III. Replies to the arguments for the negative
WAS THE ANGEL'S FIRST SIN FORMALLY PRIDE?
78 As for the claim that the angel's first sin was incurable [n. 28], I say that when the angel committed his second sin, he was still a wayfarer. Consequently, when he committed his second sin, he was able to repent of his first sin and, further, receive forgiveness and mercy; and thus the first sin was not of itself incurable. Yet because he persisted in that [first] sin to the end, all his sins became incurable. For any sinner's sin is incurable if the sinner persists in it to the end. (I will explain in the next distinction25 how this incurability derives entirely from God's law, according to which someone who persists in sin to the end does not receive grace.) I therefore deny the premise that there was only one sin in this case. Hence, the demon's badness began with his immoderate self-love, which was not the greatest sin, and reached its pinnacle in hatred of God, which is the greatest sin, since from this hatred of God it followed that he could not have the things he willed so long as God continued to exist. And so, as a result of this prior inordinate appetite, he was able to will that God not exist, and thus to hate God.
III. Replies to the arguments for the negative 79 To the first argument for the negative [n. 29] I say that the first sin was not the greatest sin. For just as in good things one proceeds from a greater good to a lesser good (for example, from love of the end one proceeds to love of things that are for the end), so, conversely, in bad things one proceeds from a lesser evil to a greater evil, as Augustine says at the end of City of God XIV: "love of self to the point of contempt for God."
80 The other two arguments—the one about passions of the irascible power in relation to passions of the concupiscible power [n. 30] and the one about the desire for excellence (taking 'excellence' in the sense that implies a comparison between the excellent person and others) [n. 31]—can be conceded. For in terms of the angel's act of desire, he did not first desire the excellence that is an irascible or concupiscible passion; rather, he desired supremely perfect happiness. But if we were speaking of his first inordinate friendship-willing, it can be said that that was not an irascible act or passion, but concupiscible: for if it is the role of the concupiscible power to desire
[concupiscere] a good for what one loves, it is also the role of the concupiscible power to love the good thing for which one desires that good.26
25 d. 7 nn. 51–4, 56, 60.
26 The edition, following ASV, adds a fragmentary response to an objection that does not even appear earlier (though it does appear in the parallel passage in the Lectura):
In reply to the passage from 1 Timothy 6:10, "The root of all sin," etc.
Ordinatio II, d. 7, q. un., nn. 28–39 The levels of goodness
Concerning the first topic I say that beyond the natural goodness of a volition, which characterizes it insofar as it is a positive being—which indeed characterizes every positive being according to the degree of its being: the more being, the more goodness; the less being, the less goodness—there is a threefold moral goodness, ordered hierarchically. The first of these is called generic goodness; the second can be called virtuous goodness or goodness from circumstances; and the third can be called meritorious goodness, gratuitous goodness, or goodness in virtue of divine acceptance as ordered to a reward.
The first of these characterizes a volition in virtue of the fact that it has an object that is suitable for that act according to a dictate of right reason, and not merely because it is naturally suitable for the act in the way that the sun is suitable for vision.
And this is the first moral goodness, which can be called generic goodness because it is in effect the matter with respect to all further goodness in the genus of morals. For an act that has an object is, as it were, formable by every other moral circumstance, and thus is in effect something potential: not completely outside the genus of morals, as that same act was in the genus of nature, but within the genus of morals, since it already has something of that genus, namely, an object suitable for the act.
The second goodness characterizes a volition in virtue of the fact that it is elicited by the will with all the circumstances that right reason dictates should characterize the act when the will elicits that volition. For as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names 4, what is good is "from a complete cause." And this is in effect specific moral goodness, since it includes all the moral differences that contract generic goodness.
The third goodness, which presupposes the first two, characterizes an act in virtue of the fact that it is elicited in conformity with the principle of merit, which is charity or grace, or (in other words) in accordance with the inclination of charity.
An example of the first is giving alms. An example of the second is giving alms from one's own resources to a poor person who is in need, and in the place in which it is most appropriate to give to him, and on account of love for God. An example of the third is doing this act not merely from natural inclination, as it could have been done
THE LEVELS OF GOODNESS
in the state of innocence (or possibly still could be done by a sinner, if someone in a state of sin and not repenting were to be moved by natural piety to relieve his neighbor), but from charity, by which the one who does such an act is a friend of God, insofar as God looks with favor on his act.
33 Now this threefold goodness is ordered in such a way that the first is presupposed by the second and not vice versa, and the second is presupposed by the third and not vice versa.
34 There is a threefold badness opposed to this threefold goodness. The first is generic badness, which is when an act that has only natural goodness, in virtue of which it ought to be located in the genus of morals, is bad because it has an unsuitable object: for example, if hating has God as its object. The second is badness in virtue of some circumstance that makes the act disordered even though the act has an object that is suitable to it according to right reason. The third is badness in demerit.
35 Now each of these badnesses can be taken as either contrary to or privative of the corresponding goodness. Taken as privative, it is merely a privation of that goodness, whereas taken contrarily, it indicates something beyond the mere lack of goodness that is incompatible with that goodness. This distinction is evident from Boethius's commentary on the Categories, in the chapter on quality, where he speaks about justice.1
36 But generic badness taken contrarily and generic badness taken privatively are equivalent: just as there is no intermediate between possession and privation, generic goodness and generic badness are immediate contraries. The reason is that there cannot be an act that has no object, and that object necessarily is either suitable or unsuitable for the act; and thus, necessarily, either an act is generically good in virtue of having a suitable object or generically bad in virtue of having an unsuitable object.
37 In the second sort of badness, badness taken privatively and badness taken contrarily are not equivalent. For an act can lack a circumstance required for the perfection of a virtuous act and yet not be elicited with a circumstance incompatible with such perfection, such as would render the act vicious. For example, suppose someone gives alms to a poor person but does not do so from the circumstance of the end (since he does not even think about the end) or according to the other circumstances that are required for a virtuous act. That act is not good or morally virtuous, but neither is it contrarily bad, since it is not ordered to an inappropriate end, as would be the case with someone who gave alms to a poor person for the sake of an empty reputation or for the sake of some other inappropriate end.
38 In the third sort of badness, badness taken contrarily and badness taken privatively are not equivalent, since an act can be privatively bad, in that it is not elicited from 1 Boethius, In Categ. Aristot. III c. 'De qualitate.'
ORDINATIO II, D. , Q. UN., NN. –
grace, and yet not be demeritorious. This is evident from the second sort of goodness and badness, since an act that is unqualifiedly good in the genus of morals is not [automatically] meritorious, and yet not every such act is demeritorious. And thus in both the second and the third sort of goodness one can affirm an indifferent act: one that is bad privatively but not contrarily, because it is indifferent. I will say more about this indifference elsewhere.2 Likewise, it is not only because an act is neutral with respect to the second goodness that it can be neutral with respect to the third
(that is, neither good nor bad, taking good and bad as contraries), but also because of the disposition of the agent. For example, if someone had acted rightly in the state of innocence, without grace, that act would indeed have been perfectly good in terms of the second sort of goodness but not good in terms of the third, since the agent did not have the principle of merit; but it would not have been contrarily bad.
Perhaps, though, in this present life no act is neutral between good and bad taken in the third way, except in one case: when an act is good from circumstances but charity does not incline the agent toward that act. And the reason is that in this life a given agent is either in a state of grace or in a state of sin. If he is in a state of grace and has an act that is good in the second way, then grace inclines him to that act and thus the act is meritorious; if he has an act that is bad in the second way, clearly the act is demeritorious. (For badness at the first level always implies badness at the second level, but not vice versa; and badness at the second level always implies badness at the third level, but not vice versa.) If, by contrast, the agent is in a state of sin and has an act that is bad in the second way, he sins by that act; if he has an act that is good in the second way, the act is neither good nor bad in the third way. Therefore, it is neutral, taking good and bad in the third way as contraries; it is not, however, neutral in the second way.
2 Ordinatio II d. 41 nn. 6–14.
Ordinatio II, dd. 34–7, q. 2
"Is sin per se a corruption of good?"
10 Concerning distinction 35, a closely related question is asked: is sin per se a corruption of good?1
11 For the negative:
Augustine, Against Faustus XXII.27, cited in the text of the Sentences:2 "A sin is something said, done, or desired contrary to the law of God." Each of these is positive
[, not privative]. Therefore, etc.
12 Furthermore, if a distinction in x is the basis for a distinction in sins, then x belongs per se to the notion of sin. And a distinction on the basis of something positive—for example, turning toward this sort or that sort of changeable good—is the basis for a distinction in sins; therefore, turning toward created good in general is itself turning toward sin in general.
13 Furthermore, I ask: of what good is sin the corruption? It is not the corruption of the good in which it exists, because an accident does not corrupt its subject, since it naturally presupposes its subject; and what naturally presupposes something does not corrupt it. It is not the corruption of some other good, because according to Augustine in City of God XII.6, evil "corrupts the good that it harms," and it harms only the one in whom it is; therefore, etc.
14 Augustine maintains the affirmative in commenting on John 1:3, "Without him nothing was made": "Sin is nothing."3 And Anselm explicitly sets out to prove this in On the Virginal Conception [5] and On the Fall of the Devil 16. Pay careful attention to what he says there.
1 Scotus raises five questions dealing with distinctions 34 through 37 taken as a unit. I have included the full text of question 2: the preliminary arguments (nn. 10–14), an examination of alternative answers to the question along with Scotus's own answer (nn. 33–66), and replies to the preliminary arguments
(nn. 67–70).
2 Peter Lombard, Sent. II d. 35 c. 1 n. 1.
3 Augustine, In Ioan. evangelium tr. 1 n. 13.