Other texts not included
xviii
INTRODUCTION
English, from "It seems to be the case (but isn't)" through "It seems to be the case (and indeed is)" to "It is obviously the case." For evidenter, then, I have had to make do with "manifestly." "Immediately" always represents immediate and has the sense "directly, without any intermediate"; statim, which indicates temporal rather than logical, causal, or epistemic immediacy, is always translated as "straightaway."
I translate rectus as "correct" and rectitudo as "correctness" whenever possible, though sometimes "right," "rightness," and even "rectitude" were unavoidable. No difference in meaning is intended (though likewise none is ruled out—how Scotus uses his terminology, and whether it has near analogues in the use of cognate words in present-day ethics, are large questions that I do not mean to pronounce on here).
Honestum is either "intrinsically worthy" or "honorable," depending on which characterization of the honestum is most prominent in a given passage. Nolle/nolitio is always
"will-against"/"willing-against" (with the hyphen), so that there can be no confusion with non velle, "not to will," "fail to will." It is particularly in such contexts that the distinction between "I can not φ" and "I cannot φ" is crucial, the former meaning "I am able not to φ, I can refrain from φ-ing" and the latter "I am unable to φ."
I have silently expanded Scotus's references, giving (for example) the verse in addition to the chapter when he cites Scriptural texts and section numbers in addition to book and chapter numbers when he cites Augustine. References to civil and canon law often conclude with the relevant paragraph's opening word(s), which I have left in Latin (the words are not typically significant in themselves, but only as a way to pinpoint a particular paragraph, and so an English translation would simply be mystifying).
Other texts not included Two texts not translated here deserve particular mention. I have not included a translation of Book II, d. 25, in which Scotus discusses the causal contributions of intellect and will to the act of choice. There is a critical edition of the Lectura version of this discussion, but Scotus did not revise that question for the Ordinatio. We know that Scotus changed his mind on this topic when he lectured on it again at Paris,13 and so the Oxford discussion is superseded by the Paris discussion; but (as I have noted) I am not confident enough in what we know about the Reportatio to venture on a translation of the Paris discussion here. It is interesting to note that the references to II, d. 25, that occur in the Ordinatio material translated here all seem to suggest Scotus's Oxford view rather than his Paris view—though, as it happens, only minor cosmetic changes would be required if all those references were to be either removed or else updated to reflect the changes in Scotus's teaching at Paris.
13 Dumont, "Did Scotus Change His Mind?"
INTRODUCTION
xix The situation is somewhat similar for Scotus's discussion of two questions in Book
IV: "Do all human beings will happiness supremely and necessarily?" and "Is everything that is desired, desired on account of happiness?" There is no Lectura on Book IV, and Scotus did not dictate those questions for Book IV of the Ordinatio.
We therefore have only the Reportatio text for these questions (IV, d. 49, qq. 8–9), and that text exists in two notably different manuscript traditions: Reportatio IV A (found in the Wadding edition) and Reportatio IV B (found in the Mair edition).
I find the A text to be much more philosophically competent than the B text—the reasoning is clearer, the writing is less elliptical, and the arguments are set forth more fully14—but in the absence of a critical edition and a definitive accounting of the manuscripts, I have chosen not to include these questions. Instead, I have provided the A text in English (the Latin is readily available) and the B text in both
Latin and English on my website (ethicascoti.com); anyone who takes the time to compare the A and B texts will agree, I think, that I was wise to leave this material out of this volume. Fortunately, the topics covered in those questions are fully discussed in other selections included here.
For reasons of space I have left out several interesting, but arguably less central, texts that I have translated for the website. Of particular interest are Scotus's discussion of hope in Ordinatio III, d. 26, q. un., "Is hope a theological virtue distinct from faith and charity?" and his analysis of the obligation to love our enemies in Ordinatio III, d. 30, q. un., "Must we love our enemies through charity?" I have also included sections omitted from questions translated only in part in this volume.
14 In his new edition of Reportatio IV (which at the time of this writing is complete through d. 17), Oleg
Bychkov likewise prefers A, for both textual and pragmatic reasons: "The reasons for choosing the 'A' version, or Rep. IV-A, are that this version was used for the Wadding-Vivès edition; that the Vatican edition of the Ordinatio refers to this version (as it was occasionally excerpted for inclusion in the Ordinatio); and that Allan Wolter used this version for his work" (The Report of the Paris Lecture:
Reportatio IV-A, ed. Oleg V. Bychkov and R. Trent Pomplun, 2 vols. [St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan
Institute, 2016], x–xi).
Questions on Aristotle's Metaphysics IX, q. 15
"Is the distinction Aristotle draws between rational and non-rational powers appropriate?"
Is the distinction that Aristotle draws between rational and non-rational powers— that rational powers are powers for opposites, whereas non-rational powers are for one of a pair of opposites1—appropriate?
Arguments that it is not:
First, that it is not correct as regards rational powers: something that has a power can do what the power is for; therefore, it could do opposite acts [simultaneously].
One might say, just as Aristotle appears to say in the text [Metaphysics IX.5, 1048a5–10, 21–4], that it does not have the power to do opposites at a given time, but rather that it has the power at a given time to do opposites.
But on the contrary: take the 'now' in which one opposite is present. I ask whether the other can be present in that very same 'now' or not. If it can, the conclusion has evidently been established: there are opposites at the same time. If it can't, it follows that this power in this 'now' is for only one of the pair of opposites.
Also, second: there is no power that cannot issue in some act. But since this power for opposites can't issue in opposite acts at the same time, it evidently cannot issue in any act at all unless it is determined, as is argued in the text in chapter 4 [Metaphysics
IX.5, 1048a5–10, 21–4]. But having been determined, it is clearly a power for only one of the opposites. Therefore, insofar as it is a power at all, it is evidently a power for only one of the opposites.
Also, third: it would then follow that the will could will the opposite of the end and could will evil under the aspect of evil, just as it can will their opposites. The 1 Metaphysics IX.2, 1046b2–6.