initially through wrath or through avarice or something of that sort; the proof of the antecedent is that every willing-against presupposes a willing. Nor did they sin by any inordinate willing regarding temporal things, or by a sin of the flesh, because such things are not possible objects of desire for them. So by process of elimination, since the other possibilities have been ruled out, it follows that they sinned by the sin of pride.2
This is also evident from the passage in the Psalms [73:23], "The pride of those who hated you," etc. Now they sinned by one and only one sin (for otherwise their sin would have been curable), since they did not commit more than one sin at the same time, since the will (just like the intellect) cannot have two complete acts simultaneously.3 Therefore, if they committed more than one sin, they committed first one sin and then another—which means that at that second instant they were able to repent
1 Cf. Bonaventure, Sent. II d. 5 a. 1 q. 1 arg. 5, a. 2 q. 1 arg. 3.
2 Cf. Alexander of Hales, ST II-II n. 91 arg. in opp. and ad 2; Bonaventure, Sent. II d. 5 a 1 q. 1 arg. 5–6;
Thomas Aquinas, ST I q. 63 a. 2 ad 2; Richard Middleton, Sent. II d. 5 princ. 1 q. 1 in corp.
3 Cf. Bonaventure, Sent. II d. 5 a. 1 q. 1 in corp.
WAS THE ANGEL'S FIRST SIN FORMALLY PRIDE?
(and accordingly they sinned after the first instant), a conclusion that is generally regarded as untenable, since the standard view is that their sin was incurable.4
29 Arguments for the negative:
Their sin was the greatest sin, for it was incurable. But pride is not the greatest sin, as is clear from the fact that its opposite, humility, is not the greatest good:5 both because humility can be unformed, whereas charity cannot (and for that reason humility is less good),6 and also because in terms of the moral virtues, humility is a kind of temperance,7 and any sort of temperance is a less perfect virtue than friendship, which is the most perfect virtue under justice (Ethics VIII).8 Therefore, etc.
30 Furthermore, pride dwells in the irascible appetite.9 But no act of the irascible appetite can be first, since the job of the irascible appetite is to fight on behalf of the concupiscible appetite. That's why the passions of the irascible appetite arise from the passions of the concupiscible appetite.10
31 Furthermore, pride is evidently a desire for excellence, since as Augustine asks in City of God XIV.13, "What is pride but a desire for perverse loftiness?"11 Now excellence consists in a relation to those things that one excels. But the devil did not first desire something in relation to others; instead, he desired something in itself before he desired it in relation to another. Nothing is with respect to another but what it first is with respect to itself; and in the same way, no one desires anything with reference to another except because he first desires it for himself. Consequently, he first desired it12 for himself.
32 Moreover, it doesn't seem that the inferior demons desired a mastery that did not befit them, or that they consented to Lucifer's mastery, since it seems probable that 4 Cf. Alexander of Hales, ST II-II n. 75 in corp. and n. 99 in corp.; Bonaventure, Sent. II d. 6 a. 2 q. 2 arg.
4, d. 7 pars 1 a. 1 q. 1 arg. 5 and in corp.; Thomas Aquinas, Sent. II d. 7 q. 1 a. 2 in corp., ST I q. 64 a. 2 in corp.; Richard Middleton, Sent. II d. 7 princ. 2 q. 1 arg. 1 in opp. and in corp.
5 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST II-II q. 162 a. 6 arg. 2.
6 Cf. ibid. q. 23 a. 7 in corp. and a. 8 in corp., q. 161 a. 5 arg. in opp.
7 Cf. ibid. q. 161 a. 4 in corp.
8 See Nicomachean Ethics V.3, 1129b29–30; VIII.1, 1155a1–2; VIII.4, 1156b7–10. See also Ordinatio III d. 34 q. un. n. 59.
9 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST II-II q. 162 a. 3 arg. in opp. and in corp.
10 Cf. Richard Middleton, Sent. II d. 5 princ. 1 q. 1 arg. 1. On the passions of the irascible and concupiscible appetites, see Alexander of Hales, ST I-II n. 162; Thomas Aquinas, ST I q. 59 a. 4 and q. 82 a. 5, II-II q. 162 a. 3, De malo q. 8 a. 3.
11 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST II-II q. 162 a. 1 ad 2 and a. 2 in corp., De malo q. 8 a. 2 in corp.
12 What is "it"? The Latin is feminine, and the only feminine noun in the neighborhood is "excellence"
(excellentia), which is what the critical edition tells us is meant. But the whole drift of the argument seems to be that one can't desire excellence first, because excellence involves a comparison with something else.
One manuscript reads "this greatness"—supplying a different feminine noun, eminentia, which is a less obviously comparative word than excellentia. In any event, though the exact word choice may be in doubt, the general purport of the argument seems perfectly clear. Scotus's response will depend on disambiguating excellentia: see in particular n. 69.