I. Reply to the question
ORDINATIO I, D. , PART , Q.
Also, the intellect assents more firmly to a truth other than the first truth; therefore, by analogy, the will can assent more intensely to a good other than the first good.
Augustine speaks in favor of the affirmative in On Christian Teaching I.5.5: "The things that are to be enjoyed are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one thing." Therefore, etc.
I. Reply to the question
To answer this question I shall first distinguish between ordinate enjoyment and enjoyment taken generally. Second, I shall discuss the first object of ordinate enjoyment, and third, the object of enjoyment in general. Fourth, I shall explain in what way enjoyment should be understood to have to do with an end: whether with the truly ultimate end, as in the second article, or with an end that is not truly ultimate, as in the third article.
A. Article 1
Concerning the first topic, I say that enjoyment in general is more extensive than ordinate enjoyment, since whenever a given power is not determined of itself to an ordinate act, its act in general is more universal than its special, ordinate act. Now the will is not of itself determined to ordinate enjoyment, as is evident from the fact that there can be supreme perversity in the will, as when it uses things that ought to be enjoyed and enjoys things that ought to be used, according to Augustine in 83 Diverse
Questions, q. 30. Now ordinate enjoyment is the sort of enjoyment that is apt to be correct, namely, when it is ordered in accordance with the requisite circumstances, whereas there is enjoyment in general whether such enjoyment is characterized by those requisite circumstances or not.
B. Article 2
As for the second topic, it is evidently Avicenna's view that there can be ordinate enjoyment of something other than the ultimate end. This is proved from what he says in Metaphysics IX.4, where he holds that a higher intelligence causes a lower intelligence through its own act of understanding. But then it seems that what is produced is perfect whenitattainsitsproductiveprinciple,accordingtoProposition35ofProclus,whichsays that "any given thing is apt to be turned toward that from which it proceeds."2 Now in such a return the circle is evidentlycompleted, and thus perfectionis achieved. Therefore, the produced intelligence rests perfectly in the producing intelligence.
An argument against this: a power is brought to rest only when its object is found in the most perfect way and in the highest degree. Now the object ofthe enjoying power is being
2 Proclus (Lycius), Institutio theologica c. 34.
THE OBJECT OF ENJOYMENT
in general, according to Avicenna in Metaphysics I.6. Therefore, the enjoying power is broughttorestonlywherethereismostperfectbeing,andthusonlyinthesupremebeing.
11 This is confirmed by the similar case of matter with respect to form: matter does not come to rest except under a form that contains other forms; nonetheless, something intrinsic does not satisfy it in this way as an object.3
12 Also, a lower intelligence seeing a higher intelligence either sees that it is finite, or believes that it is infinite, or sees neither its finitude nor its infinity. If it believes that the higher intelligence is infinite, it is not made happy in it, because "one could say nothing more foolish than that the soul is happy through a false opinion," according to Augustine in City of God XI.4.2. Now if it sees neither its finitude nor its infinity, it doesn't see it perfectly, and thus it is not happy in this case either. If, however, it sees that it is finite, it can understand that there can be something that exceeds it. We experience in ourselves that we can desire a good greater than any finite good that is presented to us, or that we can desire, in preference to any given good, another good that is presented as a greater good; and consequently the will can love that greater good and thus it does not come to rest in that [finite] intelligence.
13 Others4 argue against this view [n. 9] in the following way: the soul is an image of God; therefore, it has a capacity for God and can participate in God, since according to Augustine in On the Trinity XIV.8.11, "the soul is an image of God in virtue of the fact that it has a capacity for God and can participate in God." Now whatever has a capacity for God cannot be satisfied by anything less than God. Therefore, etc.
But this argument does not work as a reply to philosophers, since the premise about the image of God is an object of faith only, and not something cognized by natural reason.5 For the character (ratio) of the image that we conceive is an object of faith only, and not something cognized naturally by reason; for the character of the image that we conceive is founded in the soul toward God as triune and therefore is not cognized naturally, since we do not naturally cognize the extreme toward which [the character of that image-relation] points.
14 Others6 raise the following objection to the argument for this view [n. 9]: the soul is created immediately by God; therefore, the soul rests and is brought to rest immediately in God.
But the antecedent of this argument is an object of faith only, and the philosophers would deny it: Avicenna himself posits that the soul is created immediately by the last
3 "in this way": meaning, in such a way as to bring it to rest. The editors add a note, "Cf. above, n. 4," but in fact this argument seems to continue an argument that the editors leave out, as a "text canceled by Duns
Scotus." The text would read better if n. 11 were omitted.
4 Bonaventure, Sent. I d. 1 a. 3 q. 1 ad 1; Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones disputatae de gratia q. 5 ad
13, q. 10 ad 3.
5 Cf. Scotus, Quodl. q. 14 nn. [21–22].
6 Thomas Aquinas, Quodl. X q. 8 in corp., ST I q. 12 a. 1 in corp.
ORDINATIO I, D. , PART , Q.
and lowest intelligence.7 Similarly, the inference is not valid here, any more than the similar argument given for Avicenna's view is valid: for it is accidental that the character of first efficient cause and the character of end coincide in the same thing, and it is not because something is a first efficient cause, but rather because it is a supremely perfect object, that a thing comes to rest in it. Otherwise our sensitive power—which, according to one view,8 is created by God—could not rest perfectly except in God. So in the present case the efficient cause and the end are the same because the efficient cause is the fully perfect object, not because the character of an efficient cause as such includes the character of an end or of what brings something to rest.
For that reason I hold the following conclusion as far as this article is concerned: ordinate enjoyment has only an ultimate end as its object. For just as only a first truth is such that the intellect should assent to it in its own right, so too only a first good is such that the will should assent to it in its own right.
C. Article 3
Concerning the third article I say that the object of enjoyment in general (abstracting from whether it is enjoyment of an ordinate or an inordinate end) is an ultimate end: either (a) a genuine end, that is, one that is an ultimate end in virtue of what it is, or (b) an apparent end, that is, an end that is presented by erring reason as an ultimate end, or (c) a selected (praestitutus) end, that is, one that the will, in virtue of its freedom, wills as an ultimate end.
The first two items on the list are evident enough. I prove the third as follows: just as it is in the will's power to will or not to will, so too the way in which it wills— whether it refers one thing to another or not—is in the will's power. Therefore, it is in the will's power to will a given good for its own sake, without referring it to any other good, and thus selecting that good as its end.
D. Article 4
Concerning the fourth article, I say that something's being an end is not the proper basis for its being an enjoyable object either in ordinate enjoyment or in enjoyment taken generally. In the case of ordinate enjoyment, this is evident for several reasons.
First, a relation is not included in the beatific object in its own right qua beatific object. Second, that relation is merely a relation of reason, as every relation of God to a creature is; and a relation of reason cannot be a per se object or the basis for something's being a per se object of enjoyment. And third, if (per impossibile) there were some supreme object to which the will was not ordered as to an end, that object would nonetheless bring the will to rest, and yet (ex hypothesi) it would not have the 7 Avicenna, De an. pars 5 c. 4, Metaph. IX c. 4, De intelligentiis c. 4.
8 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. III q. 6.