I. Reply to the question
Ordinatio II, d. 6, q. 1
"Was the evil angel able to desire equality with God?"
1 Concerning distinction 6 I ask whether the bad angel was able to desire equality with God.
2 For the negative:
An intellect does not err in understanding the supreme truth; therefore, neither does a will sin in loving the supreme good. Therefore, one desiring equality with God would not sin. Therefore, an angel's first sinful act could not have been an act of desiring equality with God.
3 The Master argues for the affirmative in the text.1
I. Reply to the question A. The view of others 4 One view2 is that the angel could not desire equality with God.
5 There are evidently four arguments for this:
First,3 the angel did not sin from passion, obviously. Nor did he sin from ignorance, because before his fault there was no punishment. Therefore, he sinned from choice. But "there is no choice of what is impossible," as we read in Ethics III [1111b20–3], and it is impossible for an angel to be equal to God. Therefore, the angel did not sin by desiring equality with God.
6 Second,4 for an angel to be equal to God involves a contradiction. Therefore, it has no being of any kind. So it is not included in any way in the first object of the will, and therefore it cannot in any way be willed.
1 Peter Lombard, Sent. II d. 6 c. 1 n. 3.
2 Thomas Aquinas, Sent. II d. 5 q. 1 a. 2 in corp., De malo q. 16 a. 3 in corp., ST I q. 63 a. 3 in corp.
3 Thomas Aquinas, Sent. II d. 5 q. 1 a. 2 arg. 3 and in corp., De malo q. 16 a. 3 arg. 9, ST I q. 63 a. 3 arg. 3.
4 Thomas Aquinas, De malo q. 16 a. 3 arg. 7, Sent. II d. 5 q. 1 a. 2 arg. 2, ST I q. 63 a. 3 arg. 1.
ORDINATIO II, D. 6, Q. 1
Third,5 the will cannot will anything that has not first been understood. So an angel's being equal to God had to be understood first, or presented beforehand by the intellect. So it was presented either by an erring intellect, in which case there was punishment before any fault, or else by an intellect that was not erring, which is impossible, because an intellect that is not erring cannot present something that involves a contradiction.
Fourth,6 an angel's being equal to God involves the angel's not existing, because an angel can't be an angel without being inferior to God. And no one can desire his own non-existence, according to Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will III.6.63–8.84.
Therefore, no one inferior to God can desire equality with God.
B. Scotus's view
But since these arguments are not compelling, a different response to the question can be given, namely that the angel could desire equality with God.
A persuasive case can be made for this:
First, the will has a twofold act: an act of loving with friendship-love and an act of desiring something for the one loved. With regard to both acts it has the whole of being for its object; thus, just as someone can love any being with friendship-love, so too he can desire any being for the one loved. Therefore, the angel could love himself with friendship-love, and he could also desire for himself any desirable good; and so since equality with God is a good, one desirable in its own right, the angel could desire that good for himself.
Furthermore, if equality with God were possible for the angel, he could desire it for himself. That's quite clear. But its impossibility does not prevent the angel from being able to will it, because there can be willing of impossible things, according to the Philosopher in Ethics III [1111b22–3] and Damascene, chapter 38.7
This is also proved from the fact that the damned hate God, since, as the Psalm [73:23] says, "The pride of those who hated you goes up for ever." And someone who hates wills that the thing hated not exist, according to the Philosopher in Rhetoric II [1382a15]. Therefore, they will that God not exist. But this is altogether impossible in itself, and incompossible. Therefore, the impossibility of this object of desire does not mean that a sinning will cannot desire it.
Confirmation: a sinning will was able to will that God not exist and it was also able to will, along with this, that the grandeur8 and eminence of God be in someone; so he was able to will that it be in himself just as he was able to will that it be in someone else, and thus he was able to will God's eminence for himself.
5 Thomas Aquinas, Sent. II d. 5 q. 1 a. 2 in corp., De malo q. 16 a. 3 arg. 8.
6 Thomas Aquinas, Sent. II d. 5 q. 1 a. 2 in corp., ST I q. 63 a. 3 in corp., SCG III c. 109.
7 Damascene, De fide orthodoxa c. 36.
8 "grandeur": gradus, that is, degree (of being).
WAS THE EVIL ANGEL ABLE TO DESIRE EQUALITY WITH GOD?
C. Replies to the arguments for the view of others 14 Replies to the arguments for the first view:
To the first argument [n. 5] it can be said that 'choice' is used equivocally. It is used in one sense for an act of will that follows full apprehension on the part of the intellect. In this sense, we speak of "sinning from choice" when there is no passion disturbing the intellect and also no ignorance. It is used in another sense for an act of the will that follows the conclusion of a practical syllogism. Choice in this sense just is an efficacious volition of an object, a volition that is directed toward seeking some means by which the object can be attained. In the first sense there is choice of impossible things, as the Philosopher says in Ethics III that "there is will of impossible things"—and not merely an erring will, but a will that presupposes full apprehension on the part of the intellect. In the second sense there is no choice of impossible things, since no one makes practical syllogisms about impossible things. For a practical syllogism begins from the end and reaches a conclusion about what is for the end, so that the end may be attained through what is for the end, and no one ever engages in that sort of reasoning about something impossible.
15 Alternatively, one can put the point more straightforwardly. 'Choice' means either strictly "full acceptance" or "an efficacious volition that follows a practical syllogism."
Choice in the first sense can be of anything, presupposing perfect knowledge of the object. Choice in the second sense can be only of that which the will works to bring about so far as it is able, since it wills nothing efficaciously unless it arranges means by which it can be attained; and this sort of efficacious volition is never of something impossible. For no one deliberates about impossible things or commands the practical intellect to investigate means of attaining something impossible. And this is how we should understand the Philosopher's statement that "There is no choice of impossible things." The angels did not sin "from choice" in this second sense, that is, from an efficacious volition by which they willed to try to achieve their purpose by fighting against God's eminence and plundering it for themselves. They could, however, sin "from choice" in the sense that they sinned, not from ignorance,9 but from a perfect volition of equality with God.
16 One should use this distinction to answer the question [n. 1]: the angel was not able to desire equality with God by an efficacious volition, since that object is not presented as possible; but he was able to desire it by a simple volition (which extends even to impossible things), and in that simple volition there could be merit and demerit. The second set of arguments [nn. 10–13] is conclusive if this distinction is applied.
9 ex non surreptione: literally, "from not deceit." Surreptio is the noun from the verb translated
'plundering' above. As a legal term it meant misrepresentation or suppression of facts in order to gain something. I take it that sinning "from not surreption" means sinning from a position of not being under a misapprehension of the facts (including the fact that equality with God is impossible)—sinning, one might say, "clear-eyed."
ORDINATIO II, D. 6, Q. 1
To the second argument [n. 6] I say that there are two sorts of intellection: absolute and comparative. There is an absolute intellection only of a simple object that falls within the object of the intellect. There can be a comparative or relational intellection with respect to anything, no matter whether the comparison is possible or impossible; for the intellect composes not only possible propositions but also impossible ones. In the same way, there is absolute volition, and that is only of a simple object that falls within the first willable object. And there is also comparative volition, which can compare any simple willable thing to any other, even if that comparison involves a contradiction. This complex [that the angel be equal to God] cannot be willed as a matter of absolute volition, because that is not something simple that includes within itself the character of the will's first object; rather, it is a certain relationship of a simple object to another object. Both of those simple objects are willable in their own right, for both what the angel wills and the one for whom the angel wills it are willable in their own right. So the claim that this whole does not include within itself the character of the will's first object [n. 6] is false if you're speaking of the parts of the whole: for both parts, the what and the for whom, include within themselves in their own right the object of the will. And that is all that's needed for the will to [be able to] will one part as ordered to the other.
To the third argument [n. 7] I say that a simple intellect can apprehend equality with God without error, and this simple apprehension is all that's needed for the appetite to desire this apprehended object for another. For example, if an intellect apprehends whiteness and apprehends a crow, the will can will that whiteness be in the crow.
Now equality with God can be apprehended without error, since such equality exists in someone without error; for God the Son is equal to the Father, and he can be apprehended. For that matter, even if nothing were equal to God, equality could still be apprehended absolutely, and in that simple apprehension there is no error, no falsity. And yet that simple apprehension is all that's needed for a volition of that simple for any understood and loved object.
So then suppose you challenge this by asking, "Is this presented by an erring intellect or by one that is not erring?" I say, by one that is not erring, rather, by a simple intellect, which can neither err nor say something true. For those are characteristics of an intellect that composes and divides, and there is no need for an intellect to compose one thing with another, or divide one thing from another, before one desires10 something. Rather, all that's needed is for the will to compare this thing with that, since the will is a power that relates one thing to another, just as the intellect is; and consequently the will can relate the simples presented to it in whatever way [it sees fit], just as the intellect can.
10 Reading appetere (ASVBYOQ) for the edition's apprehendere.