II. Replies to the preliminary arguments
ORDINATIO III, D. , Q. UN.
As for the Philosopher's ranking prudence higher [n. 47], I reply that prudence is in a certain way the rule of other virtues, to the extent that it, or its act, is prior in generation to the habit and act of moral virtue. And in virtue of this priority, moral acts and habits are conformed to prudence53 as something prior, rather than the other way around. This priority is evidently what supports the Philosopher's conclusion that prudence has the character of a rule and measure and, as such, has dignity; but it does not follow that prudence is unqualifiedly of greater dignity.
In reply to the third objection [n. 48] I concede that there can be virtue and habit on the part of the body, as is clear in the case of the hand of a writer and a painter. For my unpracticed hand lacks the skill for such an activity or for facility in playing the lute; but after practice, it has skill, and that has to be a skill that inheres in the hand. It is granted and conceded that such skill is a virtue, because it is a quality that confers skill for a work of moral virtue. The same point is conceded for something nonrational, such as a horse, that has developed skill for certain acts for which it has been trained. Such skill is not found in purely inanimate objects: a stone can't develop a facility for being thrown upward more easily.
II. Replies to the preliminary arguments
Replies to the preliminary arguments:
In response to all the authorities [nn. 2–5] I concede what they assume, namely that in the sensory appetite there is a certain quality that can be called a virtue, though it has the character of a virtue less completely than the quality that is in the will inclining it to choice.
In response to that last argument, the one about the irascible and concupiscible [n. 6],
I say that they are not only in the sensory appetite but also in the will. And as for your objection about difficult and pleasurable objects—whether those are the objects or not will be considered in the next question54—a distinction on the basis of those objects can be found in the will in just the same way as it is in the sensory appetite.
To a further argument, which contends that the will is adequately perfected by theological virtue,55 I reply that this is true concerning the divine good, but not concerning anything else, unless that is ordered in turn to loving God (so that no act is elicited by charity unless its ultimate object is God), though it may be so ordered through other intermediate objects. But I can not only ordinately will good for myself by willing ordinately that I will God, I can also ordinately will this particular good inasmuch as it has such-and-such goodness suitable for me according to its own
53 sibi: the edition comments "scil. virtuti morali," but this is surely a mistake.
54 Ord. III d. 34 nn. 38–49.
55 The argument to which Scotus responds here is missing from the beginning of this question but can be found in Lectura III d. 33 n. 6.
ARE THE MORAL VIRTUES IN THE WILL AS IN A SUBJECT?
nature. And willing this particular good in the latter way belongs to the will in virtue of a habit other than charity.
64 And if you should object that that habit will not be a ground for referring something to God, and therefore it will not be upright, because its act is evidently one of enjoying a created good, I reply that an inferior habit does not of itself have the act of a superior habit. Now charity, which is a superior habit, has the act56 of referring immediately to God; therefore, no other habit properly has this referring of itself, but only has from itself its own proper act of loving this particular good, which ought in turn to be referred to God through charity. And it does not follow from this that the inferior habit is bad, or that it is a principle of enjoying a created good, because even if it does not refer, negatively, the created good to what is to be enjoyed, it is not the case that it refers it contrarily, that is, repudiating its being referred to God. And enjoying
[a creature] includes more than simply not referring it, negatively; it includes the opposite of referring, which is using the creature contrarily, as was discussed in Book I, d. 1, "On enjoyment."57
65 In reply to the argument from the Politics about rule with absolute authority [n. 5], it is said58 that the Philosopher thought the condition of corrupt human nature was the condition of human nature as originally established.
66 But in fact this matter was treated differently in Book II.59 There I discussed how the inferior appetite was apt to have its own pleasure and how it could be moved harmoniously by the will, though in such a way that some virtue could be posited in each appetite—unless perhaps original justice gave the will more complete sway over the sensory appetite and the will could use the sensory appetite straightaway as its slave. (But even so, that would evidently not be enough to save the claim that the sensory appetite would experience pleasure, however complete the will's control, unless there were in the sensory appetite some habit inclining it to such a motion, just as I could generate in myself some moral virtue by willing that you choose rightly with respect to some passion.) 67 The one who takes this approach distinguishes between will as nature, will as free, and will as deliberative.60
68 He denies that will as nature has any virtue, because it tends naturally to the end and to every good that is presented to it in such a way that the end shines forth in it; on account of such determination, no virtue is required in the will as nature.
56 Reading actum with PSZBQ against the edition's habitum.
57 Ord. I d. 1 nn. 16, 66, 68, 180, 186; cf. II d. 41 nn. 10–11.
58 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. IV q. 22 in corp.
59 Ord. II d. 29 nn. 8–18.
60 The arguments that follow derive from Henry of Ghent, Quodl. IV q. 22.
ORDINATIO III, D. , Q. UN.
Nor is there any virtue in the will as free, because virtue inclines after the manner of nature, and the will as free is not apt to be moved naturally. For if it could be inclined naturally, then the will as free could be necessitated.
So there will be a moral habit in the will in the third way, as deliberative with respect to things that are for the end, and not with respect to the end itself.
He adds that virtue moves after the manner of nature, because it moves suddenly.
That's why, as the Philosopher says in Ethics III [1115a32–4], "Someone who is undaunted in the face of sudden danger appears courageous above all others."
Against this:
First, the will as nature elicits no act, as was explained in Book III, d. 15.61
Therefore, the will as nature does not tend toward any object—the end or anything else—through62 an elicited act, but only through a natural inclination, in the way that what is heavy is said to tend downward even if in fact it is resting up high.
Against the other two: one evidently includes the other, for the will as deliberative is free. For it is called deliberative either insofar as it commands deliberation or insofar as it chooses in light of prior deliberation, and both of these characterize the will as free, since it commands that deliberation freely and it chooses freely.63 And it follows from this that to deny virtue in the will as free and affirm virtue in the will as deliberative is a contradiction.
And the argument that virtue is not in the will as free, because if it were, the will could be necessitated [n. 69], fails. For a higher agent that has power over the act of a lower agent cannot be necessitated by the lower agent. And virtue—if it is an agent in any way—is a lower agent, as was discussed in the material on habit in Book I, distinction
17 [nn. 53, 66–7]. And it was also explained there how there is no contradiction between the will's acting freely and a habit's acting in the will after the manner of nature with respect to one and the same effect [I d. 17 nn. 28–30].
In just the same way one could also disprove the claim that there is no virtue in the will as deliberative, if it is true that virtue acts suddenly, forestalling deliberation
[n. 71]. For the will as deliberative evidently does not act suddenly or forestall deliberation.
But one should not rely on this, because the word 'suddenly' needs explanation. For in an absolute sense no one acts virtuously except on the basis of deliberation. For just as one does not act in a properly human way unless one acts with understanding,
61 Ord. III d. 15 nn. 48–50. Cf. II d. 6 nn. 55–7, d. 39 nn. 22–4.
62 Reading per with BQ against the edition's in (which would require "tend toward an elicited act," which cannot be correct).
63 Reading libere imperat illam deliberationem et libere eligit with Q against the edition's libere imperat electionem.
ARE THE MORAL VIRTUES IN THE WILL AS IN A SUBJECT?
so too, with regard to what is for the end, one does not act in a properly human way unless one understands that for the sake of which one acts: and that understanding is precisely deliberation. Hence, a virtuous person does not act suddenly and without deliberation in the way that (according to Physics II [199b26–31]) nature acts.
77 So what the Philosopher says [n. 71] should be understood as meaning that just as a virtuous person, when an object is presented, is inclined to choose rightly in virtue of an upright habit, so too he is ordered through prudence to make straightaway a correct dictate concerning what is to be chosen; he is so swift in forming his practical syllogism that he deliberates more or less imperceptibly. Someone else who lacks this perfection forms a practical syllogism with difficulty and with some lapse of time, because he does not possess habits in a perfect and practical way. And if nonetheless he does choose rightly, he is not said to act suddenly, but sluggishly; and the other, perfect person is said to act suddenly, because he seems to act suddenly by comparison with the imperfect person, because he acts in a more or less imperceptible amount of time.